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Abstract
The research in this thesis examines the effect of different kinds of news on high 
frequency order flow, exchange rate returns and volatility.
The first chapter studies the impact of different aspects of central bank inter­
ventions (direction, size, frequency, timing), and news about these interventions, 
on exchange rate volatility. Briefly, we find that interventions decrease volatility 
contemporaneously but the effect is reversed in two hours. This effect is sym­
metric with respect to the direction of the intervention. The size and frequency 
of interventions are usually positively correlated with volatility. 9am and 2pm 
interventions have different effects on volatility, confirming that when the central 
bank chooses to intervene is important.
The second chapter examines the intra-daily influence of a broad set of news 
reports, including variables which are not typically considered “fundamentals” in 
the context of standard models of exchange rate determination, and asks whether 
they too help predict exchange rate behavior. We also examine whether “news” 
not only impacts exchange rates directly, but also influences exchange rates via 
order flow (signed trade volume). We find that along with the standard funda­
mentals, both non-fundamental news and order flow matter.
The last chapter examines intra-day foreign exchange market reactions to 
various types of intervention news (reported actual interventions, falsely reported 
interventions, oral interventions and unrequited interventions). Research has 
found that these operations can, under certain circumstances, effectively influence 
the level and volatility of exchange rates. Using Reuters’ time-stamped newswire 
reports we are able to match the timing of intervention news to movements in 
intra-day exchange rates. Overall, the results indicate that along with actual 
interventions, other kinds of intervention news (including denials of intervention
and unrequited interventions) and order flow matter.
The results from these studies suggest that future models of exchange rate 
determination ought to include a broader concept of price relevant “news” .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 News, Order Flow, Exchange Rate Returns 
and Volatility
1.1.1 Standard Exchange R ate M odels
The asset approach to exchange rate determination treats exchange rates as for­
ward looking asset prices which react to changes in the markets expectation of 
future fundamentals. This approach assumes that all information is public, that 
the mapping from information to price is common knowledge and that informa­
tion is absorbed into prices instantaneously, leaving no role for the trading process 
in price determination.
Empirical tests of the asset approach examine whether changes in macroeco­
nomic variables (fundamentals) explain exchange rate movements1. These tests, 
especially those that use low frequency data, generally find that macroeconomic 
variables can explain little of the variation in exchange rate movements. This line
1 Examples of “fundamentals” include: income (or output) differentials, money differentials, 
interest rate differentials, inflation differentials and the trade balance.
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of research is best summarized by a series of papers, Meese and Rogoff (1983a,b), 
which find that forecasts of exchange rates based on a random walk model of 
exchange rate determination do better than forecasts that are based on macroe­
conomic models. The random walk model out-performs structural macro models 
even for conditional out-of-sample forecasts using realized values of the funda­
mentals. One branch of empirical research (exemplified by Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold, and Vega (2003)) has focused on the possibility that this result is more 
a function of estimation imprecision than an indictment of the asset approach. If 
the window of time around the shock to fundamentals is too wide, other news hit­
ting the market will confound the econometrician’s ability to precisely estimate 
the effects of the change in fundamentals on exchange rates. One solution is to use 
intra-daily exchange rate data that will allow a narrow enough window around 
the time of macro announcements to be able to set up a natural experiment2.
1.1.2 M icrostructure Approach and Order Flow
There are a number of caveats to the asset approach to exchange rate determi­
nation. Not all information is public. In fact, information is often privately held 
by widely dispersed market participants, making them heterogeneously informed. 
Further, even if information across market participants was homogeneous, traders 
may not have the same pricing function linking information and prices, and hence 
may interpret the same information differently. And finally, information may not 
be absorbed into prices instantaneously, suggesting that the mechanics of the 
trading process may be relevant for exchange rate determination.
Microstructure models of asset pricing aim to take these factors into account. 
In Kyle (1985), the seminal paper in the field, informed traders act strategically,
2This research is discussed further in section 1.1.3.
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choosing to trade in periods of high liquidity to hide, and hence maximize the 
value of, their private information. The process of information revelation takes 
place gradually via order flow, and this private information will eventually be­
come known and be reflected in price. Within the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
framework, in each round of trading the market maker updates his prior on the 
asset value based on the order flow he observes. Good news results in an excess 
of buy orders and bad news in an excess of sell orders. Thus the trading process 
facilitates the incorporation of information into prices. There are a number of 
papers in the microstructure literature that underscore the importance of order 
flow and the trading process in price discovery3. This is contrary to standard 
models of exchange rate determination in which there is no role for order flow, 
since trading occurs only at the equilibrium price which already incorporates all 
information. Order flow (signed trading volume) is defined as the net of buyer- 
initiated and seller-initiated orders. In standard models there is no reason for 
order flow to rise in reaction to news because price is assumed to instantaneously 
adjust. Trading volume may rise in reaction to news, but as long as the new 
price is efficient, there is no reason for trades to be biased in favor of purchases 
or sales.
Evans and Lyons (2002) is one of the first empirical studies that found a 
link between order flow and exchange rate movements, thus providing evidence 
in favor of a different modeling strategy for exchange rate determination4. It is 
now an established fact that order flow has a significant impact on exchange rate 
returns, explaining between 40% to 60% of the variation in returns.
3Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Easley and O’Hara (1987).
4Other papers that find similar results include Rime (2000), Danielsson, Payne, and Luo
(2002), Payne and Vitale (2003), Payne (2003).
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1.1.3 W hat Drives Order Flow and Returns?
We know that empirically order flow explains exchange rate returns and that 
theoretically order flow reflects information. The interesting question now facing 
researchers, on which there is no consensus, is - what drives order flow? Does 
order flow reflect public information? Does it reflect private information? And 
even more fundamentally, what is this information that underlies order flow, 
which in turn drives returns?
One source of information in foreign exchange markets comes from central 
bank intervention operations. Within the signalling model of central bank in­
tervention popularised by Mussa (1981), agents interpret interventions as sig­
nals of future monetary policy which, in turn, influence expected exchange rate 
movement. For the signalling channel of intervention to work, transparency of 
interventions and the credibility of the central bank are crucial. Access to dis­
aggregated and time-stamped data on central bank interventions has made it 
possible to test the signalling hypothesis within the market microstructure ap­
proach. In this framework central banks are viewed as informed players with 
private information on the asset value and interventions are expected to affect 
the price (exchange rate) since they reveal this information to the market5.
Addressing another aspect of the information, order flow, exchange rate re­
turns and volatility relationship, researchers have used high frequency exchange 
rate data and timed “macro surprises” to test the impact of public information 
about macroeconomic variables on exchange rate returns. This approach is best 
exemplified by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003), who find that
5Goodhart and Hesse (1993), Chang and Taylor (1998), Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), 
Dominguez (2003b,a), Payne and Vitale (2003) generally find evidence that interventions axe 
associated with volatility increases in the short run but that they do not affect long run volatility 
as much.
18
when a narrow window is used for estimation, they are able to find a strong rela­
tionship between certain macro-surprises and exchange rate returns6. While these 
studies provide evidence that macro news influences both returns and volatility, 
because these announcements occur very infrequently (typically once a month 
or quarter) they cannot go far in explaining the bulk of foreign exchange rate 
movements.
Beyond central bank interventions and “macro surprises” do other sorts of 
news influence exchange rate movements? In practice, dealers in the foreign 
exchange market receive information from numerous different sources, including 
their own customers, electronic brokerage systems, squawk boxes, and newswire 
services. Newswire services report the macro announcements along with various 
other sorts of news including intervention news. One of the major distinctions 
that can be made between macro announcements and other news is that the 
announcements are typically made on a schedule, so that market participants 
can plan their reactions in advance (depending on realizations). Non-scheduled 
news is by its nature less likely to be anticipated by the market, and therefore, 
may have a different influence on exchange rates.
1.2 Thesis Outline and Contribution
This thesis contributes to and extends this literature by analysing the effect of 
different types of information on order flow, exchange rate returns, and volatility. 
The first chapter studies the influence of Swiss National Bank interventions, and
6 There is an enormous literature measuring the effects of macro news on intra-daily ex­
change rates including Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Ederington and Lee 
(1995), de Gennaro and Shrieves (1997), Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998), Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1998), Melvin and Yin (2000), Evans and Lyons (2003), Faust, Rogers, Wang, and 
Wright (2003), Love and Payne (2003), Love (2004), Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, Iyer, Liu, 
and Wright (2004), Bauwens, Omrane, and Giot (2005).
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news about these interventions, on the intraday volatility of the Swiss franc-U.S. 
dollar exchange rate. It characterises the impact of central bank interventions 
on exchange rate volatility based on different aspects of interventions including 
direction, size, frequency and time of intervention. Summarizing the findings 
briefly, I find that the effect of intervention on volatility varies depending on 
whether volatility is defined as the squared return, the absolute return, or as 
realised volatility. In general, interventions tend to decrease volatility contem­
poraneously but this effect is reversed in the two hours afterward and this rela­
tionship is symmetric with respect to the direction of the intervention. Larger 
interventions usually increase volatility more than small interventions while the 
frequency of interventions has a small but positive impact. The effect of the tim­
ing of the intervention is mixed and varies with the type of volatility measure. 
Reuters news reports of sell interventions have a significant lagged negative effect 
on volatility.
The second chapter examines intra-day foreign exchange market reactions to 
a wide array of “news” reported in the press. We measure news broadly, us­
ing a unique data set of Reuters’ time-stamped newswire reports created by the 
authors. These data include all Reuters news stories that provide information 
relevant to foreign exchange markets and classify them by information source 
(policymaker or market participant), geographic region (Euro zone, Japan, U.S. 
or U.K.) and substance (both actual events and rumours involving fundamentals 
and non-fundamentals). Our results do not suggest that our broader defini­
tion of news provides a vast improvement over the macro surprises. However, we 
find that non-scheduled news, and intriguingly, non-scheduled non-fundamentals- 
related news has a statistically significant influence on both intra-day exchange 
rate returns and volatility. Further, we find that news has its largest impact dur­
20
ing periods of higher than normal news arrival and higher market uncertainty. We 
find that order flow explains a large fraction of the variation in both USD-EUR 
and USD-GBP exchange rate returns, suggesting that prices are, at the very least, 
slow to adjust. At the same time, we find that our measure of “news” explains a 
relatively small fraction of the total variation in order flow. Overall, our results 
indicate that along with the standard fundamentals, both, non-fundamental news 
and order flow matter, suggesting that future models of exchange rate determi­
nation ought to include all three types of explanatory variables.
The last chapter examines intra-day foreign exchange market reactions to 
news of various types of intervention (reported actual interventions, falsely re­
ported interventions, oral interventions and unrequited interventions) reported in 
the financial press. For this study we created a unique data set of time-stamped 
Reuters’ newswire reports of intervention news. Our search criteria retrieved 
newswire articles under the joint subject area of “foreign exchange” and “in­
tervention” . We then coded and grouped news articles according to geographic 
region (Euro-zone, U.K., U.S. or Japan) and type of intervention (threat, rumour, 
oral, unrequited, actual and joint). Briefly, the results indicate that unrequited 
intervention news (and even news of “no intervention”) has a statistically signif­
icant influence on both exchange rate returns and volatility, suggesting that the 
expectation of intervention, even when governments do not intervene, can affect 
currency values. These results provide strong evidence in favor of the hypothe­
sis that interventions influence exchange rates via the information or signalling 
channel. We find evidence that order flow has some explanatory power for prices, 
however our various categories of intervention news explain a very small fraction 
of the variation in order flow. Overall, our results indicate that along with actual 
interventions, other kinds of intervention news (including denials of intervention
21
and unrequited interventions) and order flow matter. These results suggest that 
future models of exchange rate determination ought to include a broader defini­
tion of price relevant “news”.
To sum up, this thesis extends the existing literature on, and increases our un­
derstanding of, the relationship between news, order flow, exchange rate returns 
and volatility.
1.3 Exchange R ate Volatility and Central Bank 
Intervention
Chapter 2 studies the impact of Swiss National Bank (SNB) interventions, and 
news about these interventions, on the intraday volatility of the Swiss franc - 
U.S. dollar (CHF-USD) exchange rate. It describes the impact of central bank 
interventions on exchange rate volatility by analysing various characteristics of 
intervention including direction, size, frequency and time of intervention. Addi­
tionally, it considers how markets react to news about these interventions.
1.3.1 Issues, M ethodology and D ata
While the effectiveness of interventions is important to policy makers, the con­
sensus on the effectiveness has changed several times over the years (see review 
by Sarno and Taylor (2001)). In the recent past, interventions have been fre­
quent for some currencies, like the euro and especially the yen, but infrequent for 
other major currencies. Theoretically there are two standard models describing 
the effect of sterilised central bank interventions on exchange rates, the portfo­
lio balance model and the signalling model. The portfolio balance approach is
22
based on the idea that a sterilised intervention causes market players to change 
the composition of their portfolios by buying or selling foreign assets, which in 
turn leads to a change in the relative price of domestic assets and foreign assets
i.e. the exchange rate. If domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes, 
then sterilised intervention cannot work via the portfolio balance channel. The 
signalling model takes the view that agents interpret interventions as signals of 
future monetary policy, and therefore the exchange rate is affected by changes 
in the expectations of future variables. For the signalling channel of intervention 
to work, transparency of interventions and credibility of the central bank are 
crucial. Thus theoretically both models, portfolio balance and signalling, predict 
that sterilised intervention can affect the exchange rate.7
The empirical literature on the portfolio balance model is both, scarce and 
weak (exceptions to this are Dominguez and Frankel (1993a), Evans and Lyons 
(2001)). This literature provides little support for significant imperfect substitu­
tion of domestic and foreign assets for the major OECD country currencies. Em­
pirical evidence on the signalling model, based on low frequency data, is mixed.8
Recent access to disaggregated and time-stamped data on interventions has 
made it possible to test the signalling hypothesis within the market microstruc­
ture approach to exchange rates9. Within this framework central banks are
7 A number of papers have considered the influence of central bank interventions and official 
policy statements on exchange rates. These papers include: Dominguez (1998, 2003b, forth­
coming), Cai, Cheung, Lee, and Melvin (2001), Evans and Lyons (2003), Fatum and Hutchinson
(2003), Fratzscher (2004), Sager and Taylor (2004), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005), Jansen 
and de Haan (1987).
8Edison (1993) provides a review of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of central 
bank interventions. For references to high frequency work on the effectiveness of interventions 
see Chang and Taylor (1998). Dominguez (1992a), Dominguez and Frankel (1993a,b), Kaminsky 
and Lewis (1996) provide evidence in favour of the signalling hypothesis. Vitale (1999) lists 
papers which suggest that central bank interventions are informative about future monetary 
policy.
9Daily intervention data are available (with a lag) for the US and Japan, but most other 
countries do not provide this data to researchers. Interventions can also be inferred from
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viewed as informed players with private information on the asset value and their 
trades (interventions) are expected to affect the price (exchange rate) since they 
reveal this information to the market. Chang and Taylor (1998) examine the ef­
fect of Bank of Japan interventions on the Japanese yen - U.S. dollar (JPY-USD) 
exchange rate. They find that interventions have a significant positive impact 
on volatility, with the largest impact 30-45 minutes prior to the Reuters news 
report about the intervention (Reuters reports are used as a proxy for actual 
intervention)10. In addition to observing significant intervention effects on the 
level of the CHF-USD exchange rate, Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) find that the 
timing of the intervention may play an important role in the effectiveness of the 
intervention.
Studying the effect of dollar interventions by G3 governments on exchange 
rate volatility, Dominguez (2003b) finds that interventions are associated with 
increases in intraday and daily volatility, but there is not much evidence that 
intervention affects long term volatility. Expanding on results from Fischer and 
Zurlinden (1999), Payne and Vitale (2003) find that intervention has significant 
short run effects on the level of the exchange rate. Additionally, they find that 
in anticipation of the intervention (and at the time of the intervention) volatility 
increases but starts decreasing approximately 15 minutes after the operation and 
the effect is completely reversed over the next 90 minutes.
This chapter extends the existing literature by characterising the impact of 
central bank interventions on exchange rate volatility based on different aspects 
of interventions including direction, size, frequency and time of intervention.
changes in international reserves. This is, however, an inaccurate proxy given that reserves are 
affected by interest receipts and valuations changes.
10Using SNB intervention data and Reuters reports Fischer (2003) finds that the latter are 
not a good proxy for the former and therefore should be used with caution.
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1. I examine the following questions: Do interventions have an impact on 
exchange rate volatility? Do buy and sell interventions have different ef­
fects on volatility (direction)? Do larger interventions mean lower volatility 
(size)11? If there is a size effect, is it linear or non-linear? Is there a differ­
ence in impact if interventions are one shot or repeated (frequency)? Does 
one large intervention have a different effect than a set of smaller more 
frequent interventions? In other words, is there any interaction between 
size and frequency? Do interventions affect volatility differently when they 
are carried out during periods of high trading volume, for example, market 
opening and closing times (time of intervention)?
2. The second aspect this chapter considers is how markets react to news 
about interventions: Does news about interventions calm markets or make 
them volatile? Is this news important relative to the actual intervention (if 
the timing of the two is distinct)? If the news report appears before the 
intervention, does the actual intervention have any effect? On the other 
hand, if the news report appears after the intervention (or is missed), does 
the actual intervention have a larger and/or more persistent impact?
To analyse these questions I use an event study methodology and data on the 
CHF-USD exchange rate, interventions by the SNB and Reuters news reports of 
these interventions. I use four different measures of volatility in the analysis - 
squared returns, absolute returns and two measures of realised volatility, sum of 
the squared returns for the past hour and the sum of the absolute returns for the
11 It would not be surprising if there is no size effect given the large daily turnover in foreign 
exchange markets. In 2001 turnover was $1.2 billion in traditional foreign exchange instruments 
and $67 billion in OTC foreign exchange derivatives. Source: Pasquariello (forthcoming) and 
the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 
(1999).
25
past hour12. These data allow more reliable analysis by using
• Actual interventions (not proxies based on international reserves or Reuters 
reports).
• Indicative quotes of the exchange rate (not proxies based on intervention 
transaction price).
• Reuters news reports that make it possible to separate the effect of the 
intervention on volatility from the effect of the news.
1.3.2 M ain Results and Contribution
The effect of the different intervention characteristics varies depending on how 
volatility is defined, but some general conclusions can be drawn.
• Interventions decrease volatility contemporaneously but this effect is re­
versed in the two hours afterwards. This relationship is symmetric with 
respect to the direction of the intervention, whether they be buy and sell 
interventions or with-the-wind and against-the-wind interventions.
• Analysis of the volatility and intervention size relationship finds that larger 
interventions tend to increase volatility relative to small interventions.
• The frequency of interventions has a small but positive impact on volatility, 
further underscored when the analysis is done by splitting the sample into 
low, average and high frequency interventions. The interaction between 
intervention size and intervention frequency results in a small positive ef­
fect on volatility for the squared return and the absolute return volatility
measures and a negative effect for both the realised volatility measures.
12These axe standard ways of measuring volatility used in Payne and Vitale (2003), 
Dominguez (forthcoming), Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b).
• The effect of the timing of the intervention varies with the volatility mea­
sure. 9am interventions reduce volatility when measured as realised volatil­
ity while for the other two measures the overall effect is positive. 2pm 
interventions decrease volatility for both the squared return measures but 
increase volatility for both the absolute return measures.
• Reuters reports of sell interventions have a significant lagged negative effect 
on volatility for the squared return measure and both the absolute return 
measures.
1.4 W hat Defines “N ew s” in Foreign Exchange 
Markets?
Chapter 3 examines intra-day foreign exchange market reactions to a wide array 
of “news” reported in the financial press. A number of previous studies have 
shown that in order to find significant reactions in the foreign exchange market 
to the macroeconomic variables that theory suggests should matter, one needs 
to measure the precise impact of macro surprises at the intra-day level. In this 
chapter, we ask whether a much broader definition of “news” influences currency 
values and ought to be included in our models of exchange rate determination.
1.4.1 Issues, M ethodology and Data
The asset approach to exchange rate determination suggests that exchange rates 
are forward looking asset prices that react to changes in the market’s expectation 
of future fundamentals. Empirical tests of the asset approach examine in various 
ways whether changes in the macroeconomic variables that are considered fun­
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damentals explain exchange rate movements13. These tests generally find that 
macroeconomic variables, which tend to have fairly stable time series properties, 
can explain little of the (sometimes dramatic) variation in exchange rate move­
ments. This line of research is best summarized by a series of papers by Meese 
and Rogoff (1983a,b) which find that forecasts of exchange rates based on a ran­
dom walk model of exchange rate determination do better than forecasts that are 
based on macroeconomic models.
If the window of time around the shock to fundamentals is too wide, other 
news hitting the market will confound the econometrician’s ability to precisely 
estimate the effects of the change in fundamentals on exchange rates. One so­
lution is to use intra-daily exchange rate data that will allow a narrow enough 
window around the time of macro announcements to be able to set up a natural 
experiment. A number of papers, including Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and 
Vega (2003), find that when a narrow window is used, they are able to find a 
strong relationship between certain macro-surprises and exchange rate returns14.
This chapter takes the results in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega 
(2003) as a benchmark, and examines the intra-daily influence of a broad set of 
news reports, including variables which are not typically considered “fundamen­
tals” in the context of standard models of exchange rate determination, and asks 
whether they too help explain exchange rate movements.
The intra-day foreign exchange data used in this study are transactions prices
and quote spreads in the USD-EUR and USD-GBP market from the Reuters
13Examples of “fundamentals” include: income (or output) differentials, money differentials, 
interest rate differentials, inflation differentials and the trade balance.
14There is an enormous literature measuring the effects of macro news on intra-daily ex­
change rates including Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Ederington and Lee 
(1995), de Gennaro and Shrieves (1997), Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998), Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1998), Melvin and Yin (2000), Evans and Lyons (2003), Faust, Rogers, Wang, and 
Wright (2003), Love and Payne (2003), Love (2004), Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, Iyer, Liu, 
and Wright (2004), Bauwens, Omrane, and Giot (2005).
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D2000-2 electronic trading system. The data do not include information on 
traded quantities, but they do indicate whether trades were initiated by a buyer 
or seller, allowing us to measure order flow as well as returns and volatility. We 
use a 20 minute sampling frequency for each exchange rate and we measure order 
flow as the cumulative number of buyer initiated trades minus the cumulative 
number of seller initiated trades over the same 20 minutes.
This study uses a unique data set of Reuters’ time-stamped newswire reports 
created by the authors. We include all news stories that provide information rel­
evant to foreign exchange markets. The stories are then classified by information 
source (policymaker or market participant), geographic region (Euro zone, Japan, 
U.S. or U.K.) and substance (both actual events and rumours involving funda­
mentals and non-fundamentals). Our “news” data include the scheduled macro 
announcements that have been used in previous studies to allow us to compare 
the effects of our broader definition of news against these more “traditional” 
variables. These data allow us to test a number of interesting hypotheses.
1. First, we test whether non-scheduled “news” of different sorts has similar 
impact effects on returns and volatility as compared to (the already heavily 
studied) scheduled macro announcements. Theory suggests that ambiguous 
information may lead to stronger differences of opinion about the implica­
tions of the information (and, in turn, larger increases in volatility). In our 
application, we can distinguish between scheduled (and presumably better- 
understood) macro announcements and more ambiguous news (for example, 
market rumours of impending interest rate changes).
2. Second, we test whether news that is typically not considered “fundamen­
tal” in the context of standard models of exchange rate determination (for
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example, news related to technical analysis), helps to explain exchange rate 
movements.
3. Third, we examine whether any of the price discovery process in reaction 
to news occurs via order flow. Previous studies have found evidence that 
a substantial proportion of the market reaction to macro-announcements 
occurs via order flow. By examining how a broader set of news events 
influences order flow, we can begin to better understand how this measure 
relates to price and volatility movements in the foreign exchange markets.
1.4.2 M ain R esults and Contribution
In this chapter we examine the role of news in exchange rate determination. We 
measure news much more broadly, and include both fundamentals-related and 
non-fundamentals-related news reports.
• Overall, our results do not suggest that our broader definition of news pro­
vides a vast improvement over the macro surprises in explaining exchange 
rate. We do, however, find that non-scheduled news, and intriguingly, non­
scheduled non-fundamentals-related news has a statistically significant in­
fluence on both intra-day exchange rate returns and volatility.
• Further, we find that news has its largest impact during periods of higher 
than normal news arrival and higher market uncertainty.
• We find that order flow explains a large fraction of the variation in both 
USD-EUR and USD-GBP exchange rate returns, suggesting that prices are, 
at the very least, slow to adjust. At the same time, we find that our measure 
of “news” explains a relatively small fraction of the total variation in order
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flow.
• Overall, our results indicate that along with the standard fundamentals, 
both non-fundamentals-related news and order flow matter, suggesting that 
future models of exchange rate determination ought to include all three 
types of explanatory variables.
1.5 Unrequited Interventions
Chapter 4 examines intra-day foreign exchange market reactions to news of ac­
tual and unrequited interventions reported in the financial press. Intervention 
operations are used by many governments to manage their exchange rates. Pre­
vious research has found that these operations can, under certain circumstances, 
effectively influence the level and volatility of exchange rates15. One of the more 
puzzling aspects of intervention policy is the fact that some governments keep 
their intervention operations secret, even ex post16.
15 A number of recent papers have examined the influence of intervention operations on 
daily exchange rate returns and volatility and generally find evidence that interventions in­
fluence returns and increase volatility. Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), Dominguez (1998), 
Humpage (1999), Chaboud and LeBaron (1999), Beine, Benassy-Quere, and Lecourt (2002), 
Beine and Laurent (2003), Beine, Laurent, and Lecourt (2003), Beine, Laurent, and Palm 
(2003), Dominguez (2003b,a, forthcoming), Fatum and Hutchinson (2003), Frenkel, Pierdzioch, 
and Stadtmann (2005), de Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003), Ito (2003), Taylor (2004), Galati, 
Melick, and Micu (forthcoming), Fatum and Hutchinson (2006)
16Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) discuss the possible reasons that central banks might want 
to keep their intervention operations secret. Neely (2000) notes that central banks are moving 
increasingly toward electronic trading methods, which suggests that they are less interested 
in keeping operations secret. On this topic also see: Vitale (1999), Bhattacharya and Weller
(1997), Chiu (2003), Beine, Janssen, and Lecourt (2004), Beine and Bernal (forthcoming). 
Although the Japanese government does not provide contemporaneous information about their 
intervention operations, the Ministry of Finance publishes lagged daily intervention data (lagged 
one month) on their web site http://www.mof.go.jp/english/elc021.htm.
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1.5.1 Issues, M ethodology and D ata
The financial press often reports over the wire services when a central bank is 
intervening, though governments rarely officially confirm their presence in the 
market. Because there is often uncertainty in the market about whether a given 
government is intervening, there are inevitably circumstances when the financial 
press reports interventions that have not occurred. There are also frequently 
reports of what we term, unrequited interventions, interventions that the market 
expects but do not occur. This chapter examines the effects of various types of 
intervention news (reported actual interventions, falsely reported interventions, 
oral interventions and unrequited interventions) on exchange rate behaviour.
The empirical approach we take in this study is based on the assumption 
that exchange rates are forward looking asset prices that react to changes in the 
market’s expectation of future fundamentals. We further assume that “future 
fundamentals” may include both standard variables from international macro 
models (for example, money and income differentials) as well as variables such as 
actual and unrequited interventions that may provide information about future 
fundamentals. We use intra-daily exchange rate data to allow a narrow enough 
window around the times of news announcements to be able to precisely estimate 
the exchange rate reactions in the spirit of Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and 
Vega (2003)17.
For this study we created a unique data set of time-stamped Reuters’ newswire 
reports created to measure intervention news. Our search criteria retrieved
17The enormous literature measuring the effects of macro news on intra-daily exchange rates 
includes Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Ederington and Lee (1995), de Gen- 
naro and Shrieves (1997), Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev
(1998), Melvin and Yin (2000), Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright (2003), Love and Payne 
(2003), Love (2004), Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, Iyer, Liu, and Wright (2004), Bauwens, 
Omrane, and Giot (2005), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005).
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news wire articles under the joint subject area of “foreign exchange” and “in­
tervention” . We then coded and grouped18 news articles according to geographic 
region (Euro-zone, U.K., U.S. or Japan) and type of intervention (threat, rumour, 
oral, unrequited, actual and joint). Using these time-stamped Reuters’ newswire 
reports we are able to match the timing of intervention news to movements in 
intra-day exchange rates. We also include scheduled macro announcement news 
reports which have been used in previous studies to allow us to compare the 
effects of intervention news against these more “traditional” variables.
The intra-day foreign exchange data used in this study are transactions prices 
and quote spreads in the USD-EUR, USD-GBP and JPY-USD markets from the 
Reuters D2000-2 electronic trading system over the period from December 1999 
through July 2000. The data do not include information on traded quantities, 
but they do indicate whether trades were initiated by a buyer or seller, allowing 
us to measure order flow as well as returns and volatility. We use a 20 minute 
sampling frequency and measure order flow as the cumulative number of buyer 
initiated trades minus the cumulative number of seller initiated trades over the 
same 20 minutes. The intra-day intervention news and exchange rate data allow 
us to test a number of interesting hypotheses.
1. We test whether intervention news has similar impact effects on returns 
and volatility as compared to (the already heavily studied) scheduled macro 
announcements. Theory suggests that ambiguous information may lead to 
stronger differences of opinion about the implications of the information 
(and, in turn, larger increases in volatility). In our application, we can 
distinguish between scheduled (and presumably better-understood) macro
18In theory each “news” report may have a different one-time influence on exchange rates. We 
group similar news items together in order to examine whether certain “types” of intervention 
news have a systematic influence on exchange rate behaviour.
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announcements and more ambiguous intervention news.
2. We also measure what proportion of the price discovery process in reaction 
to intervention news occurs via order flow. Previous studies have found 
evidence that a substantial proportion of the market reaction to macro­
announcements occurs via order flow. By examining how intervention news 
events influences order flow - we can begin to better understand how this 
measure relates to price and volatility movements in the foreign exchange 
markets.
1.5.2 M ain Results and Contribution
This chapter examined whether actual and unrequited intervention news influ­
ences exchange rates. Previous studies have found that scheduled macro an­
nouncements and official interventions by governments in the foreign exchange 
market help to explain intra-daily exchange rate behaviour, both returns and 
volatility.
• Results in this chapter indicate that unrequited intervention news (and 
even news of “no intervention”) has a statistically significant influence on 
both exchange rate returns and volatility, suggesting that the expectation of 
intervention, even when governments do not intervene, can affect currency 
values. These results provide strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis 
that interventions influence exchange rates via the information or signalling 
channel.
• We find evidence that order flow has some explanatory power suggesting 
that prices are, at the very least, slow to adjust. At the same time, we find 
that actual interventions and our various categories of intervention news
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explain a very small fraction of the variation in order flow. Overall, the re­
sults indicate that along with actual interventions, other kinds of interven­
tion news (including denials of intervention and unrequited interventions) 
and order flow matter.
• We do not find evidence that macro surprises have much influence on re­
turns, volatility or order flow over our sample period.
These results suggest that future models of exchange rate determination ought 
include a broader conception of price relevant “news”.
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Chapter 2
Exchange R ate V olatility and 
Central Bank Interventions
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the impact of Swiss National Bank (SNB) interventions, and 
news about these interventions, on the intraday volatility of the Swiss franc - U.S. 
dollar (CHF-USD) exchange rate.
While the effectiveness of interventions is important to policy makers, the 
consensus on the effectiveness has changed several times over the years. In the 
early 1970s and early 1980s it was believed that authorities could not affect the 
exchange rate while in the late 1970s, late 1980s and the early 1990s the view was 
that the authorities should intervene (see review by Sarno and Taylor (2001)). 
Recently, interventions have been frequent for some currencies, like the euro and 
especially the yen, but infrequent for other major currencies.
Theoretically there are two standard models describing the effect of sterilised 
central bank interventions on exchange rates, the portfolio balance model and
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the signalling model. The portfolio balance approach is based on the idea that a 
sterilised intervention causes market players to change the composition of their 
portfolios by buying or selling foreign assets, which in turn leads to a change in 
the relative price of domestic assets and foreign assets i.e. the exchange rate. If 
domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes, then sterilised intervention 
cannot work via the portfolio balance channel. The signalling model, popularised 
by Mussa (1981), takes the view that agents interpret interventions as signals 
of future monetary policy, making the exchange rate sensitive to changes in the 
expectations of future variables. For the signalling channel of intervention to 
work, transparency of interventions and credibility of the central bank are cru­
cial1. Thus theoretically both models, portfolio balance and signalling, predict 
that sterilised intervention can be effective.
The empirical literature on the portfolio balance model is not only scarce, 
but also finds very little evidence in favour of the model (exceptions to this are 
Dominguez and Frankel (1993a), Evans and Lyons (2001)). This literature pro­
vides little support for significant imperfect substitution of domestic and foreign 
assets. Empirical evidence on the signalling model is mixed with some evidence 
for (Dominguez and Frankel (1993a,b), Vitale (1999) lists papers which suggest 
that central bank interventions are informative about future monetary policy) 
and some evidence against (Dominguez (1992a), Kaminsky and Lewis (1996))2.
1 Related to the effectiveness of interventions via the signalling channel is the secrecy puz­
zle. The signalling channel should work better under transparency but until very recently 
interventions have been secret. This has prompted researchers to suggest that central banks 
might intervene secretly if their objectives conflict with the fundamental value of the exchange 
rate (Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) and Vitale (1999)). However, the two papers differ on 
the concealment of interventions with Vitale (1999) claiming that the goals of the intervention 
should never be revealed while Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) conclude that under certain 
conditions central banks may prefer to reveal their objectives.
2Edison (1993) provides a review of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of central 
bank interventions. For references to recent low frequency work on the effectiveness of inter­
ventions see Chang and Taylor (1998).
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Most of this evidence is based on low frequency data. Using daily data Chaboud 
and LeBaron (1999) study the impact of interventions by the Federal Reserve 
on trading volume for dollar-yen and dollar-mark futures markets and find a 
positive correlation between them. This positive relationship survives even after 
conditioning for daily volatility. The effect is stronger for secret interventions but 
weaker for Reuters reports about the interventions. Recently, access to disaggre­
gated data on interventions has made it possible to test the signalling hypothesis 
within the market microstructure approach to exchange rates3. In this frame­
work central banks are viewed as informed players in the market and their trades 
(interventions) are expected to affect the price (exchange rate) since they reveal 
this information to the market. Assessing effectiveness based on central bank 
profits from intervention, Goodhart and Hesse (1993) find that interventions are 
profitable in the long run but not in the short run. Chang and Taylor (1998) 
examine the effect of Bank of Japan interventions on the Japanese yen - U.S. 
dollar (JPY-USD) exchange rate. They find that interventions have a significant 
positive impact on volatility, with the largest impact thirty to forty five minutes 
prior to the Reuters news report about the intervention (Reuters reports are used 
as a proxy for actual intervention)4. The data set used in the current chapter is 
an improvement on that in Chang and Taylor (1998) since it consists of actual 
intervention data from the SNB and Reuters news reports about these interven­
tions, allowing me to separate the effect of the intervention on volatility from the 
effect of the news. In addition to observing significant intervention effects on the 
level of the CHF-USD exchange rate Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) find that the
3 Prior to this interventions were inferred from changes in international reserves. This is an 
inaccurate proxy given that reserves are affected by interest receipts, valuations changes and 
sometimes do not include intervention transactions at all
4Using SNB intervention data and Reuters reports Fischer (2003) finds that the latter are 
not good proxy for the former and hence Reuters reports need to be used with caution.
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time of the intervention may play an important role in the effectiveness of the 
intervention. While they use actual foreign exchange transactions data from the 
SNB which include information on the transacted amount, price and time of day, 
they do not have exchange rate data to match. So they proxy the change in the 
exchange rate by the difference between the exchange rates of two consecutive 
interventions.
Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright (2003) study the effect of macroeconomic 
announcements on high frequency exchange rates (US dollar-Deutsche mark, US 
dollar-Euro and US dollar-British pound) and interest rates. They find that 
“stronger-than-expected” announcements lead to significant dollar appreciation. 
Using data on interest rates and interpreting results in the context of uncov­
ered interest parity, they infer that “such releases either lower the risk pre­
mium for holding foreign currency or imply future expected dollar depreciation”. 
Dominguez (2003b) studies intraday and daily effects of dollar interventions by G3 
governments on exchange rate volatility. The underlying premise in the paper is 
that heterogeneity in trader’s information can cause exchange rates to move away 
from fundamentals in the short run and if these heterogeneous traders interpret 
interventions differently, then interventions might actually increase volatility in 
the short run. She finds that interventions are associated with increases in intra­
day and daily volatility, but there is not much evidence that intervention affects 
long term volatility. Payne and Vitale (2003) expand on the results from Fis­
cher and Zurlinden (1999) by including intraday indicative exchange rate quotes. 
They find that intervention has significant short run effects on the level of the 
exchange rate. Additionally, using the absolute value of the of exchange rate 
return as a measure of volatility, they find that in anticipation of the intervention 
and at the time of the intervention volatility increases but starts decreasing from
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15 minutes after and the effect is completely reversed over the next 90 minutes.
This chapter extends the existing literature by characterising the impact of 
central bank interventions on exchange rate volatility based on different aspects of 
interventions including direction, quantity, frequency and time of intervention. It 
asks the questions: Do interventions have an impact on exchange rate volatility? 
Do buy and sell interventions have different effects on volatility (direction)? Do 
larger interventions mean lower volatility (quantity)5 If there is a size effect, is it 
linear or non-linear? If central banks do want to intervene, should they do so in 
one shot or via repeated interventions (frequency)? Does one large intervention 
have a different effect than a set of smaller more frequent interventions i.e. is 
there any interaction between quantity and frequency? Do interventions affect 
volatility more or less when they are carried out during periods of high trading 
volume, for example, market opening and closing times (timing of intervention)?
The second aspect this chapter considers is how markets react to news about 
interventions: Does news about interventions calm markets or make them volatile? 
Is this news important relative to the actual intervention? If the news report ap­
pears before the intervention, does the actual intervention have any effect? On 
the other hand, if the news report appears after the intervention (or is missed), 
does the actual intervention have a larger and/or more persistent impact?
To analyse these questions I use an event study methodology and high fre­
quency data on the CHF-USD exchange rate, interventions by the SNB and
5It would not be surprising if there is no size effect given the large daily turnover in foreign 
exchange markets. In April 1998 the daily turnover in traditional foreign exchange instruments 
(spot, forwards and swaps) was $1.5 billion and in OTC foreign exchange derivatives it was 
$97 billion. Even though the turnover declined between 1998 and 2001, it was $1.2 billion in 
traditional foreign exchange instruments and $67 billion in OTC foreign exchange derivatives. 
Approximately 5% of the global transactions in the forex market are accounted for by trad­
ing in CHF-USD. This makes it the fourth most traded currency pair. Source: Pasquariello 
(forthcoming) and the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives 
Market Activity (1999).
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Reuters reports of these interventions. As mentioned above this data allows 
more reliable analysis since I use actual interventions (and not proxies based on 
international reserves or Reuters reports), volatility measures based on changes 
in indicative quotes of the exchange rate (and not proxies based on intervention 
transaction price) and Reuters news reports that allow me to separate the effect 
of the intervention on volatility from the effect of the news.
Briefly, the chapter finds that the effect of intervention on volatility varies de­
pending on how volatility is defined. Interventions decrease volatility contempo­
raneously but this effect is reversed in the two hours afterward. This relationship 
is symmetric with respect to the direction of the intervention, whether they be 
buy and sell interventions or with-the-wind and against-the-wind interventions. 
Analysis of the volatility and intervention quantity relationship finds that as we 
move from small to large interventions, the larger interventions tend to increase 
volatility more than small interventions. The frequency of interventions has a 
small but positive impact on volatility, and this is underscored when the analysis 
is done by splitting the sample into low, average and high frequency interven­
tions. The interaction between intervention quantity and intervention frequency 
results in a small positive effect on volatility for the squared return measure and 
the absolute return measure and a negative effect for both the realised volatil­
ity measures this effect is negative. As before the effect of the timing of the 
intervention varies with the volatility measure. The relationship is different for 
interventions at different times of the day. For the two realised volatility mea­
sures 9am interventions reduce volatility while for the other two measures the 
significant coefficients have an overall positive effect increasing volatility. 2pm 
interventions decrease volatility for both the squared return measures but in­
crease volatility for both the absolute return measures. Reuters reports of sell
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interventions have a significant and lagged negative effect on volatility for the 
squared return measure and both the absolute return measures.
The data are described in Section 2.2 along with some descriptive statistics on 
the exchange rate and the intervention series. Section 2.3 describes the method­
ology briefly, Section 2.4 presents the results and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
The data covers the time period 07 Oct 1986 to 15 Aug 1995 and comprises of 
three components. The first component of the data consists of intraday indica­
tive quotes of the CHF-USD exchange rate at a 15 minute frequency and are 
provided by Olsen Sz Associates (Zurich). The second component of the data 
is the SNB interventions. These interventions were conducted in the CHF-USD 
market and are time stamped to the exact time of the intervention. Also in­
cluded is information on the size and direction of the intervention (whether the 
SNB was buying US dollars or selling US dollars)6. The final component of the 
data is news reports of central bank interventions based on Reuters headlines7. 
The interventions and news reports data are aggregated to 15 minute frequency 
to match the exchange rate data.
A plot of the exchange rate along with the interventions is in Figure 2.1. 
Eye-balling the figure it appears that the SNB is following an against-the-wind 
intervention policy for the majority of the time. Eye-balling the plot of the four 
volatility measures for an average non-intervention day in figure 2.2, it is clear 
that there is a distinct intraday pattern in volatility. This is motivation for
6An example of a typical data point would be ‘SNB bought US dollars 5 million on 05 June 
1990 at 10:49 a.m.’.
7This data is from Kathryn Dominguez and covers headlines on all days when the Federal 
Reserve was in the maxket.
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deseasonalising the exchange rate volatility series before analysing it, an issue 
that is discussed in Section 2.3.
The SNB’s intervention strategy consisted of conducting a number of small 
interventions in a short period of time and the majority of these were in con­
junction with the Federal Reserve (Fed) and/or the Bundesbank (Buba). Based 
on quotes gathered from commercial banks, SNB interventions were conducted 
in the dealer market. And while the SNB informed the counter-party on comple­
tion of the transaction that it was an intervention, it did not publicly announce 
that it had intervened8. It is worth pointing out that in any given intervention 
episode, the SNB either bought dollars or sold dollars, but never did both. From 
Table 2.1 we see that the SNB intervened 171 times over 97 days. They bought 
US dollars on 70 occasions (over 33 different days) and sold US dollars on 101 
occasions (over 64 days), figure 2.3 provides further description of the inter­
ventions. The SNB intervened more frequently in the early years of the sample 
but these interventions seem equally spread out during the week (figures 2.3a 
and 2.3b). figures 2.3c and 2.3d reiterate the point that the SNB intervened 
frequently and in small quantities rather than intervening a large amount in a 
single trade, figure 2.3e is very interesting since it shows a bimodal distribution 
of interventions by time of day. Interventions are most often at 9am and 2pm 
GMT (Greenwich Mean Time) and can be interpreted as being timed to coincide 
with the opening of the London and New York markets respectively. These are 
typically times when trading volumes are high, indicating a possibility that the 
SNB might be trying to hide its trades from the market9. At this point it is 
worth noting that these data contains no information on whether the interven­
8For a more detailed description of the SNB’s intervention strategy look at Fischer (2003).
9Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Easley and O’Hara (1987) provide theoretical underpinnings 
for informed traders’ incentives to trade when volumes are high.
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tion was conducted jointly with another central bank or singly. Any information 
on joint interventions was retrieved from Reuters reports. Reuters news reports 
have been used in numerous microstructure papers analysing interventions and 
are now a standard way of inferring when the market received information about 
interventions10. Most of this research assumes that the reports are released just 
after the intervention and typically, the time stamp on the report is taken to be 
the time the market learned about the intervention. Fischer (2003) carries out 
tests of the accuracy of these reports for SNB interventions. He finds that there 
are large prediction errors between Reuters reports and the actual interventions, 
stemming in part from the fact that it is possible for reports to be released before 
the intervention in some cases and after the actual intervention in others. So 
clearly, any results based on these reports must be viewed with caution. Since 
the Reuters news reports data start in Sept 1989, only a sub-sample (Sept 1989 
to Aug 1995) of the interventions data is used to match the Reuters news data. 
Table 2.3 provides a description of the Reuters reports data11. The Reuters re­
ports indicate that the SNB bought US dollars on 16 occasions (of which 11 were 
joint interventions) and sold US dollars on 19 occasions (of which 15 were joint 
interventions). Comparing this with the information from the SNB it appears 
that Reuters falsely reports the SNB buying US dollars on 5 occasions and misses
28 occasions when the SNB sold US dollars12.
10Goodhart and Hesse (1993), Chang and Taylor (1998), Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), 
Dominguez (2003b,a), Payne and Vitale (2003) are some other papers that have used Reuters 
news reports on interventions.
n An example of a Reuters report - ‘Swiss National Bank buys dollars for francs in concerted 
intervention with Fed’.
12It is worth noting here that if there is a report corresponding to the first intervention of an 
episode it might be possible that the other interventions in the same episode are anticipated by 
the market, given the SNB’s intervention implementation technique of small frequent interven­
tions. So these interventions should be considered as reported even if there are no additional 
Reuters reports.
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2.3 M easuring Exchange Rate Volatility
I use an event study approach to analyse the impact of various intervention char­
acteristics on exchange rate volatility13. Four different measures of volatility are 
used in the analysis. Squared returns, absolute returns and two measures of re­
alised volatility, sum of the squared returns for the past hour and the sum of 
the absolute returns for the past hour14. Returns are calculated as the log dif­
ference of the exchange rate series. There are two points I would like to raise at 
this stage. First, given that the realised volatility variable has a lag structure, 
the independent variables will have lagged effects on the dependent variable by 
definition. Secondly, it is widely recognised that seasonal patterns exist in high 
frequency exchange rate volatility and there is evidence of this in the data used 
in this chapter as well (see figure 2.2). While the simplest method to control 
for seasonality would be to include a dummy variable for every 15-minute inter­
val in the day15, I use Flexible Fourier Forms (FFF) to adjust for seasonality16. 
Intuitively, this method captures seasonality in a non-linear way by taking com­
binations of periodic components (sine and cosine curves) at different frequencies. 
For each 15-minute interval indexed by ej ’ the volatility seasonal is calculated by
13Time series methods axe not built to capture the effects of unequally spaced events like 
interventions. Fatum and Hutchinson (2003) argue that the event study methodology is more 
appropriate in such cases, where an event is defined as one episode of interventions. Other 
papers conducting event studies in this context are Chang and Taylor (1998), Fischer and 
Zurlinden (1999), Payne and Vitale (2003), Dominguez (2003b,a).
14These are standard ways of measuring volatility (also used in Payne and Vitale (2003), 
Dominguez (forthcoming), Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b)).
15However this would mean an additional 96 right-hand side variables.
16 Other papers using FFF in this context are Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b), Payne (1996), 
Dominguez (forthcoming). For a text book description of the method refer to chapter 6 (Spec­
tral Analysis) in Hamilton (1994).
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estimating the following equation over all non-intervention days17,
p  r
k = l
2 t t j  27T 7
A2k-i cos fc(— ) +  A2i! j  sin (2.1)
where j =  1,...,96 and N is the number of return intervals per day (96 in this 
data).
The parameter ‘P ’ controls the number of periodic components used18, fig­
ure 2.2 graphs the average realised volatility pattern on non-intervention days 
along with the fitted FFF.
The dependent variable for all further analysis is the deseasonalised volatility, 
which is the residual from regressing the volatility variable on the estimated 
seasonal components. The independent variables are leads and lags of dummy 
variables corresponding to the different intervention characteristics.
2.4 Results
All regressions are run on a sample of 18621 observations spaced at 15-minute 
frequency. The data include all 171 interventions over 97 days in the period Oct 
1986 to Aug 1995 and are combined with a control sample of non-intervention 
days to make up the final data set. The control sample was constructed by 
randomly choosing a non-intervention day that matched the day of week and 
the year of a given intervention day. The regressions were run for four different
17Volatility on intervention days may differ from that on non-intervention days. Using only 
non-intervention days to capture the seasonal pattern avoids explaining away any intervention 
day effects by imputing them in the seasonal. Different seasonal components axe computed for 
each of the four different definitions of volatility.
18These results are based on P =  8. Varying P to take different values (4, 6, 8, 10) did not 
affect the fit of the FFF to the data. Dominguez (forthcoming) uses P =  8 for DEM-USD and 
YEN-USD data for the period Aug 89 - Aug 1995 while Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b) use 
P =  6 for DEM-USD data for the period 1992-93.
46
definitions of volatility - squared returns, absolute returns, realised volatility 
based on squared returns and realised volatility based on absolute returns.19.
2.4.1 SN B Interventions
To confirm that interventions have an impact on exchange rate volatility the 
deseasonalised volatility series is regressed on 8 leads and lags of an intervention 
indicator which takes value 1 when there is an intervention (buy or sell) and is 0 
otherwise. The results in Table 2.4 show that there is an intervention effect but 
it depends on how volatility is defined. There is a significant contemporaneous 
decline in volatility but only when it is defined as realised volatility. However, in 
the two hours after the intervention we observe that the majority of the significant 
coefficients are positive indicating that the effect is reversed20.
2.4.2 Direction
Having established that depending on how you define it, volatility reduces con­
temporaneously with an intervention but increases afterward, the next step is to 
ascertain the relationship between the direction of the intervention and volatil­
ity. Do buy interventions have a different impact than sell interventions? In this 
chapter a buy (sell) intervention refers to the SNB buying (selling) U.S. dollars 
which would lead to a depreciation (appreciation) in the Swiss franc.
19In all the regressions I include two lags of the dependent variable. Newey-West corrected 
standard errors are used to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation usually found 
in high frequency financial data.
20This is in line with previous empirical work in the area. Chang and Taylor (1998), 
Dominguez (forthcoming) find a positive relationship between intervention and volatility; 
Chaboud and LeBaron (1999) find a positive relationship between intervention and trading 
volume.
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This hypothesis is tested explicitly based on the following regression21.
8 8
vo lt =  a  +  E Pj (Bt+j +  St+j)  +  Ik S t+k 4- 01 vo lt - 1  +  02 vo lt - 2  +  Et
8 8
Oi +  P j B t+ j +  (/?fc +  7 fc) S t+ k  +  0 \ v o l t - 1 +  02 v o l t -2 +  Et
j = - 8 k = —8
(2 .2)
where B t and are dummy variables for buy and sell interventions respectively.
Crucially, this regression tests whether 7  ^ ^  0. A non-zero 7 * coefficient im­
plies that buy and sell interventions have different relationships with volatility. 
Regression results in Table 2.5 show that almost all the 7 k are insignificant, im­
plying that buy and sell interventions have similar effects on volatility. The few 
significant 7 k coefficients are positive, indicating that at these lags sell interven­
tions reduce volatility by less than buy interventions.
Another interesting directional aspect is whether against-the-wind and with- 
the-wind interventions have different effects on volatility. Eye-balling figure 2 .1  
and Table 2.2, it appears that the SNB intervenes against-the-wind more often 
than with-the-wind, presumably to calm markets. Against-the-wind and with- 
the-wind indicators are calculated based on 1 day, 1 week, 2 week and 4 week 
moving averages and a specification similar to Eqn. (2.2) is used to test if their 
correlation with volatility is asymmetric. Results show that almost all the gamma 
coefficients are insignificant, implying that against-the-wind and with-the-wind 
interventions have similar effects on exchange rate volatility22.
21 In later sections, the same specification is used to test if other characteristics of interventions 
have asymmetric effects on volatility.
22Due to constraints of space the results are not presented here.
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2.4.3 Quantity
We now turn to investigating the effect of the size of an intervention on exchange 
rate volatility. A priori if we believe that central banks intervene to calm markets 
then we would expect the size of the intervention and volatility to be negatively 
correlated. On the other hand, it would not be surprising to find that central 
bank interventions, which are typically small relative to the daily turnover in 
foreign exchange markets23 do not affect volatility. Finally, some microstructure 
models (Kyle (1985)) predict a positive relationship between intervention quan­
tity and volatility since the central bank’s (informed trader) demand is expected 
to move price (the exchange rate). So, what does the data tell us about the rela­
tionship between intervention quantity and volatility? Is this relationship linear 
or non-linear? To this end I regress the four volatility measures on indicators 
for intervention, quantity and squared intervention quantity. When there is an 
intervention, the quantity indicator variable is equal to the absolute amount of 
the intervention, and is zero otherwise. A squared quantity indicator is con­
structed along similar lines. The regression results presented in Table 2.6 show 
that for the absolute return based volatility measures intervention quantity has 
a lagged negative effect on volatility which would lend support to the idea that 
central banks intervene to calm markets. On the other hand, for the realised 
volatility based on squared returns there is no effect at all while for the squared 
return measure the lagged effect is positive. If we believed that interventions are 
informative trades then, we would expect an increase in volatility as the mar­
23In April 1998 the daily turnover in traditional foreign exchange instruments (spot, forwards 
and swaps) was $1.5 billion and in OTC foreign exchange derivatives it was $97 billion. Even 
though the turnover declined between 1998 and 2001, it was $1.2 billion in traditional foreign 
exchange instruments and $67 billion in OTC foreign exchange derivatives. Approximately 5% 
of the global transactions in the forex market are accounted for by trading in CHF-USD. This 
makes it the fourth most traded currency pair. Source: Pasquariello (forthcoming) and the BIS 
Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity (1999).
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ket absorbs this new information. However, if we consider the realised volatility 
measure, we find a small, negative effect. So again, the effect of the size of an 
intervention on volatility depends on how volatility is defined. Looking at the 
coefficients on squared quantity we see that only a few are significant (at lead 8, 
contemporaneously and then at lags 5, 6) and these are very small24 indicating 
that the size effect might be non-linear but that this non-linearity is small25.
I analyse the volatility and intervention quantity relationship further by esti­
mating the effect of small, average and large quantity interventions on volatility26. 
Results in Table 2.7 indicate that as we move from small to large interventions 
the positive coefficients on interventions decrease and the negative coefficients in­
crease. This means that larger interventions tend to increase volatility more than 
small interventions which is counter intuitive. One possible explanation could be 
that the market interprets larger intervention quantities as signals that the cen­
tral bank trying to push the exchange rate unsuccessfully, and this negative signal 
leads to higher volatility.
2.4.4 Frequency
Frequency is the next characteristic of intervention we turn to. How is volatility 
affected by a continued presence of the central bank in the market relative to 
a one-off trade? The regression results in Table 2.8 indicate that the frequency 
effect differs across the different volatility measures. The sum of the significant
24This might be explained by the much larger scale of squared quantity relative to the volatil­
ity measures.
25Payne and Vitale (2003) find that the size effect on the level of the exchange rate is non­
linear but that this non-linearity is not economically significant.
26Small interventions are defined as sales or purchases of up to 5 million US dollars, Average 
interventions as between 5 and 10 million US dollars and Large interventions are those that are 
larger than 10 million US dollars. With this classification there are 27 small, 26 average and 5 
large interventions.
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coefficients is small and positive indicating that more frequent interventions in­
crease volatility. However, given that the coefficients are very small this could 
also be interpreted as the frequency of intervention actually having no relation­
ship with volatility i.e. that the regression has estimated a significant coefficient 
of zero. Alternatively, it could be caused by the fact that the scale of the volatil­
ity measures is much smaller than that of the frequency variable and hence the 
estimated coefficient is small but non-zero. Finally, this might be the result of 
some kind of threshold effect i.e. if the central bank is in the market for long, this 
could be interpreted positively by the market to mean that the central bank is 
determined to achieve its goal or it could be interpreted negatively, sending a sig­
nal that the central bank is in a losing battle. To test this I estimate the effect of 
low, average and high frequency interventions using the following specification27.
8 8 8 8
volt =  oi +  Pi It+i + 7j LFt+j +  ^  5k AFt+k +  ^  4>i HFt+i +  ...
t = —8 j = —8 fc=—8 / = —8
6\ vo lt- 1 +  $2 volt - 2  T  Et
(2.3)
The results in Table 2.9 indicate that low frequency interventions have virtu­
ally no effect on volatility while average and high frequency interventions have 
a small, significant and positive effect on volatility. This result would support 
the view that markets interpret the continued presence of the central bank in the 
market as the central bank fighting a losing battle and this increases volatility.
27For a given 15 minute interval, the indicator for Low frequency interventions takes value 1 
when there are between 1 and 6 interventions (44 data points), the Average frequency indicator 
takes the value 1 when there are between 7 and 12 interventions (12 data points), and the Large 
frequency indicator is 1 when the SNB intervenes between 13 and 18 times (2 data points).
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2.4.5 Quantity and Frequency
We are now interested in the combined effect of the size and the frequency of inter­
ventions. From figures 2.3c and 2.3d we can see that the SNB’s preferred strategy 
for intervention has been frequent interventions of small quantities. In the last 
two sections we saw that large size and high frequency intervention episodes in­
crease volatility. Practically, we are asking do 5 interventions of US dollars 10 
million each have the same effect on volatility as one intervention of US dol­
lars 50 million? The results of regressing the volatility measure on intervention 
quantity, intervention frequency and a quantity-frequency interaction term are 
in Table 2.10. The sum of the significant quantity coefficients is positive for 
all except the absolute return measure confirming again that the larger the in­
tervention, the higher the volatility. Almost all the frequency coefficients are 
insignificant28. The few quantity-frequency interaction coefficients that are sig­
nificant sum to give a small positive effect for the squared return measure and 
the absolute return measure. This means that for a given intervention quantity, 
the higher the frequency of intervention, the higher the volatility. For both the 
realised volatility measures the sum of the significant coefficients is negative indi­
cating that for a given intervention quantity or intervention frequency, the higher 
the other characteristic the lower the volatility. Thus the SNB’s intervention 
strategy of small but frequent interventions would be supported by these results 
only if based on the realised volatility measures.
28A possible explanation for this might be the possibility that size and frequency are highly 
correlated and hence are capturing the same effect.
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2.4.6 Time of Intervention
Central banks intervene at their own discretion, figure 2.3e shows that the max­
imum number of SNB interventions occur at 9am and 2pm GMT. Since the 
majority of the SNB’s interventions were joint with either the Fed or the Buba 
or both29, it is possible that the SNB timed its interventions to coincide with 
the opening of the London market and/or the New York market. The interest­
ing question then is, do interventions at different times of the day have different 
effects on volatility? I test this by splitting the sample of interventions into two 
sets, those at 9am (London open) and those at 2pm (New York open). The re­
sults of regressing exchange rate volatility on these two variables plus a dummy 
variable to control for joint interventions are in Table 2.11. As before the effect 
of the timing of the intervention varies with the volatility measure. For the two 
realised volatility measures 9am interventions reduce volatility while for the other 
two measures the significant coefficients have an overall positive effect increas­
ing volatility. 2pm interventions decrease volatility for both the squared return 
measures but increase volatility for both the absolute return measures.
A possible explanation for the positive coefficients is that at opening times 
there is increased uncertainty in the market and hence increased volatility. Alter­
natively, it could also be that the FFF seasonal has failed to capture the opening 
time volatility well enough.
Additionally, interventions were combined into morning and afternoon inter­
ventions30 and their effect on volatility was assessed in a regression similar to 
Eqn. (2.2). The results31 show that morning and afternoon interventions have a
29Table 2.3 gives the number of interventions joint with the Fed only, the Buba only and 
joint with both the Fed and the Buba.
30Morning interventions include those from 7am to 10am and afternoon interventions include 
interventions from 1pm to 4pm.
31 Available on request
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similar effect on volatility since nearly all the gamma coefficients are insignificant.
2.4.7 All Characteristics
In an effort to assess the combined effect of these different characteristics the 
volatility measures were regressed on the dummy variables for intervention, in­
tervention quantity, frequency, a quantity-frequency interaction term, 9am inter­
ventions, 2pm interventions, interventions joint with the Fed and interventions 
joint with the Bundesbank. Again the results, presented in Table 2.12, depend 
on the choice of volatility measure but the measures are most responsive to in­
terventions that are joint with the Fed, 2pm interventions and the size of the 
intervention. Counter intuitively, interventions that are joint with the Fed in­
crease volatility for all measures except the squared return measure for which 
it decreases volatility. For the squared return and absolute return measures in­
terventions that are joint with the Buba, 9am and 2pm interventions and the 
quantity-frequency interaction term all increase volatility but the size of the in­
tervention and the frequency of the intervention decreases volatility. For the two 
realised volatility measures interventions that are joint with the Buba, the size 
and the frequency of the intervention all increase volatility while 2pm interven­
tions and the quantity-frequency interaction term both decrease volatility and 
9am interventions have no effect on volatility. So if the SNB used the realised 
volatility measures we would expect to see them intervening in small quantities 
frequently or in one shot with a large quantity and they would time the interven­
tion at 2pm GMT. If you used the other two measures, the same strategy would 
end up increasing exchange rate volatility.
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2.4.8 Reuters Reports
Since the data on Reuters reports starts in Sept 1989, only a sub-sample of 
the interventions data is used to match the Reuters reports data. During the 
period Sept 1989 to Aug 1995 the SNB bought US dollars on 11 occasions (over 
6 different days) and sold US dollars on 47 occasions (over 27 different days)32.
Regressing the volatility measures on a dummy variable for Reuters reports 
shows that the news reports have no overall effect on volatility. But splitting into 
reports of buy interventions and those of sell interventions reveals that reports of 
buys are mostly insignificant while reports of sell interventions have a negative 
effect on volatility, mostly anticipated but also with lag for the two realised 
volatility measures (Table 2.13)33. In efficient foreign exchange markets new 
information should be absorbed into price immediately which makes it puzzling 
to observe lagged effects of the news on volatility. One possible explanation for 
observing lagged news effect only for the realised volatility measures is that by 
construction they have a lagged structure. An alternative view would be that 
market participants are slow to interpret this new information and so volatility 
effects are observed with a lag. On the other hand the anticipation effect might be 
indicative of information leakage before the report is released34. These regressions 
give the impression that reports of buy interventions have a dissimilar impact 
than reports of sell interventions. However, testing this explicitly indicates that 
reports of buys and reports of sells do not have a dissimilar relationship with 
volatility35.
32See Table 2.1.
33 Only the table with results for the reports of sell interventions is presented here. The 
results for reports of buy interventions are available on request.
34The effects of the timeliness of the news (comparing the timing of the report to the time 
of the intervention) axe investigated further in the next sub-section.
35 Results are available on request
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2.4.9 SN B Interventions and Reuters Reports
Finally, it is interesting to study whether, and how, markets reacts to actual 
interventions and news about the interventions. Intuitively, if a Reuters report 
was released before the intervention and if markets were efficient we would expect 
the intervention to have no impact on volatility since it does not convey new 
information. If the report is released after the intervention, then it could still 
have some effect on volatility since some market participants may still be unaware 
of the intervention. The strength of this effect will depend partly on how soon 
after the intervention the report is released. So it is interesting to examine the 
effect of Reuters reports on volatility in the presence of the actual intervention. 
I regress the volatility series on two dummy variables, one for the actual SNB 
interventions and the other for Reuters reports.
The results in Table 2.14 indicate that in the presence of the actual interven­
tions, Reuters reports have almost no effect on volatility. For the squared return 
and both absolute return measures, Reuters reports have a small negative im­
pact on volatility in contrast to the positive effect of the actual interventions. To 
understand this further I split these regressions into buy interventions and buy 
reports and sell interventions and sell reports. Looking at Table 2.15 we can see 
that this result is driven entirely by sell side interventions and reports. Reuters 
reports of buy interventions have an insignificant impact on volatility in the pres­
ence of the actual buy interventions while Reuters reports of sell interventions 
have a significant, anticipated and lagged, negative impact on volatility.
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2.5 Conclusions
This research has conducted an event study using the CHF-USD exchange rate 
and SNB interventions to study the relationship between the volatility of the 
exchange rate and the various characteristics of interventions. Additionally, us­
ing Reuters reports, it studies the impact of the news of these interventions on 
volatility. The data set contains information on the size, direction, frequency and 
the exact time of the intervention making it unique in many ways. The analy­
sis was conducted using four different measures of volatility - absolute returns, 
squared returns, one hour realised volatility based on absolute returns and one 
hour realised volatility based on squared returns. The results vary depending 
on which measure is used but there are some general conclusions that can be 
drawn. With this rich data set it has been possible to identify that interventions 
decrease volatility contemporaneously but this effect is reversed in the two hours 
afterward. Further, the direction of the intervention does not seem to affect 
volatility. Buy and sell interventions have similar effects on volatility and the 
same is true for against-the-wind and with-the-wind interventions.
The analysis also identifies a lagged negative effect of intervention quantity for 
the absolute return based volatility measures which would support the idea that 
large interventions calm markets. On the other hand, for realised volatility based 
on squared returns there is no effect at all while for the squared return measure 
the lagged effect is positive. There is weak evidence of non-linearity in the size 
effect. Further analysis of the volatility and intervention quantity relationship 
finds that as we move from small to large interventions, the larger interventions 
tend to increase volatility more than small interventions which is counter intuitive. 
This could be explained by the market interpreting larger intervention quantities
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as the central bank trying to push the exchange rate unsuccessfully, and this 
negative signal leads to higher volatility.
The frequency of interventions has a small but positive impact on volatility, 
and this is underscored when the analysis is done by splitting the sample into low, 
average and high frequency interventions. While small frequency interventions 
have no effect on volatility, average and high frequency interventions continue to 
have a significant positive effect.
The interaction between intervention quantity and intervention frequency re­
sults in a small positive effect on volatility for the squared return measure and 
the absolute return measure. This means that for a given intervention quantity, 
the higher the frequency of intervention, the higher the volatility. For both the 
realised volatility measures this effect is negative indicating that for a given in­
tervention quantity or intervention frequency, the higher the other characteristic 
the lower the volatility. So results based on the realised volatility measures would 
lend support to the SNB’s intervention strategy of small but frequent interven­
tions.
As before the effect of the timing of the intervention varies with the volatility 
measure. After controlling for joint interventions with the Fed and the Buba, 
results show that for the two realised volatility measures 9am interventions reduce 
volatility while for the other two measures the significant coefficients have an 
overall positive effect increasing volatility. On the other hand, 2pm interventions 
decrease volatility for both the squared return measures but increase volatility 
for both the absolute return measures.
Overall, Reuters reports of interventions do not appear to affect exchange 
rate volatility. This result appears to be driven by reports of buy interventions 
since reports of sell interventions have a lagged negative impact on volatility.
58
However, explicit testing of the difference of these impacts indicates that they 
are not dissimilar. Further, tests of the impact of Reuters reports in the presence 
of actual interventions find that Reuters reports have a small but significant and 
lagged negative effect 011 volatility for the squared return measure and both the 
absolute return measures. This overall effect is driven entirely by reports of sell 
interventions since reports of buy interventions are insignificant in the presence 
of buy intervention itself.
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Figure 2.1: Swiss franc - U.S. dollar Exchange Rate and SNB Interventions
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Notes: The data cover the period from March 1989 to Aug 1995. The currency is 
defined as the number of foreign currency per dollars and is the daily mid price at 
noon.
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Figure 2.2: Intraday Seasonality and the Flexible Fourier Transform
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Notes: The data cover the ten year period from 07 Oct 1986 to  15 Aug 1995 and are 
sampled at 15-minute frequency. The currency is defined as the number of foreign 
currency per dollars. For each of the four different measures of volatility, the figures 
plot the average intra-daily pattern of volatility (jagged line) and the Flexible Fourier 
Form seasonal (smooth line) over a 24-hour period. Volatility is defined as the absolute 
return, where returns are calculated as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote. 
The mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.
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Table 2.1: SNB Interventions
Number of 
interventions
Number of 
intervention days
Oct 86 - Aug 95
Total 171 97
Buy 70 33
Sell 101 64
Mar 89 - Aug 95
Total 58 33
Buy 11 6
Sell 47 27
Table 2.2: Intervention Direction
Moving Average
Daily 1 Week 2 Week 4 Week
Oct 86 - Aug 95
Against-the-wind 86 143 145 146
With-the-wind 85 28 26 25
Mar 89 - Aug 95
Against-the-wind 18 41 41 39
With-the-wind 40 17 17 19
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Figure 2.3: Characterising SNB Interventions
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Table 2.3: Reuters Reports
Buy Sell
SNB Interventions 11 47
Reuters Reports
Total 16 19
of which Joint 4 2
of which Joint with Fed and Buba 1 1
of which Joint with Fed only 2 0
of which Joint with Buba only 1 1
Missed 28
False 5
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Table 2.4: Effect of Interventions on Volatility
8
v o l t =  Oi +  E P i h + i  +  $1 V O lt- i +  02 VOlt-2  +  £ t
i=—8
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
a 0.0012** 0.0029** 0.0010** 0.0026**
0-8 -0.0058 -0.0087 -0.0015 -0.0017
P —7 0.0022 0.0042 0.0016 0.0069
P -  6 -0.0013 -0.0098 -0.0029 -0.0087
P -  5 -0.0039 0.0015 -0.0040* -0.0045
0-4 0.0042 0.0063 0.0045 0.0073
0-3 -0.0020 0.0052 -0.0020 0.0032
0-2 -0.0021 0.0046 -0.0013 0.0053
0-4 -0.0016 -0.0106 -0.0013 -0.0028
00 -0.0091* -0.0208* -0.0012 0.0017
01 -0.0034 -0.0163 -0.0012 -0.0037
02 0.0048 0.0156 -0.0004 -0.0041
03 0.0267** 0.0287* 0.0017 0.0071
04 -0.0362 -0.0056 0.0130** 0.0329**
05 0.0112 0.0280* 0.0093* 0.0305**
06 0.0292** 0.0269* -0.0034 -0.0051
07 -0.0255 -0.0123 -0.0174* -0.0053
08 0.0721* 0.0695** 0.0674* 0.0607**
01 1.0368** 1.0460** 0.1738** 0.2373**
02 -0.2466** -0.2057** 0.0819* 0.1349**
Adj A2 0.7172 0.7697 0.0590 0.1059
Q ( 2 ) 242.51** 195.39** 13.31** 12.65**
F  — t e s t 2624.7** 3458.4** 65.88** 123.52**
Notes: The coefficient estim ates are based oil OLS regressions using Newey-W est stan­
dard errors to  correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates 
significance at the 5% (1%) level, v o l t is the volatility measure. It+i is the interven­
tion indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to  buy or sell) and 0 
otherwise. Q ( 2) is the second order Box-Ljung statistic for serial correlation.
65
Table 2.5: Effect of Direction of Interventions on Volatility - Buy versus Sell
Interventions
8 8
vo lt =  at +  ^  p j  (B t+j +  St+j)  +  7 fc S t+k +  ...
j =-8 k=—8
6\ vo lt—I T  $2 volt-2  T  Et
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
a 0.0012** 0.0028** 0.0010** 0.0026**
7-8 0.0005 -0.0046 0.0035 0.0077
7-7 0.0109 0.0051 0.0061 -0.0078
7-6 -0.0012 0.0030 0.0055 0.0141
7-5 0.0034 -0.0075 -0.0034 -0.0189
7-4 0.0023 0.0036 0.0058 0.0163
7-3 0.0045 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0117
7-2 0.0053 0.0027 0.0081 0.0116
7 -1 -0.0136 -0.0195 -0.0037 -0.0098
7o -0.0062 -0.0134 0.0030 0.0090
7i 0.0132 0.0188 -0.0082 -0.0143
72 0.0127 0.0242 0.0045 0.0076
73 -0.0381 -0.0235 0.0152 0.0160
74 0.1100* 0.0851 0.0157 0.0339
75 -0.0162 -0.0172 -0.0183* -0.0286
76 -0.0574* -0.0384 0.0041 -0.0024
77 0.0650 0.0628* 0.0482* 0.0465*
78 -0.1317 -0.0893 -0.1251 -0.0698
Oi 1.0382** 1.0468** 0.1736** 0.2381**
62 -0.2478** -0.2060** 0.0836* 0.1352**
Adj R 2 0.7218 0.7706 0.0719 0.1084
0(2) 251.06** 197.21** 13.17** 12.59**
F  — t e s t 1381.1** 1787.9** 42.26** 65.70**
Notes: The coefficient estim ates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-W est stan­
dard errors to  correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates 
significance at the 5% (1%) level, volt is the volatility measure. Bt+j (St+j) is the  
buy (sell) intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB buys (sells) US dol­
lars and 0 otherwise. As noted in the main text, the coefficients o f interest are the  
gamm as. A non-zero 7  ^ coefficient implies that the two independent variables have 
different relationships w ith volatility. Q(2) is the second order Box-Ljung statistic for 
serial correlation.
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Table 2.6: Effect of Intervention Quantity on Volatility
8 8 8
v o l t =  oi -f ^  ^  I t+ i +  ^  7 j  \Q t+ j  \ +  5k Q t+ k  +  —
i= —8 j = —8 k—- 8
6\  v o l t - 1 +  ^2 v o l t -2  +  £*
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
a 0.0012** 0.0029** 0.0010** 0.0026**
P —8 -0.0052 -0.0009 0.0064 0.0331*
P - i 0.0038 -0.0057 0.0055 0.0095
0-6 -0.0026 -0.0141 -0.0112** -0.0323*
0 - 5 -0.0061 0.0056 -0.0083 -0.0176
0 - 4 0.0067 0.0053 0.0127 0.0318
0-8 -0.0049 0.0158 -0.0041 0.0066
0-2 0.0000 -0.0097 -0.0039 -0.0089
0-1 -0.0093 -0.0357 -0.0084 -0.0277
00 0.0014 0.0276 0.0062 0.0337
0 i 0.0140 0.0018 -0.0034 -0.0238
02 -0.0210 -0.0104 -0.0052 0.0038
03 0.0191 0.0283 0.0006 0.0153
04 -0.0683 -0.0791 -0.0006 0.0059
05 -0.0236 -0.0102 -0.0202 -0.0174
06 0.0848* 0.0920* 0.0077 0.0029
07 -0.0639 -0.0692 -0.0156 -0.0159
08 0.1278 0.1425 0.1039 0.1229
7-8 -0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0056**
7-7 -0.0003 0.0015 -0.0006 -0.0004
7-6 0.0003 0.0006 0.0012* 0.0034
7-5 -0.0001 -0.0018 0.0003 0.0006
7-4 0.0000 0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0027
7-3 0.0001 -0.0027 0.0002 -0.0010
7-2 -0.0003 0.0026 0.0003 0.0022
7-1 0.0016 0.0048 0.0010 0.0035
7o -0.0018 -0.0075* -0.0011 -0.0048*
7i -0.0027 -0.0028 0.0005 0.0038
72 0.0041 0.0042 0.0005 -0.0016
73 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0027
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Table 2.6: Contd.
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
74 0.0037 0.0092 0.0021 0.0040
75 0.0051 0.0063 0.0045* 0.0076*
76 -0.0086 -0.0114* -0.0025 -0.0027
77 0.0051 0.0075 -0.0007 0.0006
78 -0.0068 -0.0094 -0.0042 -0.0079
<^—8 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0000* 0.0002**
5 -  7 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
<5-6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* -0.0001
-^5 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
<5-4 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
<5-3 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
<5-2 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
<5-! -0.0001* -0.0002* 0.0000 -0.0001
<5o 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0000 0.0001*
<5i 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001**
<52 -0.0001* -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
<53 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001*
<54 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
5^ -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001** -0.0002**
<*6 0.0002* 0.0004** 0.0001* 0.0002
87 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
ss 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
0i 1.0371** 1.0474** 0.1736** 0.2378**
#2 -0.2468** -0.2068** 0.0829* 0.1364**
Adj R 2 0.7176 0.7705 0.0600 0.1092
Q ( 2 ) 244.00** 197.88** 13.27** 12.18**
F  — te s t 911.03** 1203.0** 23.86** 44.93**
Notes: The coefficient estim ates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-W est stan­
dard errors to  correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A  * (**) indicates 
significance at the 5% (1%) level. volt is the volatility measure. It+i is the intervention  
indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0 oth­
erwise. \Qt+j\ is the absolute m agnitude of US dollars bought or sold by the SNB and 
Q2+k is the squared quantity. Q(2) is the second order Box-Ljung statistic for serial 
correlation.
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Table 2.7: Effect of Intervention Quantity on Volatility: Small, Average and
Large Quantity Interventions
8 8 8
v o l t — Oi +  P i I t+ i +  7j S Q t + j  +  A Q t+ k  +  •••
i——8 j = —8 fc=—8
8
4>l L Q t+ l +  $1 v o l t - 1 +  ^2 v o l t -2  +  £*
/ = —8
Volatility Measure (sum of all coefficients)
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
a 0.0012** 0.0029** 0.0010** 0.0026**
P -0.0487 -0.1574 -0.0550 -0.2100
7 0.0186 0.0468 0.0211 0.0620
S 0.0113 0.0261 0.0121 0.0332
<$> 0.0052 0.0156 0.0047 0.0157
1.0368** 1.0468** 0.1735** 0.2375**
02 -0.2464** -0.2061** 0.0823* 0.1365**
Adj R 2 0.7177 0.7707 0.0600 0.1096
Q(2) 243.47** 198.12** 13.28** 12.32**
F  — t e s t 687.11** 908.25** 18.24** 34.25**
Notes: The coefficient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West stan­
dard errors to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The table shows the 
sum of all coefficients. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level, v o l t is 
the volatility measure. SQt+j is an indicator for small magnitude interventions which 
are defined as sales or purchases of up to 5 million US dollars, AQt+k is an indicator 
for interventions between 5 and 10 million US dollars and LQt+i is an indicator for 
interventions that are larger than 10 million US dollars. With this classification there 
are 27 small, 26 average and 5 large interventions. Q(2) is the second order Box-Ljung 
statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 2.8: Effect of Intervention Frequency on Volatility 
8 8
volt — OL +  ^  ^ Pi It+i +  ^  ^ 7 j  Ft+j +  0\ vo lt- 1 +  $2 vo lt - 2  +  £t
i—~ 8 j = - 8
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
a 0.0012** 0.0028** 0.0010** 0.0026**
P - s 0.0047 0.0229 0.0002 0.0073
P-7 -0.0053 -0.0077 -0.0028 0.0019
(3-6 -0.0079* -0.0331* -0.0026 -0.0069
(3- 5 -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0030 -0.0048
/?-4 -0.0069 -0.0187 -0.0092* -0.0291**
{3- 3 -0.0034 0.0092 -0.0033 -0.0018
P- 2 0.0038 0.0267 0.0006 0.0179
/?-l 0.0002 0.0028 -0.0015 0.0004
A) 0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0030 -0.0021
A -0.0197** -0.0502** -0.0032 -0.0125
P2 -0.0265** -0.0407** -0.0096* -0.0189
Ps 0.0124 0.0001 -0.0114 -0.0210
P4 -0.0275 -0.0075 -0.0147 -0.0194
Pb 0.0176 0.0354 0.0159* 0.0358*
Pe 0.0352* 0.0519** 0.0163 0.0258
Pi -0.0501* -0.0440* -0.0203 -0.0094
P8 0.0509 0.0342 0.0268 0.0120
7-8 -0.0024* -0.0074** -0.0003 -0.0019
7-7 0.0017 0.0025 0.0012 0.0013
7-6 0.0016 0.0056* 0.0000 -0.0005
7-5 0.0000 0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0002
7-4 0.0027 0.0061* 0.0032* 0.0087**
7-3 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0017
7-2 -0.0012 -0.0050 -0.0003 -0.0028
7-1 -0.0005 -0.0032 0.0001 -0.0007
7o -0.0030 -0.0049 0.0004 0.0009
7i 0.0036* 0.0076* 0.0003 0.0019
72 0.0078** 0.0139** 0.0021 0.0034
73 0.0039 0.0074* 0.0032 0.0067*
74 -0.0020 0.0007 0.0069** 0.0130**
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Table 2.8: Contd.
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
75 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0012 -0.0006
76 -0.0016 -0.0061 -0.0050** -0.0078**
77 0.0060 0.0074 0.0004 0.0005
78 0.0054 0.0090 0.0101 0.0122*
01 1.0356** 1.0442** 0.1720** 0.2350**
02 -0.2461** -0.2045** 0.0828* 0.1355**
Adj R 2 0.7177 0.7706 0.0628 0.1106
0(2) 245.39** 198.82** 13.28** 12.27**
F  — t e s t 1353.8** 1787.7** 36.71** 67.21**
Notes: The coefficient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West stan­
dard errors to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates 
significance at the 5% (1%) level, v o l t is the volatility measure. I t+ i is the interven­
tion indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0 
otherwise. Ft+j is a dummy variable for the frequency of the intervention. Q(2) is the 
second order Box-Ljung statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 2.9: Effect of Intervention Frequency on Volatility: Low, Average and High
Frequency Interventions
8 8 8
v o l t  — c t +  E P i %t+i “1“ E 7 j  L F t+ j  4 -  ^ 2 ,  ^ k A F t + k  +  . . .
i=—8 j = - 8 k=—8
8
^  ] 4>i HFt+i +  6\ v o lt- i  +  02 vo lt - 2  St
l= - 8
Volatility Measure (sum of all coefficients)
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
a 0.0012** 0.0028** 0.0010** 0.0026**
P -0.0761 -0.0460 -0.0689 -0.0588
7 0.0397 0.0401 0.0366 0.0470
6 0.0231 0.0340 0.0255 0.0424
4> 0.0171 0.0264 0.0160 0.0287
0i 1.0362** 1.0434** 0.1712** 0.2343**
02 -0.2466** -0.2035** 0.0821* 0.1343**
Adj R 2 0.7204 0.7718 0.0676 0.1128
0(2) 242.26** 192.22** 13.25 12.27**
F  — t e s t 696.45** 913.54** 20.58** 35.34**
Notes: The coefficient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West stan­
dard errors to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The table shows the 
sum of all coefficients. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level, v o l t is 
the volatility measure. I t+ i is the intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB 
intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0 otherwise. LFt+j is an indicator for low fre­
quency interventions (between 1 and 6 times in 15 minutes), A F t+ k is an indicator for 
intervention frequency between 7 and 12 times in 15 minutes and HFt+i is an indicator 
for frequency of interventions larger than 13. With this classification there are 44 low, 
12 average and 2 high frequency interventions. Q(2) is the second order Box-Ljung 
statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 2.10: Effect of Intervention Quantity and Frequency on Volatility
8 8 8
voit — cn+ Pi i t+i + t j Qt+j + $k Ft+k+ —
i=-8 j=-8 k= - 8
8
r ,  ^
l= — 8
* Ft+i +  0i vo lt-i +  6 2 volt- 2 +
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
CK 0.0012** 0.0028** 0.0010** 0.0026**
0-8 0.0058 0.0078 0.0002 -0.0029
P - 7 -0.0039 0.0033 -0.0021 -0.0035
/?-6 -0.0012 -0.0056 -0.0016 -0.0007
P—5 -0.0133 -0.0302 -0.0103 -0.0225
0-4 -0.0103 -0.0143 -0.0124 -0.0193
0-3 -0.0118 -0.0336 -0.0055 -0.0148
0 - 2 -0.0309** -0.0381 -0.0100 -0.0085
0 - 1 0.0186 0.0522 -0.0066 -0.0086
Po -0.0078 -0.0147 -0.0103 -0.0162
Pi -0.0094 -0.0084 0.0073 0.0272
P2 0.0110 0.0111 0.0176* 0.0291
Ps -0.0075 -0.0470 -0.0276* -0.0647*
P4 -0.0228 -0.0157 -0.0044 -0.0082
Ps 0.0241 0.0460 0.0144 0.0235
Pe 0.0416 0.0481 0.0050 0.0112
P 7 -0.0930 -0.0835 -0.0143 -0.0038
Ps 0.0773 0.0627 0.0288 0.0288
7-8 -0.0001 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0007
7-7 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0006
7-6 -0.0002 -0.0018 0.0001 -0.0001
7-5 0.0005 0.0018 0.0004 0.0012
7-4 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0009
7-3 0.0010 0.0043* 0.0004 0.0016
7-2 0.0029** 0.0054** 0.0009 0.0023
7 -1 -0.0014* -0.0040 0.0005 0.0010
7o 0.0005 0.0000 0.0006 0.0010
73
Table 2.10: Contd.
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
7i -0.0009 -0.0036* -0.0009** -0.0035**
72 -0.0032 -0.0046 -0.0024** -0.0043*
73 0.0018 0.0046** 0.0013 0.0038*
74 0.0003 0.0018 -0.0004 -0.0001
75 -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0003 0.0013
76 -0.0002 0.0013 0.0012 0.0018
77 0.0037 0.0035 -0.0006 -0.0008
78 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0005 -0.0017
<5—8 -0.0046 -0.0099 -0.0005 -0.0004
8-7 0.0020 0.0014 0.0018 0.0045
8 - 6 0.0003 -0.0024 -0.0003 -0.0014
8-5 0.0002 0.0024 -0.0008 -0.0028
8 -  4 0.0051 0.0103 0.0057 0.0109
<5-3 0.0012 0.0049 0.0008 0.0035
<5-2 0.0086** 0.0148* 0.0020 0.0046
<5-1 -0.0036 -0.0121* 0.0011 -0.0005
<50 -0.0004 -0.0009 0.0029 0.0054
<5i 0.0012 -0.0027 -0.0009 -0.0037
<52 -0.0020 0.0012 -0.0063* -0.0109*
8 3 0.0070 0.0167* 0.0049 0.0120
8 4 -0.0102 -0.0091 0.0036 0.0087
8 5 -0.0044 -0.0025 -0.0009 0.0054
Se -0.0020 -0.0102 -0.0049 -0.0108
8 7 0.0134 0.0120 -0.0027 -0.0066
0.0090 0.0126 0.0173 0.0171
0-8 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001
0-7 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0004
0-6 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000
0-5 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005
0-4 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003
0-3 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003
0-2 -0.0009** -0.0018** -0.0002 -0.0007
0-1 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0000
00 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003
01 0.0002 0.0009 0.0001 0.0004
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Table 2.10: Contd.
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
02 0.0009 0.0011 0.0008** 0.0014**
03 -0.0003 -0.0009* -0.0001 -0.0004
04 0.0007 0.0008 0.0002 0.0002
05 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0007
06 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003
07 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0008
08 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0006
0 i 1.0350** 1.0446** 0.1714** 0.2354**
62 -0.2453** -0.2045** 0.0836* 0.1367**
Adj R 2 0.7181 0.7711 0.0635 0.1128
0(2) 243.79** 197.86** 13.27** 12.21**
F  — t e s t 688.48** 910.10** 19.32** 35.32**
Notes: The coefficient estimates are based oil OLS regressions using Newey-West stan­
dard errors to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates 
significance at the 5% (1%) level. v o l t is the volatility measure. I t+ i is the intervention 
indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0 oth­
erwise. Q t+ j  is the absolute magnitude of US dollars bought or sold by the SNB, F t+k  
is a dummy variable for the frequency of the intervention and Q t+ i * Ft+i is a dummy 
variable for the quantity-frequency interaction. Q ( 2) is the second order Box-Ljung 
statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 2.11: Effect of Time of Interventions on Volatility: 9am versus 2pm
8 8
v o l t =  a + ^ 2  Pi 9amt+i +  ^  7 , 2 + ...
i= - 8 j= -8
8
'Tt+fc +  $1 v o l t - 1 +  $2 v o l t -2  +  £«
k——8
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
o: 0.0014** 0.0032** 0.0011** 0.0029**
P—8 -0.0119** -0.0186 -0.0117** -0.0177
P-7 0.0017 -0.0002 0.0069 0.0211
P - 6 -0.0081** -0.0267* -0.0069** -0.0214**
P - 5 0.0018 0.0126 -0.0026 -0.0064
0-4 -0.0075 -0.0258 -0.0020 -0.0051
0-3 0.0082 0.0263 0.0046 0.0208
P - 2 0.0007 0.0023 0.0011 0.0056
0-1 -0.0028 -0.0182 -0.0027 -0.0138
00 -0.0080 -0.0127 0.0071 0.0282*
01 0.0048 0.0035 -0.0037 -0.0064
02 0.0079 0.0257 0.0024 0.0061
03 0.0132 0.0336 0.0061 0.0172
04 0.0156 0.0595 0.0237** 0.0631**
05 0.0059 0.0142 0.0010 0.0182
06 0.0023 0.0154 0.0030 0.0116
Pi -0.0137 -0.0133 -0.0012 0.0057
08 0.0230 0.0307 0.0127 0.0198
7-8 -0.0069 -0.0130 0.0018 0.0017
7-7 0.0023 0.0022 0.0040 0.0133
7-6 0.0012 -0.0096 -0.0028 -0.0069
7-5 -0.0071 -0.0211 -0.0083** -0.0251**
7-4 0.0096 0.0156 0.0108 0.0169
7-3 0.0009 0.0082 0.0027 0.0106
7-2 0.0054 0.0293* -0.0013 0.0095
7-1 0.0000 -0.0027 0.0007 0.0064
7o -0.0085 -0.0069 0.0015 0.0084
7i -0.0003 -0.0055 0.0021 0.0105
72 -0.0082 -0.0183 -0.0086 -0.0204
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Table 2.11: Contd.
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
73 0.0373 0.0441* 0.0003 0.0090
74 -0.0513 -0.0312 0.0137 0.0196
75 0.0160 0.0230 0.0070 0.0279
76 0.0456** 0.0526** -0.0007 0.0091
77 -0.0724* -0.0508 -0.0294* -0.0202
78 0.0829 0.0726 0.0819 0.0753*
6 - 8 -0.0023 -0.0016 0.0008 0.0017
6-7 0.0221 0.0294 0.0165 0.0293
6 - 8 -0.0074 -0.0025 -0.0038 -0.0020
6-5 -0.0036 -0.0199 -0.0041 -0.0155
6-4 0.0007 -0.0244 0.0026 0.0045
6-3 -0.0201 -0.0188 -0.0079 -0.0059
6 - 2 0.0161 0.0223 0.0022 -0.0068
6 - 1 -0.0067 -0.0092 -0.0023 0.0024
6 o 0.0240 0.0587* 0.0049 0.0390
6 i -0.0641 -0.0292 0.0135 0.0247
6 2 0.0344 0.0276 0.0004 -0.0012
6 3 0.0582 0.0511 0.0073 0.0289
6 4 -0.0549 -0.0891 -0.0024 -0.0078
6 5 0.1573 0.1201 0.1140 0.0820
6 e -0.0557 -0.0391 -0.0087 -0.0191
6 7 0.0348 0.0622* -0.0076 0.0093
6 s 0.1056 0.1413* 0.0795 0.1171*
0 i 1.0448** 1.0507** 0.1786** 0.2406**
0 2 -0.2549** -0.2101** 0.0763 0.1317**
Adj t i 2 0.7186 0.7702 0.0566 0.1049
0(2) 233.27** 190.34** 14.31** 12.96**
F  — test 915.70** 1200.9** 22.50** 42.98**
Notes: The coefficient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West stan­
dard errors to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates 
significance at the 5% (1%) level, v o l t is the volatility measure. 9a m t+ i is a dummy 
variable for interventions occurring at 9am, 2p m t+ j  is a dummy variable for interven­
tions occurring at 2pm and J t+ k  is a dummy variable that controls for interventions 
that were joint with either the Fed or the Buba or both. Q(2) is the second order 
Box-Ljung statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 2.12: Effect of Different Intervention Characteristics on Volatility 
8 8 8 8
voit — a +^22 p* it+i +  ^22 Qt+j +  2^2 k^ ^t+k ^1 Qf+i * ^t+i
i=— 8 j =—8 k=-8 l=—8
8 8 8
^  Krn 9 a m t+rn +  ^  An 2p m t+n  +  ^  f ip F e d t+P +  ...
m=—8 n=—8 p=—8
8
^   ^ (j>q B u b d t+ q  +  01 V o l t - l  +  #2 VOlt-2  +  Et
q= -8
Volatility Measure (sum of all coefficients)
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
a 0.0012** 0.0028** 0.0010** 0.0026**
P -0.0040 -0.0470 -0.0155 -0.0636
7 0.0001 0.0045 -0.0003 0.0033
5 0.0176 0.0249 0.0199 0.0326
V 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001
K -0.0356 0.0173 -0.0237 0.0532
A -0.0185 -0.0190 0.0179 0.0461
V 0.7966 0.5604 0.6868 0.5474
<i> 0.3147 0.3539 0.2707 0.2824
0i 1.0367** 1.0423** 0.1697* 0.2334**
02 -0.2474** -0.2020** 0.0848* 0.1366**
Adj R 2 0.7312 0.7744 0.1018 0.1234
0(2) 250.38** 195.56** 13.17** 12.49**
F  — t e s t 370.72** 467.63** 16.41** 20.15**
Notes: The coefficient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West stan­
dard errors to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The table shows the 
sum of all coefficients. A * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level, v o l t is 
the volatility measure. It+i is the intervention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB 
intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0 otherwise. Q t+ j  is the absolute magnitude of 
US dollars bought or sold by the SNB, F t+k is a dummy variable for the frequency of 
the intervention, Q t+ i* F t+ i is a dummy variable for the quantity-frequency interaction, 
9amt+i is a dummy variable for interventions occurring at 9am, 2prrit+j is a dummy 
variable for interventions occurring at 2pm, F e d t+ P is a dummy variable that controls 
for interventions that were joint with the Fed and B u b a t+ q  is a dummy variable that 
controls for interventions that were joint with the Bundesbank. Q ( 2) is the second 
order Box-Ljung statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 2.13: Effect of Reuters Reports of Sell Interventions on Volatility
8
volt =  OL + ^  ^Pi RSt+i +  9\ volt-1 T $2 volt-2 +  £t
i= - 8
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
a 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002
P-8 -0.0060** -0.0150 -0.0066** -0.0187*
(3-7 -0.0045 -0.0085 -0.0026 -0.0048
P—6 -0.0044 -0.0057 -0.0031 -0.0054
P-5 -0.0060 -0.0217 -0.0055* -0.0179
P-A -0.0096 -0.0442* -0.0051* -0.0151
P-3 -0.0071 -0.0162 -0.0025 -0.0109
P-2 0.0054 0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0155
P-1 -0.0040 0.0025 -0.0014 -0.0049
Po 0.0083 0.0455* 0.0060 0.0321
Pi 0.0093 0.0047 0.0063 0.0117
P2 -0.0077 -0.0056 -0.0048 -0.0052
p3 0.0054 -0.0043 0.0043 -0.0026
Pa -0.0090** -0.0360* -0.0033 -0.0178
-0.0003 0.0115 -0.0041 0.0000
P6 -0.0074 -0.0257 0.0015 -0.0094
P7 0.0075 0.0115 -0.0011 -0.0007
(38 0.0079 0.0124 0.0064 0.0171
01 1.0666** 1.0539** 0.2037** 0.2148**
e 2 -0.2702** -0.2297** 0.0591** 0.0931**
Adj R 2 0.7266 0.7485 0.0501 0.0642
0(2) 230.49** 189.22** 14.68** 15.39**
F  — t e s t 2563.1** 3420.4** 46.75** 110.98**
Notes: The coefficient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West stan­
dard errors to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates 
significance at the 5% (1%) level, v o l t is the volatility measure. RSt+% is a dummy 
variable which is 1 whenever there is a Reuters report that the SNB sold US dollars 
and 0 otherwise. Q (2) is the second order Box-Ljung statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 2.14: Effect of SNB Interventions and Reuters Reports on Volatility 
8 8
volt — C* +  ^   ^ Pi It+i +  ^   ^ 7 j  R R t+ j T  ^1 v o l t -1 +  $2 vo lt - 2  H~
i= -8 i=- s
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility 
Squared Absolute
Squared
Return
Absolute
Return
a 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
P -8 -0.0019 0.0000 -0.0015 -0.0009
(3-7 0.0053 0.0025 0.0084 0.0143
(3-6 0.0034 0.0061 -0.0010 -0.0024
(3-5 -0.0040 0.0076 -0.0042 0.0008
(3-4 -0.0002 -0.0080 0.0020 0.0047
(3 - 3 0.0060 0.0275* 0.0031 0.0185
/?-2 -0.0042 -0.0090 -0.0028 -0.0019
/?-! -0.0061 -0.0184 0.0010 0.0013
A -0.0073 -0.0037 0.0030 0.0188
A 0.0073 -0.0003 -0.0029 -0.0071
P 2 0.0103 0.0335 0.0050 0.0167
P s 0.0503** 0.0735** 0.0150* 0.0383**
P a -0.0606 -0.0164 0.0229** 0.0526**
P5 0.0132 0.0328 0.0007 0.0280*
P 6 0.0497* 0.0520** -0.0023 0.0085
P7 -0.0511 -0.0228 -0.0237 -0.0083
P 8 0.1189* 0.1221* 0.1124* 0.1102*
7-8 0.0135 0.0189 0.0079 0.0075
7-7 -0.0121 -0.0135 0.0040 0.0085
7-6 0.0003 -0.0103 -0.0047 -0.0125
7-5 -0.0086 -0.0354* -0.0090* -0.0243*
7-4 -0.0026 -0.0249 -0.0093 -0.0250
7-3 -0.0018 -0.0068 0.0119 0.0054
7-2 -0.0019 -0.0045 -0.0040 -0.0123
7-1 0.0032 0.0192 -0.0018 0.0060
7o 0.0086 0.0163 -0.0087 -0.0009
7i -0.0285 -0.0206 0.0163 0.0191
72 0.0200 0.0136 -0.0002 -0.0028
73 0.0177 -0.0050 -0.0029 -0.0136
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Table 2.14: Contd.
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
74 -0.0419 -0.0592 -0.0132* -0.0204
75 0.0863 0.0671 0.0539 0.0385
76 -0.0477 -0.0446 -0.0143 -0.0212
77 0.0163 0.0202 -0.0029 0.0046
78 0.0511 0.0622 0.0363 0.0476
01 1.0677** 1.0535** 0.2033** 0.2137**
02 -0.2724** -0.2303** 0.0583** 0.0921**
Adj R 2 0.7281 0.7489 0.0547 0.0661
0 (2) 238.74** 192.43** 13.27** 12.59**
F  — t e s t 1367.1** 1788.1** 36.64** 65.18**
Notes: The coefficient estimates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-West stan­
dard errors to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A * (**) indicates 
significance at the 5% (1%) level, v o l t is the volatility measure. I t+ i is the intervention 
indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB intervenes (whether to buy or sell) and 0 oth­
erwise and RRt+j is a dummy variable indicating when there is a Reuters report of an 
SNB intervention. Q(2) is the second order Box-Ljung statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 2.15: Effect of Sell Interventions and Sell Reports on Volatility 
8 8
volt =  OL ^   ^ Pi ISt+i +  ^   ^ 7 j R S t+ j T  @1 vo lt - 1  +  $2 vo lt- 2  +
i—-8 J=-8
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility 
Squared Absolute
Squared
Return
Absolute
Return
a 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
P -8 -0.0015 0.0007 -0.0010 0.0002
(3-7 0.0115 0.0089 0.0109 0.0157
(3—6 0.0011 -0.0021 0.0006 -0.0017
(3—5 0.0003 0.0170 -0.0027 0.0001
(3-4 -0.0015 -0.0159 0.0036 0.0057
P -  3 0.0070 0.0295* 0.0004 0.0132
P —2 -0.0049 -0.0092 0.0006 0.0051
P - l -0.0061 -0.0233 -0.0023 -0.0105
Po -0.0089 -0.0097 0.0053 0.0277*
P i 0.0029 -0.0093 -0.0064 -0.0155
P 2 0.0136 0.0461* 0.0090 0.0225
p 3 0.0280** 0.0591** 0.0125* 0.0313*
p 4 0.0083 0.0471 0.0280** 0.0708**
05 0.0156* 0.0440** 0.0060 0.0354**
P 6 0.0146* 0.0341 0.0071 0.0122
P7 -0.0096 -0.0060 -0.0047 0.0027
p 8 0.0360* 0.0541* 0.0289 0.0484*
7 -8 -0.0063** -0.0171* -0.0072** -0.0233*
7 -7 -0.0084 -0.0182 -0.0034 -0.0082
7 -6 -0.0076* -0.0138 -0.0072* -0.0155
7 -5 -0.0115* -0.0349* -0.0103** -0.0307**
7 -4 -0.0107 -0.0494* -0.0094** -0.0276*
7 -3 -0.0084 -0.0190 -0.0025 -0.0141
7-2 0.0009 -0.0120 -0.0055 -0.0253
7-i -0.0089 -0.0068 -0.0054 -0.0147
7o 0.0010 0.0265 -0.0018 0.0132
7i 0.0060 -0.0054 0.0030 -0.0004
72 -0.0096 -0.0120 -0.0079 -0.0143
73 0.0008 -0.0182 0.0014 -0.0140
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Table 2.15: Contd.
Volatility Measure
Realised Volatility Squared Absolute
Squared Absolute Return Return
74 -0.0176** -0.0533** -0.0088 -0.0294*
75 -0.0051 -0.0037 -0.0096 -0.0146
76 -0.0160** -0.0445** -0.0053 -0.0262
77 0.0054 0.0029 -0.0040 -0.0094
78 0.0048 0.0031 0.0047 0.0105
01 1.0664** 1.0533** 0.2035** 0.2141**
02 -0.2703** -0.2296** 0.0589** 0.0926**
Adj R 2 0.7267 0.7486 0.0506 0.0651
0(2) 231.33** 191.30** 15.66** 14.33**
F  — t e s t 1319.9** 1766.4** 25.10** 60.20**
Notes: T he coefficient estim ates are based on OLS regressions using Newey-W est stan­
dard errors to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. A  * (**) indicates 
significance at the 5% (1%) level, volt is the volatility measure. I S t + i  is the inter­
vention indicator which is 1 whenever the SNB sells US dollars and 0 otherwise and 
R S t + j  is a dum m y variable which is 1 whenever there is a Reuters report that the SNB  
sold US dollars and 0 otherwise. Q ( 2 ) is the second order Box-Ljung statistic for serial 
correlation.
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Chapter 3 
W hat Defines “N ew s” in Foreign 
Exchange Markets?
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines intra-day foreign exchange market reactions to a wide array 
of “news” reported in the financial press. A number of previous studies have 
shown that in order to find significant reactions in the foreign exchange market 
to the macroeconomic variables that theory suggests should matter, one needs to 
measure the precise impact of macro surprises at the intra-day level. While these 
studies provide evidence that macro news influences both returns and volatility, 
because these announcements occur very infrequently (typically once a month 
or quarter) they cannot go far in explaining the bulk of foreign exchange rate 
movements. In this paper, we ask whether a much broader definition of “news” 
influences currency values and ought to be included in our models of exchange 
rate determination. Using Reuters’ time-stamped newswire reports, we include
1This chapter is based on joint work with Prof. Kathryn M.E. Dominguez.
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all news stories that provide information relevant to foreign exchange markets. 
The stories are then classified by information source (policymaker or market par­
ticipant), geographic region (Euro zone, Japan, U.S. or U.K.) and substance (both 
actual events and rumours involving fundamentals and non-fundamentals). Our 
“news” data include the scheduled macro announcements that have been used in 
previous studies to allow us to compare the effects of our broader definition of 
news against these more “traditional” variables. The intra-day foreign exchange 
data used in this study are transactions prices and quote spreads in the USD- 
EUR and USD-GBP market from the Reuters D2000-2 electronic trading system. 
The data do not include information on traded quantities, but they do indicate 
whether trades were initiated by a buyer or seller, allowing us to measure order 
flow as well as returns and volatility. We use a 20 minute sampling frequency for 
each exchange rate and we measure order flow as the cumulative number of buyer 
initiated trades minus the cumulative number of seller initiated trades over the 
same 20 minutes.
These data allow us to test a number of interesting hypotheses. First, we 
test whether non-scheduled “news” of different sorts has similar impact effects 
on returns and volatility as compared to (the already heavily studied) scheduled 
macro announcements. Theory suggests that ambiguous information may lead 
to stronger differences of opinion about the implications of the information (and, 
in turn, larger increases in volatility). In our application, we can distinguish 
between scheduled (and presumably better-understood) macro announcements 
and more ambiguous news (for example, market rumours of impending interest 
rate changes). Second, we test whether news that is typically not considered 
“fundamental” in the context of standard models of exchange rate determination 
(for example, news related to technical analysis), helps to explain exchange rate
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movements. Third, we examine whether any of the price discovery process in 
reaction to news occurs via order flow. Previous studies have found evidence 
that a substantial proportion of the market reaction to macro-announcements 
occurs via order flow. By examining how a broader set of news events influences 
order flow - we can begin to better understand how this measure relates to price 
and volatility movements in the foreign exchange markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the links between macroe­
conomic fundamentals and exchange rates in standard models, the lack of empiri­
cal support for these links, and alternative modeling strategies that may improve 
our understanding of what drives exchange rate movements. Section 3 describes 
the exchange rate and order flow data from Reuters D2000-2 used in our empirical 
analysis. Section 4 provides results of our event study analysis of the influence 
of our broader definition of news on exchange rate returns and volatility. Section 
5 introduces our order flow information and examines its role in explaining ex­
change rate movements. Section 6 examines the influence of news on returns and 
order flow simultaneously in the context of a VAR analysis. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 News and Exchange Rates
The asset approach to exchange rate determination suggests that exchange rates 
are forward looking asset prices that react to changes in the market’s expectation 
of future fundamentals. Empirical tests of the asset approach examine in var­
ious ways whether changes in the macroeconomic variables that are considered 
fundamentals explain exchange rate movements2. These tests generally find that 
macroeconomic variables, which tend to have fairly stable time series properties,
2Examples of “fundamentals” include: income (or output) differentials, money differentials, 
interest rate differentials, inflation differentials and the trade balance.
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can explain little of the (sometimes dramatic) variation in exchange rate move­
ments. This line of research is best summarized by a series of papers by Meese 
and Rogoff (1983a,b) which find that forecasts of exchange rates based on a ran­
dom walk model of exchange rate determination do better than forecasts that are 
based on macro-economic models3.
In the wake of the Meese and Rogoff papers4, one branch of empirical research 
has focused on the possibility that their result was more a function of estimation 
imprecision than an indictment of the asset approach5. If the window of time 
around the shock to fundamentals is too wide, other news hitting the market 
will confound the econometrician’s ability to precisely estimate the effects of the 
change in fundamentals on exchange rates. One solution is to use intra-daily 
exchange rate data that will allow a narrow enough window around the time 
of macro announcements to be able to set up a natural experiment. A number 
of papers, including Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003), find that 
when a narrow window is used, they are able to find a strong relationship between 
certain macro-surprises and exchange rate returns6. An alternative approach is
3 Engel and West (2005) provide an explanation for the Meese-Rogoff result based on the 
present value relationship that follows from the asset approach. They show that if the discount 
factor is near one, exchange rates will be largely driven by expected fundamentals far out into 
the future, which will be dominated by their random walk component. Other studies that re­
examine the Meese-Rogoff result for long-horizon forecasts include Mark (1995), Kilian (1999), 
Kilian and Taylor (2003).
4 A number of researchers have re-investigated the original Meese and Rogoff (1983a,b) result 
and have generally found it to be robust. See, for example, Flood and Rose (1995), Cheung, 
Chinn, and Pascual (2004).
5An alternative approach assumes that the underlying reason for the Meese-Rogoff result 
is that the foreign exchange market is either not efficient, or that market participants are 
not rational. The fact that many foreign exchange traders follow technical trading rules that 
are unrelated to the types of variables found in standard exchange rate determination models 
provides suggestive evidence that this approach may have some merit. See Osier (2003) for an 
example of this approach.
6The enormous literature measuring the effects of macro news on intra-daily exchange rates 
includes Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Ederington and Lee (1995), de Gen- 
naro and Shrieves (1997), Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev 
(1998), Melvin and Yin (2000), Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright (2003), Love and Payne
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taken by Fair (2003) who identifies large intra-day changes in exchange rates 
(and stock and bond prices) over the period 1982 through 1999 and then looks 
for “news” that hit markets around the large changes to connect exchange rates 
movements to changes in macro fundamentals.
This paper takes the results in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) 
as a benchmark, and asks three important follow-on questions. First, are the tra­
ditional sets of macro surprises that most of the literature considers the only sorts 
of news that can explain exchange rate movements? We examine the intra-daily 
influence of a broad set of news reports, including variables which are not typi­
cally considered “fundamentals” in the context of standard models of exchange 
rate determination, and ask whether they too help explain exchange rate move­
ments7. If we find that non-fundamental variables matter, the “positive” results 
that many researchers have found for the influence of macro announcements on 
exchange rates at intra-daily frequencies may need to be re-interpreted. If all 
sorts of news influence exchange rates, the “narrow window” explanation for why 
low frequency empirical tests of standard models are inappropriate, is no longer 
sufficient. Or, put another way, we are back again to the Meese-Rogoff result 
that it is not macro-fundamentals that best predict exchange rate behaviour. 
Second, we ask whether using a broader definition of news, we are able to explain 
a significant portion of the overall variation of exchange rate movements. Macro­
announcements occur relatively infrequently, so that even if they explain 100% 
of the short-term movements in exchange rates, this translates into explaining
(2003), Love (2004), Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, Iyer, Liu, and Wright (2004), Bauwens, 
Omrane, and Giot (2005).
7 A number of papers have considered the influence of central bank interventions and official 
policy statements on exchange rates. These papers include: Dominguez (1998, 2003b, forth­
coming), Cai, Cheung, Lee, and Melvin (2001), Evans and Lyons (2003), Fatum and Hutchinson 
(2003), Fratzscher (2004), Panthaki (2005), Sager and Taylor (2004), Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2005), Jansen and de Haan (1987).
less than 1% of overall exchange rate movements. The third question we consider 
is whether “news” not only impacts exchange rates directly, but also influences 
exchange rates via order flow (signed trade volume). Like non-fundamental news, 
order flow plays no role in standard models of exchange rate determination, so 
a finding that order flow matters will provide evidence in favor of a different 
modeling strategy for exchange rate determination (at least for very short term 
movements)8.
There are a number of reasons for questioning whether macro announcements 
are the best real-time source of information on fundamentals. First, macro an­
nouncements are retrospective, in the sense that they provide information about 
past changes in variables. Second, announcements are often revised substantially 
so that the first (or preliminary) report is not necessarily a good indication of the 
true (or final) report. When macro announcements are used in empirical studies 
they are generally measured relative to market expectations. Money Market Ser­
vices International’s median survey responses are used to calculate the “surprise” 
component, based on the assumption that market participants (and survey par­
ticipants) are rational and the foreign exchange market is efficient, so that only 
unexpected news matters. There are a number of reasons to be skeptical that 
the median survey response accurately reflects market expectations9. So that 
both the announcements and the proxy used to measure the expectation of the 
announcements may be noisy indicators of actual macro surprises10.
8Evans and Lyons (2002) is one of the first studies that found a link between order flow and 
exchange rate movements. We will be examining these same links though with a very different 
data set and time period.
9For example, the median survey participant may not be representative of “market” opinion, 
or survey participants may have strategic reasons not to reveal their true expectation.
10Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, Iyer, Liu, and Wright (2004), Laakkonen (2004) find that 
even if there is no macro surprise (so that the expectation exactly matches the announcement) 
volatility (and trading volume) tends to rise after the release of the (unsurprising) announce­
ment. These results could either be interpreted as suggesting our measure of macro surprise is
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In practice, dealers in the foreign exchange market receive information from 
numerous different sources, including their own customers, electronic brokerage 
systems, squawk boxes, and newswire services. Newswire services report the 
macro announcements described previously along with various other sorts of news 
which sometimes are also directly related to macro fundamentals. One of the 
major distinctions that can be made between macro announcements and other 
news is that the announcements are typically made on a schedule, so that market 
participants can plan their reactions in advance (depending on realizations). Non­
scheduled news is by its nature less likely to be anticipated by the market. It 
may also be the case that market participants are less able to quickly interpret 
the implications of non-scheduled news for exchange rates, potentially leading to 
more heterogeneity in their responses to the news11.
Whether news is scheduled or non-scheduled its influence on exchange rates 
may be related to the state of the market at the time of the news arrival12. News 
that arrives during periods of high uncertainty may have different effects on the 
exchange rate, than news that arrives in calmer periods13. It may also be the case 
that the frequency of news arrival itself will influence the relative importance of
flawed, or that market reactions to news do not conform to our standard models.
11 Of course, an increase in market heterogeneity may also occur in reaction to scheduled 
announcements. Kondor (2005) shows that if traders display confirmatory bias, the release of 
public information may increase divergence in opinion. The main insight is that sometimes 
(public) information implies something different when it is coupled with different (private) 
pieces of existing information. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) also model the influence of 
higher-order expectations in reaction to news.
12For example, Dominguez (2003b) shows that the influence of central bank interventions on 
exchange rate returns depends on the intra-day timing of intervention operations (whether they 
occur during heavy trading volume, or are closely timed to scheduled macro announcements) 
as well as whether the operations are coordinated with another central bank.
13Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) find evidence that “bad” news in good 
times (economic expansions) have greater impacts than good news in good times, suggesting 
that good news in good times confirms beliefs but bad news in good times comes as more of 
a surprise. Our short sample period will not allow us to test this hypothesis directly, though 
in future work we intend to test whether “confirming” versus “surprising” news have different 
effects.
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individual news releases14.
In this paper we allow for the possibility that exchange rates react to a wide 
spectrum of “news”, including, but not exclusively, macro announcements. We 
also allow for the possibility that information on the “state of the market” will 
influence the way that news influences exchange rates. Finally, we allow for the 
possibility that the trading process itself serves to convey information to the 
market via order flow.
One way to think about why order flow might matter is suggested in the Kyle 
(1985) model which focuses on the strategic aspects of informed trading in a 
market microstructure model. Informed traders in Kyle’s model can be thought of 
as information monopolists who act to exploit this advantage by maximizing the 
value of private information. In the model, Kyle introduces the concept of a price 
impact coefficient which reflects how much the market adjusts prices to reflect 
the information content of trades. The model suggests that since the more liquid 
a market, the less individual trades will impact price, informed traders will prefer 
to “hide” their private information by trading during periods of high liquidity. In 
this context private information will eventually become known (and be reflected 
in price) but the process of information revelation takes place gradually via order 
flow. Standard exchange rate models give no role to private information (or 
order flow) because the assumption is that the sorts of information that matter, 
macro fundamentals, are common knowledge and are incorporated into price 
instantaneously.
An alternative view is that individual traders are not “informed” in the sense
that they have a better understanding of future market movements than other
14A dramatic example of this occurred during the period in late 1995 when the US govern­
ment was shut down and macro announcements went unreported. During this period traders 
apparently reacted to “news” (such as the shoe manufacturer’s monthly sales survey) which in 
normal periods have little influence.
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traders, but that their own trading motives (based on real trade, profit repatri­
ation, speculation, portfolio rebalancing) may be correlated with other traders, 
eventually leading to aggregate changes in fundamentals. In this context, deal­
ers who have information about order flow may learn about fundamentals before 
they are officially announced. Evans and Lyons (2004) test this proposition using 
a data set that allows them to disaggregate order flow among various end-user 
segments (non-financial corporations, investors, leveraged traders); they find ev­
idence that order flow information forecasts macro fundamentals.
We are not able to directly measure the “private” information available to 
individual dealers, but we have collected a relatively rich measure of public (time- 
stamped) news from Reuters’s newswire reports15 as well as the order flow infor­
mation available from Reuters D2000-2. We use these two sources of “common 
knowledge” news, as well as the macro announcements typically used in the lit­
erature, to test some intra-daily implications of standard exchange rate models.
Tables 3.1 through 3.3 provide information about: (1) the scheduled macro 
news announcements from the UK, the US, and the Euro-zone, (2) the broad 
categories of non-scheduled fundamental news, and (3) the broad categories of 
non-scheduled non-fundamental news that we include in our empirical analysis. 
Our news variables were created using a search criteria which retrieved newswire 
articles under the broad subject areas of “money", “foreign exchange” and “eco­
nomics” over the period 15 November 1999 through 18 January 2000. We ex­
cluded all re-published news, recurring price and market data, articles covering 
obituaries, sports, calendars of events, letters, diaries, weather, cooking and per­
sonal announcements. We then coded and grouped16 news articles according to
15These data are from the Factiva database and, unfortunately, do not include the headline 
news that rim over the Reuters and Bloomberg ticker second by second, but they include the 
major economic news events that occur over a given day.
16In theory each “news” report may have a different one-time influence on exchange rates.
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source (policymaker or market participant), geographic region (Euro-zone, U.S. 
or Japan) and substance (related to fundamentals or non-fundamentals). On 
average there were 4 news items per day so that approximately 5% of our 72 
20-minute return intervals per day include a news report. Approximately 65% of 
these news reports were categorized as related to ’fundamentals’, while 35% were 
coded as non-fundamental news.
News that we code as “non-scheduled non-fundamental” largely falls into six 
main sub-categories. The first four categories: the options market, technical 
analysis, market characteristics and market sentiment, are all related specifically 
to the foreign exchange market, and are often based on interviews with or quotes 
from market participants who trade based on “technical” rather than “funda­
mental” information17. Our non-fundamental news also includes news related to 
the private sector (often focused on restructuring, and mergers and acquisitions), 
and politics. While it is possible that some of this news is indirectly related 
to fundamentals (when firms restructure they may improve profitability, and, in 
turn this may lead to higher country-level growth) our sense is that these sorts 
of news reports do not fit the traditional definition of “fundamentals “. It is also 
likely that there is more heterogeneity in market participant’s interpretations of 
the importance of this sort of news relative to, for example, scheduled macro 
announcements. In any case, given that a significant portion of newswire reports 
fall into this category of non-scheduled non-fundamental news, it seems worth
examining whether their influence on exchange rates differs from fundamentals
We group similar news items together in order to examine whether certain “types” of news 
have a systematic influence on exchange rate behaviour.
17For example here are some quotes from market participants: “Price action today was 
dictated by technical factors, options related factors “Dealers said the euro would likely 
struggle to break key technical levels near $1.0350“; “Analysts said only a breach of key chart 
resistance located around $1.03 could give an incentive to market bulls for betting on the euro“; 
“Liquidity is still pretty poor... but it is a market that is moving as more people get sucked in, 
so inevitably momentum can build up and we can get a reasonably sharp move“.
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related news.
3.3 Exchange Market Data
Our intra-day exchange rate and order flow data cover a two-month period, from 
15 Nov 1999 through 18 Jan 2000 for the USD-EUR and USD-GBP18. The data 
are from the brokered segment of the inter-dealer exchange rate market as cap­
tured by the Reuters D2000-2 electronic trading system19. Electronic brokers 
were first introduced in 1992 and since that time their market share has increased 
rapidly. In the early 1990s the inter-dealer market was split evenly between direct 
and voice-broker trading but by the late 1990s the two top electronic brokerage 
systems, Reuters and EBS, made up over 50 percent of the market.
Inter-dealer brokering systems provide prices that are advertised to all member 
dealers (though the identity of the quoting dealer is only available once the quote 
is hit). Dealers can submit a buy or sell quote or “hit” a quote of another dealer. 
Only the highest bid and lowest ask (the touch) are shown on the Reuters screen20. 
The quantity available at each (best) bid and ask is also shown (which may involve 
more than one bank), and when a bid or ask is hit the quantities available at 
that price are adjusted if they dip below $10 million. When multiple banks have
18EBS, the other major electronic brokerage system, has a much larger share of total trading 
in the USD-EUR market potentially leading the Reuters data for the USD-EUR to be less 
representative. Reuters USD-EUR order flow data, in particular, may not well capture average 
trading behaviour in that market outside of European hours. Reuters dominates EBS in the 
USD-GBP market.
19See Rime (2003) for a detailed description of electronic trading systems and Lyons (2001), 
chapter 3 for a full description of the three basic types of trades in the foreign exchange market. 
Direct inter-dealer trading was traditionally the most liquid part of the foreign exchange market 
- it typically is used for large size trades (above $10 million) and spreads are typically only one 
to two basis points. Brokered inter-dealer trades are a growing segment of the market, and 
typically involve slightly higher spreads of 2-3 basis points (especially for trades below $10 
million). Customer-dealer trades involve 3-7 basis point spreads for “good” customers.
20Limit orders with prices below the best bid or above the best offer are not observable on 
Reuters D2000-2 but are shown on Minex.
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entered the same bid or ask price, and the price is hit, offers are met on a first 
come basis (meaning that the dealer who first input the price gets the deal first 
and if more quantity is needed, the dealer that next submitted the same price 
fills the order, and so on). All transactions are made at either the posted bid 
or ask21. Figure 3.1 shows bid and ask quotes for the USD-EUR and USD-GBP 
rates over our sample period along with the quote mid-point It is worth noting 
that the USD-GBP rate was relatively stable over this sample period, with a 
fluctuation range of between 1.59 and 1.65. The USD-EUR rate was roughly 
twice as variable, with trades ranging from 0.99 to 1.16.
While dealers in individual banks will know their own customer order flow - 
they do not have access to information on customer orders of other banks. One 
of the reasons that inter-dealer brokerage systems have become so popular is that 
they provide an important source of real time information on both market quotes 
and overall market order flow. The Reuters D2000-2 system classifies transactions 
as buyer-initiated or seller-initiated, providing dealers with a real time proxy of 
signed trading volume22. We measure order flow in this study as the difference 
between the number of buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated trades in each 
20-minute interval. Figure 3.2 shows the number of buy and sell orders separately 
as well as our measure of order flow for the USD-EUR and USD-GBP rates.
The intra-day price series used in this study incorporates information from 
both transactions prices (actual trades) and (tradeable) bid and ask quotes sub­
mitted by dealers (but not hit)23. We use tradeable quotes in addition to actual
21 One advantage of the (shrinking) voice-brokered market is that it allows for some commu­
nication between dealers and brokers which allows for negotiation over price.
22The dealer posting the quote is considered the non-initiating side. Reuters does not provide 
information on the size of each trade.
23Tradeable quotes differ from indicative quotes, which have been used in a number of pre­
vious studies, in that they provide “firm” prices. Indicative quotes provide market information 
for non-dealers.
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transactions prices to create a 20-minute price series for each of our two exchange 
rates that spans the period over which we have “news” data24. We measure ex­
change rate returns, A s t i , as the log difference in 20-minute (midpoint) prices 
and exchange rate volatility, V t i , as the absolute value of the 20-minute returns. 
Figure 3.3 shows USD-EUR and USD-GBP returns and volatility over our sample 
period. The volatility series displays the strong seasonal pattern that is typically 
found in intra-day exchange rate volatility data which, in turn, largely reflects 
the opening and closing of the three main trading markets in Tokyo, Europe 
and New York. We de-seasonalize the volatility series using the Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1997b,a, 1998) flexible fourier form (FFF) regression method which 
involves decomposing the demeaned i-minute exchange rate returns, into a daily 
volatility factor, a periodic component for the i th intraday interval and an i.i.d. 
mean zero unit variance innovation term all divided by the square root of the 
number of uncorrelated intraday return components25. Figure 3.4 shows the av­
erage absolute USD-EUR and USD-GBP return in each 20-minute interval over 
the 24-hour GMT time scale along side the estimated FFF seasonal. Figure 3.5 
shows average daily USD-EUR and USD-GBP returns, order flow and news ar­
rival also over the 24-hour GMT time scale. It is worth noting that news arrival 
is fairly evenly spread over the day, while order flow for the USD-EUR market 
is relatively light outside of European trading hours, presumably reflecting that 
EBS holds a dominant share of trading volume in that market. There is little
evidence of a within day trend in average returns for either exchange rate.
24There axe a periods of low liquidity on Reuters D2000-2 due to technical problems (the feed 
failing), holidays, and during Asian trading hours. Some studies simply drop these time periods 
from the sample. Our approach is to interpolate a 20 minute time series (using a piecewise 
cubic Hermite interpolating function which preserves the monotonicity and shape of the data) 
from all available quotes in order to fully span our “news” data set. Reuters does not include 
weekend data so any news that arrives over a weekend is moved to the first 20-minute interval 
on the nearest Monday.
25See Dominguez (forthcoming) for a detailed description of how this was implemented.
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Table 3.4 provides descriptive statistics for our 20-minute USD-EUR and 
USD-GBP exchange rates, returns26 and volatility, order flow and order flow 
volatility, and transaction frequency (measured as the number of transactions in 
a given 20-minute interval). The USD-EUR exchange rate returns series only 
display first-order autocorrelation, suggesting that future exchange rate changes 
cannot be predicted from past changes beyond a 20 minute horizon. There is no 
evidence of autocorrelation for the USD-GBP returns. Intra-day return volatil­
ity and transaction frequency for both currencies shows evidence of strong and 
persistent autocorrelation. While buy and sell orders are highly autocorrelated, 
order-flow (buy orders minus sell orders) does not display significant autocorre­
lation for either currency.
Table 3.5 presents contemporaneous correlations among our key variables: ex­
change rate returns and volatility, order flow and order flow volatility as well as 
a measure of news arrival (measured as the number of news articles in a given 
20-minute interval) and trading frequency27. The correlations indicate that there 
exists a strong contemporaneous association between exchange rate returns and 
order flow and order flow volatility and transaction frequency for both currencies. 
For the USD-GBP rate the correlations between exchange rate volatility, order 
flow volatility, and transaction frequency are also high. Beyond these contem­
poraneous correlations, we might expect longer-lived correlation between news 
and the other variables if traders have different views of the implications (and 
information content) of the news.
26We compute returns (approximately) as the percentage change in the exchange rate mul­
tiplied by 100, so the units can be thought of as basis points.
27Evans and Lyons (2003) document strong contemporaneous correlation between news ar­
rival, transaction frequency and order flow volatility. Melvin and Yin (2000) find a positive 
correlation between trading frequency (using indicative quotes) and the rate of flow of public 
information.
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3.4 Effects of Different Categories of News on
Returns and Volatility
The standard approach in the empirical exchange rate literature is to run the 
following sort of “event study” style regression28 of the conditional mean of i- 
minute exchange rate returns, As t i , on j leads29 and lags of each of the k “news” 
announcements and g lags of past returns (to account for the autocorrelation we 
found in table 3.5); that is:
A s ti — a Q +  ^ 2  a i ^ 2,3Asti_9 +  eti (3.1)
k  j  9
where As ti denotes the change in the natural log of the i-minute (spot market) 
exchange rate on day t and N denotes the (time-stamped to the nearest i-minute) 
“news”30. We use the Schwarz (1978) criteria to fix the lag length on returns and 
the lead/lag length on “news“, and we correct for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the error term using the Newey and West (1987) approach. Using 
this general regression specification it is possible to test for the impact and intra­
day effects of news on exchange rate returns by examining whether the N ks are 
individually and jointly statistically significant. The a j j S  in this context measure 
the typical effect of the k th news announcement at time j (on day t) on exchange
28An alternative approach based on state dependent heteroscedasticity is used by Rigobon 
and Sack (2004), Evans and Lyons (2003).
29We include leads in order to take into account the possibility that the time-stamp on our 
“news” lags the actual timing of when market participants first learn about the news. We find 
evidence of significant lead effects for many of our variables for up to two hours prior to the 
Reuters’ time-stamp.
30The Reuters news variables are (0,1) dummy variables. The macro surprises axe measured 
as the difference between the specific announcement and the ex-ante expectation of the an­
nouncement (based on the median response to a survey conducted by Money Market Services 
International) divided by the sample standard deviation of each announcement (this serves to 
normalize the surprises so that comparisons of the relative size of coefficients is feasible).
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rate returns in the same (narrow) 20-minute window. It is worth noting that 
in order to be able to interpret the a \ j S  in this way we need to assume that 
the variables in the regression can be viewed as fixed over the 20-minute period 
(which is less likely to be realistic for low-frequency data windows). It is also the 
case that the aj^-s will measure the linear combination of exchange rate return 
effects associated with the market’s assessment of both the “news” a n d  how the 
news will influence the economy31.
Our “news” variable includes three distinct categories of news: (1) scheduled 
macro surprises, (2) non-scheduled but fundamentals-driven news, and (3) non­
scheduled non-fundamental based news. Within categories (2) and (3) news was 
further broken down by source (policy-maker or market participant), geographic 
region (Euro-zone, Japan, US or UK), substance (subcategories of fundamentals 
and non-fundamentals) and expected direction of influence (whether the news is 
expected to appreciate or depreciate the exchange rate)32. Category (2) and (3) 
news are in binary dummy variable form which is likely to downward bias our 
results if these sorts of news are sometimes anticipated by the market.
Table 3.6 presents results of our regression of USD-EUR and USD-GBP re­
turns on various categories of “news“. The first and third columns in table 3.6 
present the results of our benchmark regression which include only the macro 
surprises as “news” for the USD-EUR (first column) and USD-GBP (third col­
umn). As has been found in previous studies, the macro surprises significantly
influence both USD-EUR and USD-GBP returns, though the relatively low re­
31 For a nice discussion of the underlying assumptions in this sort of event study analysis see 
Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright (2003) pages 6-9.
32We attempted to group news into variables in such a way as to insure that we would not 
be combining news that would be expected to lead to opposite effects on exchange rates. The 
coefficients on these disaggregated news variables are then aggregated into broader groupings 
of variables (monetary fundamentals, fiscal fundamentals, growth and unemployment, options 
market, technical analysis, private sector) in order to keep our tables readable. Regression 
results with the disaggregated news categories are available upon request.
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gression goodness-of-fit (especially for the USD-GBP) suggests that macro sur­
prises account for a small fraction of the overall variability of returns33. The 
second and fourth columns in table 3.6 present results of regressions that include 
our broader definition of news. These columns include, along with the macro 
surprises, non-scheduled news reports that are related to fundamentals and news 
that is not related to fundamentals. In the usd-euro regressions Euro-zone macro 
surprises are only statistically significant when other “news” is not included (first 
column). For the USD-GBP regressions both UK and Euro-zone macro surprises 
matter, even when other “news” is included (third and fourth column). US macro 
surprises did not enter significantly in any of the regressions.
Looking first at the influence of non-scheduled fundamentals, we find that a 
number of these “news” reports matter in terms of statistical significance. The 
first variable that shows up significant in the USD-EUR regression is contempo­
raneous “Euro-zone monetary fundamentals” with a coefficient of -0.02, which 
can be interpreted as indicating that these news reports (which tended to men­
tion Euro-zone interest rates or inflation) led to a 2 basis point appreciation of 
the dollar relative to the euro. It is interesting to note that reports of Japanese 
interventions (which were aimed at weakening the yen over this time period)34 
led to a contemporaneous 3.8 basis point appreciation of the dollar relative to the 
euro and a similar size influence on the dollar relative to the pound (though in
33The macro surprises are disaggregated by region (so that all U.S. surprises are included as 
one variable). As robustness checks we also included disaggregated macro surprises (by type 
and region, e.g. US PPI, etc) as well as aggregating the surprises (all US, UK and European 
surprises included as one variable). Results were qualitatively similar across the three levels of 
aggregation. The non-reported results (disaggregated by type and region, and fully aggregated) 
are available upon request.
34The Japanese government intervened on 4 occasions during our sample period, all of these 
were dollar strengthening operations. A number of unrequited interventions (interventions that 
the market expected but did not occur) also influenced returns over this period. See Dominguez 
and Panthaki (2006) for a more detailed examination of the influence of actual and unrequited 
interventions.
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the 20 minutes prior to the Reuters time-stamp). Focusing next on the influence 
of non-fundamentals related news, we find evidence that reports connected to 
all our included categories (option market, technical analysis, sentiment, private 
sector and politics) enter significantly. Moreover, the coefficient estimates on 
non-fundamental news are similar in size to those found for fundamentals-related 
news. We also find strong evidence of both lead (especially for the USD-GBP)35 
and lag effects on the non-scheduled news variables, suggesting both that some 
traders learn of the news before our Reuters’ time-stamp and that market reaction 
to “news” is often not instantaneous.
The results in table 3.6 indicate that both scheduled macro surprises and non- 
scheduled fundamental and non-fundamental news influences returns. In order 
to further examine how information is processed by the market under different 
market conditions, we test for two types of interaction effects. First, we ask 
whether news is more (or less) likely to influence returns during periods when 
lots of other news is hitting the market. We create an indicator variable that 
takes on the value 1 during 20-minute intervals when the number of news reports 
exceeds the sample average by two standard deviations and run the following 
regression:
aS(( = «o+EE +E E al-NL  *HN^ +E a^ ti-3+
k j  k j  g
(3.2)
where As ti denotes the change in the natural log of the i-minute (spot market) 
exchange rate on day t, N denotes the (time-stamped to the nearest i-minute) 
“news” and HN is the indicator variable for periods with high news arrival. The
35One explanation for why lead effects are more important for the USD-GBP market is that 
the source of our data, Reuters, is the dominant player (in terms of market share) in this 
currency market.
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first two columns of table 3.7 suggest that for both USD-EUR and USD-GBP 
returns “news” often had a larger impact on returns when it arrived during heavy 
news periods. Our results are even more dramatic when we test whether news 
has a stronger impact during periods of high market uncertainty (proxied by 
high volatility). We create an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 during 
20-minute intervals when volatility (measured as the absolute value of returns) 
exceeds the sample average by two standard deviations and then run the regres­
sion:
AS(, = « o + £ E  a f X . ,  + E  E  <iNl ,* HV^  + £ “ i A . ,  + e‘. (3-3)
k j  k j  g
where As ti denotes the change in the natural log of the i-minute (spot market) 
exchange rate on day t, N denotes the (time-stamped to the nearest i-minute) 
“news” and HV is the indicator variable for periods with high volatility. The 
second two columns in table 8 present regression results that show that during 
periods when the market is most uncertain “news” (of all types) had a signifi­
cantly larger influence on returns than was the case when news arrived during 
normal periods.
The regression results presented in tables 3.6 and 3.7 indicate that “news” 
both narrowly defined as macro surprises, and more broadly defined, has an 
influence on intra-daily exchange rate returns. However, the relatively low re­
gression goodness-of-fit suggests that even our broader measure of news does not 
go very far in explaining overall exchange rate movements. It is possible that 
our binary coding of news is partly to blame for our inability to explain a larger 
fraction of exchange rate variation. It may be that while we are not able to “sign” 
exchange rate movements using such a crude indicator of information flow, our
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“news” variables will be more successful at explaining exchange rate volatility. 
It may also be that news (however measured) does not impact price directly, 
but that its influence is mediated through order flow. We investigate both these 
possibilities in the next two sets of regressions.
In order to examine whether our broader definition of news helps to explain 
the absolute value of exchange rate returns, we regress de-seasonalized intra-day 
volatility, V^, on the same set of explanatory “news” variables:
^ = Ao + EE + E ^ oVu.g +  Vn (3.4)
k j  9
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) find that three factors influence intra-daily ex­
change rate volatility: calendar effects and volatility dependencies (both of which 
are captured in the FFF seasonal) and macro surprises, with macro surprises 
providing the least explanatory power. We examine the influence of our broader 
definition of news on de-seasonalized36 volatility and allow for a longer lag struc­
ture to test whether the effects of non-scheduled news reports are longer-lived. 
We use the Schwarz (1978) criteria to fix the leads and lags in the regression 
specification and correct for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in 
the error term using the Newey and West (1987) approach.
Table 3.8 presents our volatility regression results using the same column 
format as we did in table 3.6. The first thing to note about these results, is that 
many more of our fundamental-related news reports, and especially our non­
fundamentals related news reports, have a statistically significant effect on de- 
seasonalized volatility37. This provides suggestive evidence that non-scheduled
36It could be that the intra-day seasonal is explained by news arrival. We test for this 
possibility by including our news variables directly in the FFF regression and find no evidence 
of correlation between the daily seasonal and our news variables.
37It is also worth noting that the regression goodness-of-fit is dramatically higher, due in part
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news, perhaps because it is more ambiguous, leads to stronger differences in 
opinions about the implications of the information. None of the macro surprises 
are significant in the USD-EUR regressions, while US macro surprises enter with 
a high degree of statistical significance in the USD-GBP regressions both when 
entered alone and when included with the other “news” variables.
3.5 W hat D oes Order Flow Reveal?
In standard models of exchange rate behaviour when “positive” news arrives for 
a currency, demand for that currency rises, causing the relative value (the price) 
of the currency to rise. In these models there is no reason for order flow to rise 
in reaction to news because price is assumed to instantaneously reflect the news. 
Trading volume may rise in reaction to news, but as long as the new price is 
efficient, there is no reason for these trades to be biased in favor of purchases or 
sales. So that in standard models the arrival of “news” should increase volume, 
but be orthogonal to changes in order flow38.
We use transaction frequency, TF, as a proxy for volume, and first test whether 
the arrival of “news” in our sample is positively related to transaction frequency.
T F U =  7 0  + J2 E  ifX-, + E  +  uti (3.5)
k  j  9
We find strong evidence of a positive association between “news” and transac­
t o  t h e  s t r o n g  A R  c o m p o n e n t  o f  v o la t i l i ty .
38 O n e  v ie w  o f  t h e  r e la t i o n s h ip  b e tw e e n  o r d e r  flo w  a n d  p r ic e s  is  t h a t  i t  is  o n ly  a  t e m p o r a r y  
p h e n o m e n o n .  O r d e r  f lo w  in  t h i s  c o n te x t  r e f le c ts  t r a d e r  “d ig e s t io n  e f fe c ts ” in  r e a c t i o n  t o  n e w s , 
so  t h a t  o n c e  t h e  n e w s  is  fu l ly  “d ig e s te d  “ , a n y  o r d e r  flo w  in d u c e d  p r i c e  e f fe c ts  w ill  r e v e r t  b a c k .  
W o r k  b y  E v a n s  a n d  L y o n s  (2 0 0 2 ) ,  D a n ie l s s o n ,  P a y n e ,  a n d  L u o  (2 0 0 2 ) ,  h o w e v e r ,  s h o w s  t h a t  o r d e r  
flo w  c o n t in u e s  t o  e x p la in  c h a n g e s  in  fo r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  r e t u r n s  w e ll  a f t e r  2 4  h o u r s ,  s u g g e s t in g  
e i t h e r  t h a t  d ig e s t io n  is  v e r y  s lo w , o r  m o r e  lik e ly , t h a t  t h e  in f lu e n c e  o f  o r d e r  f lo w  o n  p r ic e s  is  
n o t  t e m p o r a r y .
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tion frequency. Interestingly, macro surprises were sometimes associated with a 
decrease in transactions, while all other “news” (and especially non-fundamental 
news) generally were positively associated with transaction frequency. In the 
USD-EUR regression macro surprises had no influence on transaction frequency, 
but other news, and again especially non-fundamentals related news, led to in­
creases in transaction frequency.
Under what circumstance might “news” cause a change not just in volume, 
but in order flow? One reason that price might not immediately (or fully) react 
is if the “news” either is not common knowledge, or if different market partici­
pants interpret the news differently. In this case, order flow might convey this 
information to the market (rather than price). Further, if underlying demand for 
currencies is driven not by news per se, but by changes in risk aversion or hedging 
technologies, again it might be order flow that will convey this information to the 
market39.
A simple linear regression specification that relates foreign exchange returns 
to order flow is:
= p 0 + ^  Pi, jOFti_j +  ^  /?2)5Asti_9 +  (3.6)
j  9
Table 3.9 presents results for a regression of USD-EUR and USD-GBP returns 
on contemporaneous and lagged order flow. The first thing to note in the table 
is that our measure of regression goodness-of-fit is now markedly higher. Our 
estimates suggest that order flow explains over 25% of the variation in 20-minute 
USD-GBP returns and almost 40% in the USD-EUR market40. These results
39R e c e n t  p a p e r s  t h a t  h a v e  s t u d i e d  t h e  l in k  b e tw e e n  “n e w s ” a n d  o r d e r  f lo w  a r e  L o v e  (2 0 0 4 ) ,  
L o v e  a n d  P a y n e  (2 0 0 3 ) ,  M e lv in  a n d  Y in  (2 0 0 0 ) ,  E v a n s  a n d  L y o n s  (2 0 0 3 , 2 0 0 4 , 2 0 0 5 ) .  B r e e d o n  
a n d  V i t a l e  (2 0 0 4 )  e x a m in e  t h e  c o n n e c t io n  b e tw e e n  o r d e r  f lo w  a n d  l i q u i d i ty  r is k .
40D a n ie l s s o n ,  P a y n e ,  a n d  L u o  (2 0 0 2 )  c o m p a r e  t h e  fo r  t h i s  s o r t  o f  r e g r e s s io n  o v e r  m u l t i p le
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are strongly suggestive that order flow belongs in our empirical models of ex­
change rate determination. Indeed, Danielsson, Payne, and Luo (2002), Evans 
and Lyons (forthcoming) perform Meese-Rogoff style RMSE comparisons to ex­
amine whether forecasting out-of-sample exchange rate returns with order flow 
outperforms the random walk model (using future realized values of order flow) 
and find strong evidence in favor of the order-flow model41.
Our results so far suggest that news, broadly defined, influences exchange rate 
returns and volatility, and that order flow influences returns. The next question 
to ask is what drives order flow? Previous studies have found a link between 
macro surprises and order flow, which runs counter to standard models that 
would suggest that common knowledge news, such as macro surprises, should be 
instantly incorporated in price. We test whether this result also holds for our 
data sample, and whether our broader definition of news is also linked to order 
flow, O F .
O F ti =  7 0  + E  E  TfX-i + E  ^ O F ti_ g +  v tl (3.7)
k j  g
Table 3.10 presents results for the regression of USD-EUR and USD-GBP order 
flow on various categories of news. The first and third columns provide results for 
our benchmark specification which only includes the macro surprises. European 
macro surprises are highly statistically significant for USD-EUR order flow but 
none of the macro surprises are significant in the USD-GBP order flow regression. 
The results in the second and fourth columns indicate that many of the non­
s a m p l in g  f r e q u e n c ie s  ( f r o m  5  m in u te s  t o  o n e  w e e k )  a n d  f in d  t h a t  fo r  t h e  U S D - E U R  r a t e  t h e  
p e r c e n t  v a r i a t i o n  is  f a i r ly  s t a b le  ( a r o u n d  4 0 % ) o v e r  a l l  f re q u e n c ie s .
41 H o w e v e r ,  w h e n  D a n ie l s s o n ,  P a y n e ,  a n d  L u o  (2 0 0 2 )  o n ly  u s e  o r d e r  f lo w  i n f o r m a t io n  a v a i la b le  
a t  t h e  f o r e c a s t  d a t e ,  t h e  R M S E  o f  t h e  o r d e r  flo w  f o r e c a s t  m o d e l  fa lls  b e lo w  t h e  R M S E  fo r  t h e  
r a n d o m  w a lk  m o d e l .  U s in g  d i s a g g r e g a te d  o r d e r  flo w  i n f o r m a t io n  o v e r  a  lo n g e r  h o r iz o n  (1 0  d a y s  
o r  lo n g e r )  E v a n s  a n d  L y o n s  ( f o r th c o m in g )  f in d  t h a t  t h e  f o r e c a s t in g  a b i l i ty  o f  t h e i r  o r d e r  flow  
m o d e l  is  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  b e t t e r  t h a n  t h e  r a n d o m  w a lk  m o d e l .
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scheduled fundamental and non-fundamental related news enter significantly for 
both currencies. However, “news” explains a relatively small fraction of the 
overall variation in order flow. Our regression goodness-of-fit measure never rises 
above 0.05 for either currency, indicating that our measure of order flow is largely 
not being driven by our measures of “news“42. However, if we allow for interaction 
effects as we did previously in our returns regression, we find stronger evidence of 
a relationship between “news” and order flow. This is particularly true when we 
interact “news” with “high volatility” periods, where the regression goodness-of- 
fit rises to 0.14 for USD-EUR order flow and 0.13 for USD-GBP order flow.
3.6 VAR Analysis
In the previous section we analyzed the relationships between returns (or volatil­
ity), order flow and various categories of news using single equation methods. It 
is probably more appropriate, however, to think of these variables as part of an 
interrelated economic system. News hits the market and influences trader expec­
tations, which in turn impacts prices (and returns), volume, and order flow43. It 
is also clear that order flow (imbalances in buy and sell orders) influence returns.
42T h i s  r e s u l t  is  a t  o d d s  w i t h  r e s u l t s  in  E v a n s  a n d  L y o n s  (2 0 0 4 )  w h ic h  f in d  a  s t r o n g  c o n n e c t io n  
b e tw e e n  d i s a g g r e g a te d  o r d e r  f lo w  a n d  n e w s . I t  is  p o s s ib le  t h a t  t h e  d if f e r e n c e  i n  r e s u l t s  is  d u e  
t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o u r  o r d e r  f lo w  i n f o r m a t io n  is  o n ly  r e f l e c t in g  i n te r - d e a l e r  t r a d e s .
43I n  s t a n d a r d  m a c r o  m o d e ls  “n e w s ” s h o u ld  o n ly  in f lu e n c e  p r i c e s  a n d  v o lu m e ,  n o t  o r d e r  flo w . 
H o w e v e r ,  o u r  s in g le  e q u a t i o n  r e s u l t s  s t r o n g ly  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  in f lu e n c e  o f  n e w s  is ,  a t  l e a s t  in  
p a r t ,  m e d i a t e d  t h r o u g h  o r d e r  f lo w , a s  w e ll  a s  d i r e c t l y  a f fe c t in g  p r ic e s .  P r e v io u s  w o r k  b y  E v a n s  
a n d  L y o n s  (2 0 0 3 )  h a s  a t t e m p t e d  t o  d i s e n ta n g le  t h e  e f fe c ts  o f  n e w s  o n  p r ic e s  a n d  o r d e r  flo w  b y  
a s s u m in g  t h a t  ( c o m m o n - k n o w le d g e )  n e w s  is  o r th o g o n a l  t o  ( d i s p e r s e d  in f o r m a t io n )  o r d e r  flow . 
O u r  a p p r o a c h  is  t o  a s s u m e  t h a t  n e w s  in f lu e n c e s  b o t h  p r ic e s  a n d  o r d e r  flo w  a n d  fo c u s  m o r e  o n  
t h e  t o t a l  in f lu e n c e  o f  n e w s  -  r a t h e r  t h a n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  d i s e n ta n g le  i t s  s e p a r a t e  e f fe c ts .
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This suggests the following two-equation system:
A s u — a 0 +  ^  ^ 2  a l +  ^ 2  a 2 ,9& Sti-g  + a ^rnO Fti_m +  eti (3.8) 
k j g m
O F u =  A, +  J2 E +  E A s«-* +  X] +  ut i , (3.9)
fc j  g m
Our identifying assumption is that order flow does not depend on contempora­
neous returns, so that # 2,0 =  0- This assumption is not innocuous. If returns 
are mean-reverting, feedback trading would be profitable and would in turn lead 
returns to influence order flow.
VAR regression results44 indicate that order flow enters with a very high 
degree of statistical significance in the returns regression, as was true in our 
single equation estimates. An increase in USD-EUR order flow (an increase in 
net purchases of euros) leads on average to an increase in the USD-EUR rate 
(an euro appreciation relative to the dollar) of 0.4 basis points. Similarly, in 
the USD-GBP market an increase in net purchases of pounds leads, on average, 
to a 0.3 basis point appreciation of the pound relative to the dollar. While it 
is clear that most of the explanatory power in the returns regression is coming 
from order flow, “news” and especially non-scheduled “news“, continues to also 
matter. Or, put another way, the inclusion of order flow does not wipe out the 
influence of “news“. Likewise, all three types of “news” enter significantly in 
the order flow equations. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 present examples of the intra-day 
impulse responses of returns and order flow to “news“.
44S e e  t a b l e s  A . l  a n d  A .2  in  A p p e n d ix  A .
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3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we examine the role of news in exchange rate determination. Pre­
vious studies have found that scheduled macro announcements, when measured 
in surprise form, help to explain intra-daily exchange rate behaviour. These 
results, in turn, have breathed new life into the post Meese-Rogoff empirical 
exchange rate literature. We measure news much more broadly, and include 
both fundamentals-related and non-fundamentals-related news reports to exam­
ine whether it is macro announcements, or simply intra-daily data (and a more 
“narrow window”), that accounts for these positive results. Overall, our results do 
not suggest that our broader definition of news provides a vast improvement over 
the macro surprises in explaining exchange rate behaviour, giving yet more cre­
dence to the importance of macro variables in standard models. We do, however, 
find that non-scheduled news, and intriguingly, non-scheduled non-fundamentals- 
related news has a statistically significant influence on both intra-day exchange 
rate returns and volatility. Further, we find that news has its largest impact dur­
ing periods of higher than normal news arrival and higher market uncertainty.
We also examine the role of order flow in exchange rate determination. In 
standard models there is no reason for order flow to rise in reaction to news 
because price is assumed to instantaneously adjust. Trading volume may rise in 
reaction to news, but as long as the new price is efficient, there is no reason for 
trades to be biased in favor of purchases or sales. We find that order flow explains 
a large fraction of the variation in both USD-EUR and USD-GBP exchange rate 
returns, suggesting that prices are, at the very least, slow to adjust. At the same 
time, we find that our measure of “news” explains a relatively small fraction of 
the total variation in order flow. Overall, our results indicate that along with
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the standard fundamentals, both non-fundamentals-related news and order flow 
matter, suggesting that future models of exchange rate determination ought to 
include all three types of explanatory variables.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Macro News Announcements, 15 Nov 1999 - 18 
Jan 2000
Announcement Reported as Local time
UK Announcements (total = 16)
RPIX Y/Y % change 08:30 GMT
Retail Sales M/M % change 08:30 GMT
Global trade GBP (billion) 08:30 GMT
Provisional M4 M/M % change 08:30 GMT
PPI M/M % change NSA 08:30 GMT
Industrial Production M/M % change 08:30 GMT
Unemployment thousands 08:30 GMT
Current Account GBP (billion) 08:30 GMT
US Announcements (total =  18)
PPI M/M % change 08:30 ET
CPI M/M % change 08:30 ET
Industrial Production M/M %  change 09:15 ET
Monthly M3 change USD (billion) 16:30 ET
Goods & Services Trade Balance USD (billion) 08:30 ET
Civilian Unemployment Rate percent 08:30 ET
Nonfarm Payrolls thousands 08:30 ET
Retail Sales M/M % change 08:30 ET
Euro Area Announcements (total = 1 2 )
PPI M/M % change 11:00 GMT
Harmonised CPI M/M %  change 11:00 GMT
Ind Production 3M/3M % change 11:00 GMT
M3 Y/Y % change 09:00 GMT
Trade ex-EMU prel. EUR EUR (billion) 11:00 GMT
Unemployment rate percent 11:00 GMT
Notes: M /M %  change refers to  month-on-month percentage change. 3M /3M %  change 
is three month-on-three m onth percentage change. Y /Y %  change is year-on-year per­
centage change. NSA refers to  non-seasonally adjusted.
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Table 3.2: Broad Categories of Non-Scheduled Fundamental-Related News
Monetary
Fundamentals
Fiscal
Fundamentals
Growth and 
Unemployment
Exchange Rate Policy 
Fundamentals
Inflation Trade Growth news No exchange rate
factor (surplus/deficit) (positive /  negative) target
Inflation Fiscal position Unemployment Exchange rate
(rise/fall) 
Interest rates 
(rise/fall)
(good/bad) (good/bad) target
Intervention
Bias Real effective Intervention
(loosening/tightening) exchange rate (potential weapon) 
Housing Joint Intervention 
(strong/weak)
No intervention 
Strong dollar 
policy
Differences b/w Economies 
Growth gap (increase/decrease)
B/w Europe-US 
B/w Europe-Japan
Table 3.3: Broad Categories of Non-Scheduled Non-Fundamental-Related News
Options Technical Market Market Private Politics
Market Analysis Characteristics Sentiment Sector
Options market Technical factors Year end Europe Restructuring Political
(support (good/bad) Month end (positive/ news uncertainty
no support) Technical Y2K negative) (good/bad) Political
Demand for magnetism Thin/concentrated US Government news
barrier options of parity markets (positive/ intervention in (good/bad)
(up/down) Window Risks from negative) corporate sector
Market for current dressing large orders Holzman
current contracts Exposure Aggressive selling
(liquid/thin) driven trading (curbed)
Trading Lack of Stop-loss selling/ M&A
(at/below) par momentum orders executed Mannesman-Orange
Institutional Investors /  traders Vo dafone- Mannesman
selling cut losses Coca-Cola-Orangina
Long positions Novartis-AstraZeneca
(opened/closed) Banking M&A
Trading (choppy, Attempts to
lively, jittery) block M&A
Exchange rate Speculation about
volatility (up/down) flows due to M&A
Spreads (wider/ Deals (more,large)
narrower)
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for USD-EUR and USD-GBP Quotes, Returns, 
Volatility, Order Flow and Transactions, 15 Nov 1999 - 18 Jan 2000
Mid
Quote
Return Volatility Order
Flow
Order
Flow
Volatility
Transactioi
Frequency
a. USD-EUR
Mean 1 .0 2 0 .1 1 4.18 -0.08 0.82 21.38
Variance 0 .0 1 9.02 7.99 10.52 1.45 44.42
Skewness 5.05 0.39 5.00 0.15 2.16 3.53
Kurtosis 123.43 33.73 42.58 20.41 9.21 27.16
Autocorrelation
lag 1 0.80 0.25 0.54 0.03 0.85 0.82
lag 5 0.76 0.09 0.27 -0 .0 1 0.60 0.53
lag 1 0 0.73 0 .0 2 0.13 -0 .0 1 0.36 0.29
lag 2 0 0.70 0 .0 0 0.09 -0 .0 2 0 .0 0 -0.03
b. USD-GBP
Mean 1.62 -0.03 2.69 0.79 0.94 24.22
Variance 0 .0 1 4.77 3.94 8.45 1.14 39.22
Skewness 0.33 -0.27 2.84 0.67 1.48 2.64
Kurtosis 2.37 11.54 14.04 13.77 5.36 13.23
Autocorrelation
lag 1 1 .0 0 -0 .1 1 0.37 0.04 0.81 0.80
lag 5 0.99 -0 .0 2 0.25 -0 .0 2 0.61 0.54
lag 1 0 0.98 0 .0 2 0.17 0.05 0.42 0.33
lag 2 0 0.96 -0.05 0.05 0 .0 0 0.15 0.06
Notes: T he data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Both currencies are defined as 
the number of dollars per foreign currency (euro and sterling, respectively). T he mid 
quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Returns are defined as 100 
tim es the log difference of the mid quote. Volatility is defined as the absolute return. 
Order flow is the net of total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to  a trade in 
which th e initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD- 
EUR and sterling for U SD -G B P). In each 20-minute period, order flow volatility is the  
standard deviation of order flow, transaction price refers to  the last transaction price 
and transaction frequency is the number of actual trades in a that 20-m inute period.
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Table 3.5: Contemporaneous Correlations Between Returns, Volatility, Order Flow, Transactions and Reuters News, 15 
Nov 1999 - 18 Jan 2000
Return Volatility Order
Flow
Order
Flow
Volatility
Transaction
Frequency
Reuters
News
Arrival
a. USD-EUR
Return 1
Volatility 0.083 1
Order Flow 0.487 -0 .0 1 0 1
Order Flow Volatility -0.030 0.352 -0.016 1
Transaction Frequency -0.007 0.350 0.015 0.955 1
Reuters News 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 1 2 0.042 0.041 1
b. USD-GBP
Return 1 . .  *
Volatility -0.072 1 . . . • .  *
Order Flow 0.502 0.068 1
Order Flow Volatility -0 .0 0 2 0.577 0.114 1
Transaction Frequency -0.003 0.574 0.104 0.930 1
Reuters News -0 .0 1 2 0.006 -0.030 0.039 0.037 1
Notes: The data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Both currencies are defined as the number of dollars per foreign currency 
(euro and sterling, respectively). Returns are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is 
calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Volatility is defined as the absolute return. Order flow is the net of total buys 
and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro 
for USD-EUR and sterling for USD-GBP). In each 20-minute period, order flow volatility is the standard deviation of order flow, 
transaction price refers to the last transaction price and transaction frequency is the number of actual trades in a that 20-minute 
period. Reuters News Arrival refers to an indicator variable for measures the number of news articles in each 20 minute period.
Table 3.6: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Returns
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News
Non-News
Constant 0.0018 0 .0 0 1 0 -0.0003 -0 .0 0 0 1
Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.2693*** 0.2562*** -0.1159*** -0.1365***
lag 2 0.1813*** 0.1673** 0 .0 0 0 0 -0.0170
Macro Surprises
UK -0.0169 -0.0178 0.0292* 0.0331**
US -0.0507 -0.0513 -0.0283 -0.0296
Euro-zone -0.0329*** 0.0019 -0.0441*** -0 .0 2 2 2 **
Fundamentals
Monetary
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.0060 -0.0016
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0049 -0.0093
Euro-zone lag 0 -0 .0 2 2 1 * -0.0084
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0056 0.0063
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0035 0.0029
US leads 2 -6 -0 .0 1 1 1 * -0.0037
US lead 1 -0.0046 0 .0 0 2 1
US lag 0 0.0099 0.0125*
US lag 1 -0.0060 -0.0003
US lags 2 -6 0.0040 -0.0025
Other Asset Markets
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0 .0 0 2 0 -0.0057
Euro-zone lead 1 0 .0 2 0 1 0.0203**
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0085 -0 .0 0 1 2
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0256 -0.0051
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0005 -0.0013
US leads 2-6 0.0014 -0.0041
US lead 1 0 .0 0 2 1 -0.0037
US lag 0 -0.0128 -0.0116*
US lag 1 -0.0004 0.0028
US lags 2-6 -0.0050 -0 .0 0 0 2
Japan leads 2-6 0.0139 0.0084
Japan lead 1 0.0332 -0.0048
Japan lag 0 0.0118 0.0005
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Table 3.6: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Benchmark 4 - 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Japan lag 1 0.0505 0.0031
Japan lags 2-6 0.0257 0.0036
Fiscal
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0 .0 0 1 1 0.0007
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0158 -0.0105
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0154 -0.0039
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0098 -0 .0 1 0 0
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0024 -0.0025
US leads 2-6 -0.0108 -0.0005
US lead 1 0 .0 0 0 0 0.0241*
US lag 0 -0.0403* -0.0123
US lag 1 0.0216 0 .0 1 2 1
US lags 2 -6 -0.0203 -0.0240**
Exchange Rate Policy
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0004 0 .0 0 0 1
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0037 -0.0034
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0025 -0.0044
Euro-zone lag 1 0 .0 1 2 1 -0 .0 0 2 2
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0026 0.0033
US leads 2-6 0.0486 0.0234**
US lead 1 -0.0733 0.0036
US lag 0 0.0441 0.0038
US lag 1 -0.0455 -0.0288
US lags 2 -6 0 .0 0 1 1 -0.0067
Japan leads 2-6 -0.0037 0.0037
Japan lead 1 0 .0 1 1 1 -0.0023
Japan lag 0 0.0385** 0.0043
Japan lag 1 -0.0253* -0.0130*
Japan lags 2-6 0.0168 0.0029
Actual Intervention
Japan leads 2-6 -0.0019 -0.0125**
Japan lead 1 0.0522 0.0384**
Japan lag 0 -0.0479** 0.0084
Japan lag 1 0.0171 0.0038
Japan lags 2-6 -0.0044 -0.0042
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Table 3.6: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Independent
Variables
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Other Macro
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0068 -0.0007
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0092 0.0044
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0129 0.0114
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0124 0.0134*
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0026 0.0033
US leads 2 -6 -0 .0 0 2 1 -0.0018
US lead 1 -0.0098 0.0046
US lag 0 -0.0008 -0.0007
US lag 1 -0.0246** -0.0039
US lags 2 -6 -0 .0 0 1 2 -0.0033
Japan leads 2-6 0.0045 0.0099
Japan lead 1 -0.0663 -0.0374
Japan lag 0 0.0188 -0.0156
Japan lag 1 -0.0713** -0.0287*
Japan lags 2-6 0.0040 0.0029
Non-Fundamentals 
Options Market
leads 2 -6 -0.0006 -0.0058*
lead 1 0.0090 0.0027
lag 0 -0.0003 -0.0030
lag 1 -0.0240** -0.0035
lags 2 -6 0.0051 0 .0 1 1 2 **
Technical Analysis
leads 2 -6 0.0134 0.0042
lead 1 0.0040 -0.0085
lag 0 -0.0116 -0.0155*
lag 1 -0.0039 -0.0019
lags 2 -6 -0.0048 -0.0014
Sentiment
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0 .0 0 2 2 -0.0032
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0042 0.0061
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0135 0.0006
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0048 0.0038
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0 .0 1 0 2 0.0233***
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Table 3.6: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
US leads 2 -6 0.0360 0.0455***
US lead 1 0.0088 0.0555***
US lag 0 -0.0370 -0.0132
US lag 1 -0.0330*** 0.0026
US lags 2-6 0.0160 -0.0091
Private Sector
leads 2 -6 -0 .0 0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 0
lead 1 -0.0104 -0.0058
lag 0 -0.0044 -0.0026
lag 1 0 .0 1 1 2 0.0032
lags 2 -6 -0 .0 0 2 0 -0.0058***
Politics
leads 2 -6 0.0123 0.0092
lead 1 -0.0118 0.0266*
lag 0 -0.0439* -0 .0 1 0 1
lag 1 0.0145 -0.0063
lags 2 -6 0.0037 0.0037
Adj R 2 0.1360 0.1168 0.0140 0.027
F  — t e s t 119.10*** 4.81*** 11  9 5 *** 1 gi***
Notes: Returns and order flow are calculated at 20 minute frequency. Returns are
defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote. The mid quote is calculated
as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Order flow is the net of total buys and total 
sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of 
the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR and sterling for USD-GBP). *, ** and 
*** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 3.7: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Returns in 
“High News Arrival” and “High Volatility” Periods
Independent “High News Arrival” “High Volatility”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP USD-EUR USD-GBP
Non-News
Constant 0 .0 0 1 0 -0 .0 0 0 2 -0 .0 0 0 1 -0.0003
Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.2557*** -0.1359*** 0.1592** -0.1196***
lag 2 0.1716** -0.0186 0.1055* -0 .0 1 1 1
Macro Surprises
UK -0 .0 2 0 1 0.0331** -0.0086 0.0336**
US -0.0508 -0.0293 -0.0498 -0.0296
Euro-zone 0 .0 1 0 2 -0.0165 -0 .0 0 0 2 -0.0226**
Fundamentals
Monetary
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.0063 -0.0023 0.0036 -0 .0 0 0 2
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0096 -0 .0 1 2 0 -0.0163 -0.0027
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0263* -0.0036 -0.0183* -0.0054
Euro-zone lag 1 -0 .0 0 2 2 0.0070 0.0014 -0.0075
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0 .0 0 1 2 0.0042 -0.0031 0.0053*
US leads 2-6 -0 .0 1 0 0 -0.0036 -0.0087** -0.0036
US leads lead 1 -0.0025 0.0025 0 .0 0 0 0 -0.0078
US leads lag 0 0.0170 0.0045 0.0086 0.0048
US lag 1 -0.0071 -0.0008 -0.0063 0.0103**
US lags 2-6 0.0032 -0.0024 0.0050* -0.0015
Other Asset Markets
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0028 -0.0069 0.0008 -0.0023
Euro-zone lead 1 0 .0 2 2 1 0 .0 2 1 1 ** 0.0240* 0.0216***
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0139 0.0059 0.0138 0.0096
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0347 -0.0172 -0.0163 -0.0082
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0030 -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0016
US leads 2-6 -0 .0 0 0 1 -0.0055 0.0008 -0 .0 0 2 2
US lead 1 0.0073 -0.0032 -0.0053 0.0028
US lag 0 -0.0166 -0.0054 -0.0129 -0.0058
US lag 1 -0 .0 0 2 1 0.0039 0.0103 -0.0027
US lags 2-6 -0.0070 -0 .0 0 1 0 -0.0016 0.0018
Japan leads 2-6 0.0094 0.0115** 0.0137 0.0071
Japan lead 1 0.0248 -0.0070 0.0076 -0 .0 0 0 1
Japan lag 0 0.0487 0.0004 -0.0177 -0.0103
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Table 3.7: Contd.
Independent
Variables
“High News Arrival” “High Volatility”
USD-EUR USD-GBP USD-EUR USD-GBP
Japan lag 1 0.0697* 0.0072 0.0088 0.0032
Japan lags 2-6 0.0271 0.0025 -0.0007 0.0093
Fiscal
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0 .0 0 1 0 -0 .0 0 1 2 0.0030 -0.0007
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0167 -0.0099 -0.0197 -0.0152**
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0379 0.0005 -0.0123 -0.0084
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0091 0.0042 -0.0026 -0.0060
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0038 -0 .0 0 2 0 0.0071 -0 .0 0 1 2
US leads 2 -6 -0.0080 0.0019 -0.0184* 0.0031
US lead 1 -0.0023 0.0237 0.0048 0.0091
US lag 0 -0.0544 -0.0187 -0.0308 0.0084
US lag 1 -0 .0 0 0 2 0.0025 0.0435** 0.0146
US lags 2-6 -0.0166 -0 .0 2 2 2 ** -0.0224* -0.0267***
Exchange Rate Policy
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0004 0.0015 0 .0 0 0 2 -0.0006
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0079 -0.0019 0.0051 0.0028
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0045 -0.0037 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 1 1
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0191 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0003
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0013 0.0025 0.0019 0.0016
US leads 2-6 0.0354 0.0196** 0.0141*
US lead 1 -0.0806 0.0053 -0.0586 -0 .0 0 1 2
US lag 0 0.0194 -0.0193 0.0493 0 .0 1 2 1
US lag 1 -0.0513 -0.0259 -0.0503** -0.0433***
US lags 2 -6 0.0184 0.0051 -0.0096 -0.0165
Japan leads 2-6 0.0006 0.0007 0.0005 0 .0 0 2 0
Japan lead 1 0.0089 -0.0026 0.0088 -0.0048
Japan lag 0 0.0350** -0.0077 0.0151 0.0029
Japan lag 1 -0.0253* -0.0128* -0.0126 -0.0124*
Japan lags 2-6 0.0149 0.0033 -0.0069 0.0016
Actual Intervention
Japan leads 2-6 -0.0050 -0 .0 1 2 1 ** 0.0060 -0.0069**
Japan lead 1 0.0540 0.0385* 0.0303** 0.0160**
Japan lag 0 -0.0642* 0.0105 -0.0347* 0.0057
Japan lag 1 0.0128 0.0029 0.0042 0.0055
Japan lags 2-6 -0.0033 -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0064**
Other Macro
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0068 -0 .0 0 0 1 -0.0071* 0.0018
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Table 3.7: Contd.
Independent “High News Arrival” “High Volatility”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP USD-EUR USD-GBP
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0038 0.0035 0.0071 0.0046
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0126 0.0144** 0.0094 0.0082
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0191 0.0118 0.0137 0.0133**
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0018 0.0028 -0 .0 0 2 2 0.0030
US leads 2-6 -0.0017 -0.0030 -0.0024 -0.0005
US lead 1 -0.0135 0.0041 -0.0061 -0.0019
US lag 0 -0 .0 0 2 2 -0.0007 0.0015 -0.0031
US lag 1 -0.0311** -0.0051 -0.0107 -0.0042
US lags 2-6 0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0009 -0.0036*
Japan leads 2-6 0.0024 0.0052 0.0078 -0 .0 0 0 2
Japan lead 1 -0.0645 -0.0374 -0.0459 -0 .0 0 1 0
Japan lag 0 -0.0566 -0.0879*** 0.0281 -0 .0 1 2 0
Japan lag 1 -0.0603 -0.0303** -0.0466 -0.0249
Japan lags 2-6 -0.0086 -0.0024 0.0039 0.0025
Non-Fundamentals 
Options Market
leads 2 -6 -0 .0 0 1 0 -0.0052* 0.0013 -0.0052*
leads lead 1 0.0094 0.0058 0.0166** 0.0003
leads lag 0 0.0077 0.0017 0.0050 -0.0029
lag 1 -0.0421*** -0.0029 -0.0192* -0.0031
lags 2 -6 0.0081 0.0142*** 0.0069* -0.0008
Technical Analysis
leads 2 -6 0.0140 0.0030 0.0026 0.0036
lead 1 -0.0008 -0.0094 0 .0 0 1 2 0.0056
lag 0 -0.0124 -0.0007 -0.0054 -0.0061
lag 1 -0.0027 -0 .0 0 1 0 -0.0026 -0.0082
lags 2 -6 -0.0030 -0.0014 0.0019 0.0019
Sentiment
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.0115 -0 .0 0 2 0 0.0025 -0.0058
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0008 0.0062 0 .0 1 1 0 0.0063
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0245 -0.0150 0.0240 0.0149
Euro-zone lag 1 -0 .0 0 1 2 0 .0 1 0 1 0.0128 0.0127
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0086 0.0258*** 0.0119 0.0009
US leads 2-6 0.0398 0.0500*** 0.0340** 0.0267***
US lead 1 -0.2127 -0.1420* 0.0315 0.0428***
US lag 0 -0.8874* -1.0732*** -0.0419* 0.0005
US lag 1 -0.0337*** 0.0029 -0.0474*** -0.0035
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Table 3.7: Contd.
Independent “High News Arrival” “High Volatility”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP USD-EUR USD-GBP
US lags 2-6 0.0159 -0.0082 0.0017 -0.0004
Private Sector
leads 2 -6 0.0019 0.0035 0.0006 0.0005
lead 1 -0.0104 -0.0057 -0.0095 -0.0157***
lag 0 -0.0042 -0.0077* -0.0051 -0.0083**
lag 1 0.0136 0.0070 0.0059 0.0046
lags 2 -6 -0.0051 -0.0053** 0.0003 -0.0056***
Politics
leads 2 -6 0.0038 0.0084 0.0223* 0.0057
lead 1 -0.0134 0.0281* -0.0123 0.0402***
lag 0 -0.0676** -0.0204 -0.0538** -0.0019
lag 1 0 .0 1 1 1 -0 .0 1 2 1 0.0054 -0 .0 1 2 0
lags 2 -6 0.0098 0.0032 -0.0052 0.0052
Interaction Terms
Monetary Fundamentals
US leads 2 -6 -0.0079 0.0090 0.9797*** -0.2664
US lags 2 -6 0.0116 -0.0027 -0 .1 1 0 0 *** 0.0085
Other Asset Markets
Japan leads 2-6 -0.0525 -0.1767*** 0.2342*** -0.4710
Japan lag 1 -0.8273*** -0.7267*** 0.3322***
Fiscal Fundamentals
US lags 2 -6 -0.0639 -0.0105 -0.5274* 0.3910***
Exchange Rate Policy - Actual Intervention
Japan lead 1 . . . 0.0458** 0.5289*** 0.3010***
Other Macro Fundamentals
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.0280 0.0117 0.4087*** 0.0441
Non-Fundamentals
Options Market
lags 2 -6 0.0227 -0.0591** 0.4547 0.0779*
Adj R 2 0.1150 0.0293 0.2833 0.1716
F  — t e s t 3  4 4 *** 1.57*** 9.83*** 5.32***
Notes: Returns are calculated at 20 minute frequency and are defined as 100 times
the log difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the average 
of the bid and ask quotes. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively.
Table 3.8: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Volatility
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News
Non-News
Constant -0.0035* -0.0042** -0.0033*** -0.0042***
Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.4674*** 0.4604*** 0.2181*** 0.2023***
lag 2 0.0903* 0.0877* 0.1308*** 0.1219***
lag 3 0.0971*** 0.0958*** 0.0486** 0.0421*
lag 4 0.0586** 0.0552** 0.0943*** 0.0943***
lag 5 0 .0 0 1 1 0.0018 0.0518* 0.0477*
lag 6 0.0240 0.0258 0.0528* 0.0525*
Macro Surprises
UK -0.0295 -0.0312 -0.0123 -0.0105
US -0.0143 -0.0150 -0.0376*** -0.0379***
Euro-zone -0.0017 -0.0028 0.0049 0.0054
Fundamentals
Monetary
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 2 0
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0069 0.0006
Euro-zone lag -0.0105 -0.0005
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0023 -0 .0 0 0 2
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0053 -0.0036
US leads 2-6 -0.0049 -0.0005
US lead 1 0.0005 -0.0093
US lag 0 0.0066 -0.0023
US lag 1 0.0034 0 .0 0 1 0
US lags 2-6 0 .0 0 0 0 0.0039*
Other Asset Markets
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0055 0.0067*
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0180 -0.0034
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0029 -0.0086
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0131 0.0068
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0 .0 0 0 2 0.0031
US leads 2 -6 0 .0 0 0 1 0.0003
US lead 1 0.0077 0.0092
US lag 0 0.0125 0.0026
US lag 1 -0.0064 0.0108**
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Table 3.8: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
US lags 2 -6 -0.0031 -0.0014
Japan leads 2-6 0 .0 0 0 1 -0.0115***
Japan lead 1 0.0095 -0.0016
Japan lag 0 0.0085 0.0029
Japan lag 1 0.0234 -0.0130*
Japan lags 2-6 0.0169 -0.006
Fiscal
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0063 -0.0105**
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0157 -0.0048
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0008 -0.0049
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0365*** -0.0089
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0149 -0 .0 1 1 0 **
US leads 2 -6 0.0076 0.0086
US lead 1 -0.0442** -0.0196**
US lag 0 -0.0004 0.0254*
US lag 1 -0.0207 -0.0125
US lags 2-6 -0.0037 0 .0 0 1 0
Exchange Rate Policy
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0019 -0 .0 0 2 1
Euro-zone lead 1 0 .0 1 0 0 0.0017
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0044 -0 .0 0 2 1
Euro-zone lag 1 0 .0 1 2 1 0.0042
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0042 0.0056***
US leads 2-6 0.0138 -0.0133*
US lead 1 -0.0156 -0.0042
US lag 0 -0.0050 -0.0113
US lag 1 -0.0147 -0.0209
US lag 2-6 -0.0073 0 .0 0 1 1
Japan leads 2-6 0 .0 0 2 0 0.0013
Japan lead 1 0.0026 0.0071
Japan lag 0 0.0149 0.0007
Japan lag 1 -0.0146 -0.0081**
Japan lags 2-6 0 .0 1 2 2 -0.0044**
Actual Intervention
Japan leads 2-6 -0.0088 0.0067
Japan lead 1 0.0118 0.0093
Japan lag 0 0.0165 -0.0039
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Table 3.8: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Independent
Variables
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Japan lag 1 0.0044 -0 .0 0 1 0
Japan lags 2-6 -0.0108 -0 .0 0 0 1
Other Macro
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 2
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0092 -0.0073
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0118** 0.0005
Euro-zone lag 1 0 .0 1 0 1 -0.0017
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0009 -0.0009
US leads 2-6 0.0046 0.0027
US lead 1 -0.0191* -0 .0 0 1 1
US lag 0 -0.0006 0 .0 0 2 0
US lag 1 -0.0159** -0.0059
US lags 2-6 -0 .0 0 2 1 -0.0045**
Japan leads 2-6 -0.0047 0.0007
Japan lead 1 0.0369 0 .0 2 1 1
Japan lag 0 0.0126 -0.0134
Japan lag 1 -0.0155 0.0073
Japan lags 2-6 -0.0030 0.0038
Non-Fundamentals 
Options Market
leads 2 -6 -0.0017 -0.0058*
lead 1 -0.0013 -0.0070*
lag 0 0.0106** -0.0065
lag 1 0.0106* -0.0061**
lags 2 -6 -0 .0 0 2 0 0.0032
Technical Analysis
leads 2 -6 0 .0 1 1 2 0.0040*
lead 1 -0.0063 0.0161
lag 0 -0.0147* 0.0033
lag 1 -0 .0 1 0 1 -0.0005
lags 2 -6 0.0016 -0.0026
Sentiment
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0027 -0.0047
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0162 -0.0240**
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0119 -0.0107
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Table 3.8: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Independent Benchmark + Benchmark +
Variables Benchmark Reuters News Benchmark Reuters News
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0082 0.0048
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0058 0.0065
US leads 2 -6 0.0336* 0 .0 1 0 2 *
US lead 1 -0.0674*** -0.0105
US lag 0 -0.0451** -0.0487***
US lag 1 0 .0 2 2 1 ** -0.0138**
US lags 2 -6 0.0048 0.0132*
Private Sector
leads 2 -6 0.0013 -0.0029**
lead 1 -0.0027 0.0057**
lag 0 -0.0003 0.0053*
lag 1
lags 2-6 -0.0004
-0.0057
0.0015
-0.0034
Politics
leads 2 -6 -0.0133 -0.0074
lead 1 -0.0042 -0.0042
lag 0 0.0237 -0.0199**
lag 1 -0.0095 0.0038
lags 2 -6 0.0033 -0.0042
Adj R 2 0.3628 0.3853 0.1503 0.154
F  — t e s t 235.78*** 16.78*** 67.93*** 6.11***
Notes: Volatility is calculated at 20 minute frequency and is defined as the absolute 
return where returns are calculated as 100 tim es the log difference of the mid quote. 
T he mid quote is calculated as the average o f the bid and ask quotes. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 3.9: The Influence of Order Flow on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Returns
Independent USD-EUR USD-GBP
Variables Return on order flow Return on order flow
Non-News
Constant
Dependent Variable 
lag 1 
lag 2
0.3765***
0.1422***
-0 .0 0 2 2 ***
Order Flow 
lagO 
lagl 
lags 2 -6
0.0041***
-0.0019***
0.0028***
-0.0003*
Adj U l  
F  — t e s t
0.3895
479.52***
0.2601
267.07***
Notes: Returns and order flow are calculated at 20 minute frequency. Returns are 
defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote .The mid quote is calculated 
as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Order flow is the net of total buys and total 
sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of 
the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR and sterling for USD-GBP). *, ** and
*** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 3.10: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Order Flow
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark -f 
Reuters News
Non-News
Constant -0.0916 -0.0720 0.7134*** 0.6438***
Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.0276 0.0068 0.0375 0.0239
lag 2 0.0064 -0.0140 0.0612** 0.0414
Macro Surprises
UK 5.0043 5.7282 5.5390 5.9551
US -5.2395 -4.7519 -3.1900 -3.0639
Euro-zone -14.3592*** -8.1623*** 2.4857 6.2941
Monetary
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -1.0664 0.6128
Euro-zone lead 1 -4.6384** -3.0961***
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.2166 0.5266
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.5150 -3.8553***
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -2.0149* -1.4698*
US leads 2-6 0.1683 -0.1976
US lead 1 0.4166 0.8880
US lag 0 -0.8355 0.0358
US lag 1 -0.8338 1.1835
US lags 2-6 1 .1 2 1 1 ** 0.2023
Other Asset Markets
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.7458 -1.4982**
Euro-zone lead 1 8.5026*** 0.6791
Euro-zone lag 0 2.5776 -2.3840
Euro-zone lag 1 -2.2379 0.3759
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -2.6458* 0.5862
US leads 2 -6 -0.9672 -0.0193
US lead 1 0.7701 2.0473**
US lag 0 -0.3633 0.1308
US lag 1 0.9499 0.2826
US lags 2-6 -0.8867 -0.5952
Japan leads 2-6 -0.0483 0.7684
Japan lead 1 -8.4890*** -1.8291
Japan lag 0 -1.6512 1.2118
Japan lag 1 3.4236 -1.6684
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Table 3.10: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Japan lags 2-6 3.1405 -0.7835
Fiscal
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.4517 -0.3809
Euro-zone lead 1 -6.1345* -1.3813
Euro-zone lag 0 -1.6459 2.8255
Euro-zone lag 1 -2.2238 -2.5632
Euro-zone lags 2-6 1.1478 -1.0193
US leads 2-6 -3.6302* -1.0672
US lead 1 5.0921 1.0908
US lag 0 -5.7113 -1.5695
US lag 1 3.6271 6.5694**
US lags 2-6 -4.2852 -1.6651
Exchange Rate Policy
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.7444 -0.3120
Euro-zone lead 1 2.2783* 1.3134*
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.2348 -2.1597**
Euro-zone lag 1 0.3445 0.8507
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.3848 1.0142**
US leads 2 -6 1.2634 5.1489***
US lead 1 -14.8325 -2.7571
US lag 0 10.5302 2.5919
US lag 1 -5.9310 -4.2393
US lags 2 -6 -6.6751* -4.1263**
Japan leads 2-6 0.6125 0.4493
Japan lead 1 -1.5933 0.2873
Japan lag 0 1.4530 0.1225
Japan lag 1 -1.7703 -0.5979
Japan lags 2-6 -0.6091 -0.8216*
Actual Intervention -2.0098 -0.7482
Japan leads 2-6
Japan lead 1 7.4541 2.2856
Japan lag 0 1.2634 -0.1558
Japan lag 1 1.2091 -0.6040
Japan lags 1.3187 -0.4869
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Table 3.10: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Independent
Variables
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Other Macro
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.3565 0.2400
Euro-zone lead 1 1.1168 0.1463
Euro-zone lag 0 0.4636 0.4353
Euro-zone lag 1 3.3291 2.3196*
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.9315 0.6359
US leads 2 -6 -1.4502 0.1066
US lead 1 -1.7229 -0.7207
US lag 0 -1.2686 0.2478
US lag 1 -1.4547 -0.2004
US lags 2 -6 -0.4525 -0.2859
Japan leads 2-6 0.0938 1.4134
Japan lead 1 -5.5085 -1.0686
Japan lag 0 -0.8941 -0.5508
Japan lag 1 -10.8177 -6.4707
Japan lags 2-6 -3.2868 2.2332
N on-Fundament als 
Options Market
leads 2 -6 -2.0105 -0.0058*
lead 1 3.6767** 1.0264
lag 0 2.1123 0.0083
lag 1 -1.1373 -2.0049
lags 2 -6 1.8932* 0.2565
Technical Analysis
leads 2 -6 -0.5391 0.1745
lead 1 0.5049 0.0781
lag 0 -1.2501 -1.2757
lag 1 1.5795 -0.2632
lags 2 -6 -1.1253* 0.3740
Sentiment
Euro-zone leads 2-6 1.9762 0.0214
Euro-zone lead 1 3.7804 1.8435
Euro-zone lag 0 5.1912 3.2942
Euro-zone lag 1 -2.1566 2.0271
Euro-zone lags 2-6 4.4319** 2.6850
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Table 3.10: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP
Independent Benchmark + Benchmark +
Variables Benchmark Reuters News Benchmark Reuters News
US leads 2-6 8.2922*** 2.3937
US lead 1 18.1050*** 3.4189
US lag 0 -1.8335 -2.4227
US lag 1 13.0734*** 0.4593
US lags 2-6 0.1711 3.0685*
Private Sector
leads 2 -6 -0.4838 0.3700
leads 1 -2.7635 -1.0075
lag 0 -1.1951 0.1768
lag 1 1.0433 0.3638
lags 2 -6 0.2696 -0.7336*
Politics
leads 2 -6 3.3832* -0.1477
leads 1 -1.1338 -0.3227
lag 0 0.9213 -2.1606
lag 1 -5.8603** -4.2438*
lags 2 -6 -1.6658 -0.4108
Adj R 2 0 .0 0 2 0 0.0203 0.0048 0 .0 1 2
F  — t e s t 2.76*** 1.61*** 4.90** 1.38**
Notes: Order flow is calculated at 20 m inute frequency. It is the net of total buys and 
total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to  a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser 
(seller) of th e denominator currency (euro for U SD -EU R  and sterling for U SD -G B P). 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Reuters D2000-2 Bid, Ask and Mid Quotes, 15 Nov 1999 - 18 Jan 
2000
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(c) USD-GBP Bid & Ask Quotes (d) USD-GBP Mid Quote
Notes: Both currencies are defined as the number of dollars per foreign currency (euro 
and sterling, respectively). The mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and 
ask quotes.
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Figure 3.2: Total Buys, Total Sells and Order Flow, 15 Nov 1999 - 18 Jan 2000
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Notes: Order flow is the net of total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to 
a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro 
for USD-EUR and sterling for USD-GBP).
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Figure 3.3: Exchange Rate Returns and Volatility, 15 Nov 1999 - 18 Jan 2000
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Notes: The data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Both currencies are defined as 
the number of dollars per foreign currency (euro and sterling, respectively). Returns 
are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is 
calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Volatility is defined as the absolute 
return.
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Figure 3.4: Average Daily Volatility and the FFF Seasonal (in basis points), 15
Nov 1999 - 18 Jan 2000
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Notes: The data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Both currencies are defined as 
the number of dollars per foreign currency (euro and sterling, respectively). The figures 
plot the average intra-daily pattern of volatility (jagged line) and the Flexible Fourier 
Form seasonal (smooth line) over a 24-hour period. Volatility is defined as the absolute 
return, where returns are calculated as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote. 
The mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.
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Figure 3.5: Average Daily USD-GBP Returns, Order Flow and News Arrival, 15
Nov 1999 - 18 Jan 2000
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Notes: The data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Both currencies are defined as 
the number of dollars per foreign currency (euro and sterling, respectively). The figures 
plot the average intra-daily pattern of returns, order flow and news arrival over a 24- 
hour period. Returns are calculated as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote 
where the mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Order flow 
is the net of total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which 
the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR  
and sterling for U SD -G BP). News Arrival is an indicator variable for the number of 
Reuters news articles in each 20 minute period.
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Figure 3.6: Intra-day Effects of Order Flow and News on USD-EUR and USD- 
GBP Returns
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N o t e s :  T h e s e  f i g u r e s  s h o w  t h e  c u m u l a t i v e  e f f e c t s  o n  r e t u r n s  o f  o r d e r  f lo w  tw o  h o u r s  
a f t e r  a n d  “n e w s ” t w o  h o u r s  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  R e u t e r s  r e p o r t  ( t i m e  0 ) .  
T h e  d a s h e d  l i n e s  s h o w  t h e  9 5 %  c o n f id e n c e  i n t e r v a l .
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Figure 3.7: Intra-day Effects of News on USD-EUR and USD-GBP Order Flow
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Notes: These figures show the cumulative effects on order flow of “news” two hours 
before and after the tim e of the Reuters report (time 0). The dashed lines show the 
95% confidence interval.
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Chapter 4 
Unrequited Interventions
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines intra-day foreign exchange market reactions to news of 
actual and unrequited interventions reported in the financial press. Interven­
tion operations are used by many governments to manage their exchange rates. 
Research has found that these operations can, under certain circumstances, ef­
fectively influence the level and volatility of exchange rates2. One of the more
1This chapter is based on joint work with Prof. Kathryn M.E. Dominguez.
2 A number of recent papers have examined the influence of intervention operations on daily 
exchange rate returns and volatility and generally find evidence that interventions influence re­
turns and increase volatility. Dominguez and Frankel (1993a,b), Dominguez (2003a), Humpage
(1999), Fatum and Hutchinson (2003, 2006), de Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003), Ito (2003) find 
that interventions influence daily returns. Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996), Dominguez (1998), 
Galati, Melick, and Micu (forthcoming), Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann (2005) find that 
interventions lead to increases in implied volatilities measured using options data. Chaboud 
and LeBaron (1999) find a positive correlation between daily (futures) trading volume and Fed 
interventions. Dominguez (1998) using a GARCH model, Beine, Benassy-Quere, and Lecourt 
(2002) using a FIGARCH model, and Beine and Laurent (2003) using a model that allows 
for a time-varying jump probability associated with interventions, all find evidence that in­
terventions tend to increase exchange rate volatility. Dominguez (forthcoming) and Beine, 
Laurent, and Palm (2003) examine the effects of G3 interventions on daily realized volatility 
using an ARFIMA model. A few papers find evidence that situation-specific interventions lead 
to decreases in volatility. For example, Beine, Laurent, and Lecourt (2003) allow for a regime- 
dependent specification using a Markov switching model and find that when the market is 
highly volatile concerted interventions decrease volatility. Dominguez (1998) and Taylor (2004)
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puzzling aspects of intervention policy is the fact that some governments keep 
their intervention operations secret, even ex post3. The financial press often 
reports over the wire services when a central bank is intervening, though gov­
ernments rarely officially confirm their presence in the market. Because there is 
often uncertainty in the market about whether a given government is intervening, 
there are inevitably circumstances when the financial press reports interventions 
that have not occurred. There are also frequently reports of what we term, un­
requited interventions, interventions that the market expects but do not occur. 
In this chapter we examine the effects of various types of intervention news (re­
ported actual interventions, falsely reported interventions, oral interventions and 
unrequited interventions) on exchange rate behaviour.
A number of previous studies have shown that in order to find significant 
reactions in the foreign exchange market to the news, one needs to measure 
the precise impact of the news at the intra-day level4. Using Reuters’ time- 
stamped newswire reports we are able to match the timing of intervention news 
to movements in intra-day exchange rates. We also include scheduled macro 
announcement news reports which have been used in previous studies to allow 
us to compare the effects of intervention news against these more “traditional” 
variables.
The intra-day foreign exchange data used in this study are transactions prices
find that interventions in the mid-1980s reduced exchange rate volatility.
3Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) discuss the possible reasons that central banks might 
want to keep their intervention operations secret (the so-called stealth operations). Neely
(2000) notes that central banks are moving increasingly toward electronic trading methods, 
which suggests that they are less interested in keeping operations secret. On this topic also 
see: Vitale (1999), Bhattacharya and Weller (1997), Chiu (2003), Beine, Janssen, and Lecourt
(2004), Beine and Bernal (forthcoming). Although the Japanese government generally does 
not provide contemporaneous information about their intervention operations, the Ministry 
of Finance publishes lagged daily intervention data (lagged one month) on their website: 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/elc021.htm.
4 See Dominguez and Panthaki (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the intra-day influence 
of news on exchange rates.
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and quote spreads in three dollar currency markets: USD-EUR, USD-GBP and 
YEN-USD available from the Reuters D2000-2 electronic trading system over the 
period from December 1999 through July 2000. The data do not include infor­
mation on traded quantities, but they do indicate whether trades were initiated 
by a buyer or seller, allowing us to measure order flow as well as returns and 
volatility. We use a 20 minute sampling frequency and measure order flow as 
the cumulative number of buyer initiated trades minus the cumulative number of 
seller initiated trades over the same 2 0  minutes.
The intra-day intervention news and exchange rate data allow us to test 
whether interventions have similar impact effects on returns and volatility as 
compared to (the already heavily studied) scheduled macro announcements. The 
fact that information regarding interventions most often comes from unofficial 
sources suggests that there are likely to be differences of opinion among market 
participants about the implications of the information. In our application, we 
can distinguish between scheduled (and presumably better-understood) macro 
announcements and more ambiguous intervention news. We also measure what 
proportion of the price discovery process in reaction to intervention news occurs 
via order flow. Previous studies have found evidence that a substantial propor­
tion of the market reaction to macro-announcements occurs via order flow. By 
examining how intervention news events influence order flow - we can begin to 
better understand how this measure relates to price and volatility movements in 
the foreign exchange markets.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2  reviews the links between inter­
vention operations and exchange rates in standard models. Section 3 describes 
the exchange rate and order flow data from Reuters D2000-2 used in our em­
pirical analysis. Section 4 provides results of our event study analysis of the
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influence of intervention news and macro surprises on exchange rate returns and 
volatility. Section 5 introduces our order flow information and examines its role 
in explaining exchange rate movements. Section 6  concludes.
4.2 Intervention News and Exchange Rates
Theory suggests that foreign exchange market interventions that are sterilized5 
may influence exchange rates through two potential channels: portfolio balance 
and “information/signaling” . In portfolio-balance models of exchange rate deter­
mination, investors diversify their holdings among domestic and foreign assets as 
a function of expected returns and the variance of returns. Foreign and domestic 
assets are assumed to be outside assets (so that Ricardian equivalence does not 
hold) and imperfect substitutes (so that uncovered interest parity does not hold). 
Portfolio balance theory predicts that the change in the relative supply of foreign 
and domestic assets that occurs with a sterilized intervention will require a change 
in expected relative returns. For example, after a sterilized home-currency sup­
porting intervention, investors will require a higher expected return on foreign 
assets to hold willingly the larger outstanding stock, leading to a depreciation 
of the foreign currency relative to the home currency. In the portfolio balance 
model, traders do not need to observe the intervention operation in order for it 
to be effective. However, only actual intervention operations, which change the 
composition of domestic relative to foreign assets in trader’s portfolios, can in­
5 Sterilized interventions are a combination of two transactions. The central bank conducts 
a non-sterilized intervention, for example, by purchasing (or selling) foreign-currency denom­
inated bonds and increasing (decreasing) the home monetary base. The central bank then 
sterilizes the operation by selling (or purchasing) a corresponding quantity of home-currency 
denominated bonds in order to reverse the effects on the monetary base. Countries that adhere 
to monetary targets are generally assumed to engage chiefly in sterilized intervention operations, 
h  practice the U.S. and the ECB claim to routinely sterilize their operations.
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fluence exchange rates via this channel. Consequently, unrequited interventions 
(as well as false reports of interventions and oral interventions) should have no 
influence on exchange rates via the portfolio balance channel.
The second channel whereby intervention operations may influence exchange 
rates is the information or signaling channel. Intervention operations may pro­
vide investors with “information” about the Central Bank’s (or Government’s) 
view of the appropriate exchange rate6. Intervention operations may also pro­
vide a “signal” of future policy intentions (for example, future monetary policy). 
Moreover, the intervention operation may itself “buy credibility” for future pol­
icy intentions. As long as the information signaled through intervention policy 
is relevant and credible, it can potentially influence the exchange rate7. Only 
those intervention operations that are observed by the market can serve to in­
fluence exchange rates via the signaling channel so that non-reported or secret 
interventions (if they are truly secret) are unlikely to serve as signals8.
When traders first learn of an intervention operation over the newswires, they 
may not know whether the information is substantiated or not. It is therefore 
possible for all intervention news (whether actual, false or unrequited) to have 
a short-term impact on exchange rates via the signaling channel. As soon as 
traders learn that intervention news is false or unrequited then we might expect 
returns and volatility to revert to their original levels. Alternatively, it may 
be that in periods when interventions are expected (even if they do not occur)
that unrequited interventions reported over the newswires serve to coordinate the
6It is also possible for governments to communicate this information directly to the market. 
See, for example, Fratzscher (2004), Jansen and de Haan (1987), Sager and Taylor (2004).
7See Mussa (1981), Dominguez (1992b), Vitale (2003), Sarno and Taylor (2001), D ’Souza
(2002), Taylor (2005) for further discussion of the intervention-signaling hypothesis.
8Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000) hypothesize that non-secret interventions create signif­
icant adverse selection problems for dealers. They find evidence in daily data that dealers 
increase exchange rate spreads around interventions and suggest that in doing so they protect 
themselves against the greater informational asymmetry around interventions.
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markets’ view of exchange rate movements9.
We use time-stamped Reuters’s newswire reports10 to measure intervention 
news. Our search criteria retrieved newswire articles under the joint subject area 
of “foreign exchange” and “intervention”. We then coded and grouped11 news 
articles according to geographic region (Euro-zone, U.K., U.S. or Japan) and type 
of intervention (threat, rumour, oral, unrequited, actual and joint). Table 4.1 pro­
vides a breakdown of the intervention news categories that appeared in newswire 
reports over the period under study. In the table we distinguish between cases 
where there was a ‘Threat’ or ‘No Threat’ of intervention from the policymaker. 
Further distinctions were made between interventions that were ‘Reported’ or 
‘Not Reported’ in the news (panel a), and interventions that were ‘Expected’ or 
‘Not Expected’ by the market (panel b). There were 172 ‘Threats’12, which we 
define as news that a central bank intervened, threatened to intervene, or made 
a statement that was intended to influence the home currency (termed oral in­
terventions). There were 48 ‘No Threat’ interventions13 which we define as news
9Montgomery and Popper (2001) suggest that actual central bank intervention may also 
serve to aggregate and disseminate traders’ information and thereby serve an informational 
sharing role for a heterogeneously informed market.
10These data are from the Factiva database and, unfortunately, do not include the headline 
news that run over the Reuters ticker second by second, but they include the major economic 
news events that occur over a given day.
11 In theory each “news” report may have a different one-time influence on exchange rates. We 
group similar news items together in order to examine whether certain “types” of intervention 
news have a systematic influence on exchange rate behaviour.
1209 May 2000: “The beleaguered euro got a boost overnight when French Finance Minister 
Laurent Fabius reminded markets that currency market intervention was a weapon in Europe’s 
arsenal and the currency should rise in the coming weeks”; 14 Mar 2000: “Japanese Finance 
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa said Japan would act in response to rapid moves in the foreign 
exchange market”.
1317 February 2000: “ECB President Wim Duisenberg was reported on February 10 as saying 
the ECB could not and should not do anything directly to influence the euro’s exchange rate 
but said he would not fundamentally rule out intervention. Asked whether there was a floor 
set at which the ECB would defend the euro at all costs, Duisenberg said, If there were such 
a limit, I wouldn’t tell you. But there isn’t one. But we know how limited the effect of such 
intervention is. If we take such a step in coordination with the United States and Japan, 
then that would be a possibility. But we see no reason for it at present, he said; 06 March
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that a central bank did not intend to intervene (including orally). The ‘Interven­
tion Detected’14 category refers to cases where the central bank intervened and 
it was reported in the news. The one ‘False Intervention’15 refers to an occa­
sion when the market incorrectly thought the ECB was intervening. The largest 
category of intervention news in the table is ‘Unrequited Intervention’16 which is 
defined as a report that the market expected an intervention that did not occur.
The euro officially came into existence in January 1999, and a year later there 
was broad concern in Europe that the euro had dipped below parity against the 
dollar. The majority of the unrequited intervention news reports in our data 
over this period were associated with the absence of ECB operations to support 
the euro against the dollar. An example of the sort of news reports involving 
the ECB in this period includes: “[ECB President Wim Duisenberg] poured cold 
water on speculation that euro zone central banks had been covertly propping up 
the currency... Such talk has swirled around the foreign exchanges for the past
week as a steady stream of orders to buy the single currency from such quarters,
2000: “Bundesbank’s Welteke quoted by magazine as saying he was convinced euro has upward 
potential due to internal strength. - Welteke also says doesn’t believe short-term measures can 
stabilise euro’s exchange rate”.
1416 Mar 2000: “The Bank of Japan has intervened at least 16 times in foreign exchanges 
since June, 1999, most recently on Wednesday, in an attempt to fight the market forces which 
have driven the Japanese currency higher”
154 May 2000: “Traders contacted by Reuters said it was unclear whether these orders were 
executed for commercial purposes or whether they were intended to signal official intervention 
in support of the battered euro”; 11 May 2000: “Duisenberg contradicted himself over how 
sensitive the ECB actually was to the threat of inflation being imported by the euro’s protracted 
fall, and poured cold water on speculation that euro zone central banks had been covertly 
propping up the currency”; 11 May 2000: “ Traders had already become more inclined to sell 
the euro after Duisenberg denied that any of the recent purchases of the euros by European 
central banks had been covert intervention.”.
1628 February 2000: “The issue now is what are the Europeans going to do about it. Just to 
say it’s got the potential to appreciate would not be enough - they’ve been saying that since 
we were at $1.10”; 05 May 2000: “The market is sick of words, we need action.”; 05 May 2000: 
“The authorities have to show their hand. They have to stand up and be seen. I think the 
market will take their lead,” Soros said in London on Thursday”; 11 May 2000: “Actions speak 
louder than words, and it is all very well saying that you want the currency to be higher but 
people are actually waiting to see intervention, said Paul Coughlin, chief trader at American 
Express Bank in London”.
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ostensibly for commercial reasons, has kept traders on their toes” (May 11, 2000 
at 10:57am). It was not until September 2000 (beyond our sample period) that 
the ECB actually intervened (in coordination with a number of other central 
banks including the Fed, the BOJ and the BOE).
The Japanese government, in contrast to the Europeans, sought a depreciation 
of the yen relative to the dollar in this time period. Figure 4.1, which shows the 
YEN-USD exchange rate and BOJ interventions from 1990 though 2002, puts 
Japanese exchange rate objectives into context. After a number of years of yen 
depreciation relative to the dollar, the yen began to strengthen in August 1998 
(on the heels of a number of interventions in support of the yen by the BOJ and 
the Fed17) with a precipitous rise in the value of the yen relative to the dollar 
starting in July 1999 through early 2000. The BOJ intervened to weaken the yen 
by selling yen and purchasing dollars on 17 days over the period January 1999 
(with the YEN-USD rate at 108) through April 2000 (with the YEN-USD rate at 
104). Our eight-month sample period (circled on Figure 4.1) includes the last 5 of 
these 17 intervention days. Table 4.2 shows the dollar amounts purchased by the 
Bank of Japan on each of these days18. Reuters reports over this period suggest 
that both the market and the Japanese government considered the YEN-USD 
“1 0 0 ” mark as a critical value not to be crossed (which indeed did not happen).
17Ito (2003) provides a chronological description of Japanese foreign exchange intervention 
over the period 1991 through 2004. He notes that Japanese intervention strategy changed 
dramatically in 1995 under Eisuke Sakakibara, the Director General of the International Bureau, 
toward larger sized interventions on fewer occasions. Sakakibara retired in July 1999 but 
his successor, Mr. Kuroda, who was in charge of Japanese intervention policy during our 
sample period, followed a similar intervention philosophy of infrequent, large and unpredictable 
operations. Also see Chaboud and Humpage (2005), Kim (forthcoming), Fatum and Hutchinson 
(2006), Frenkel, Pierdzioch, and Stadtmann (2005) for further analysis of Japanese interventions 
over this time period.
18Newswire reports reveal that the BOJ intervened on multiple occasions on each “interven­
tion day”. The Fed, Bundesbank, and ECB also generally follow a strategy of intervening on 
multiple occasions over the course of a given intervention day. See Dominguez (2003b) for more 
discussion of intra-day intervention operation strategies.
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The first BOJ intervention in our sample occurred on December 24, 1999, a 
day when our Reuters electronic brokerage data (and the Reuters news data) 
suggests there was extremely little trading in advance of the Christmas holiday. 
The second intervention, on January 4, 2000, also occurred during a period of 
extremely light trading volume. The YEN-USD rate rebounded from the critical 
“1 0 0 ” level after these interventions for a few weeks and then as the yen began 
to depreciate in early March, the BOJ again intervened on March 8 th, 15th and 
April 3rd. The YEN-USD rate rebounded over the next few months and it was 
not until after a year’s hiatus that the BOJ again began to purchase dollars in 
September 2001 through June 2 0 0 2 . Along with the actual BOJ interventions 
that took place during this time, there were numerous unrequited intervention 
news reports of additional Japanese operations (which did not occur) to weaken 
the yen.
During our sample period the Bank of England (BOE) did not engage in any 
intervention operations and the there were no rumours of BOE interventions or 
reports of unrequited interventions in the USD-GBP market. We include the 
USD-GBP in our analysis in large part because the source of our exchange rate 
data, the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage trading system, is most dominate 
in this market. Triangular arbitrage suggests that news that influences other 
dollar cross-rates is also likely to influence the USD-GBP rate, and for this reason 
we include it in our study.
The empirical approach we take in this chapter is based on the assumption 
that exchange rates are forward looking asset prices that react to changes in the 
market’s expectation of future fundamentals. We further assume that “future 
fundamentals” may include both standard variables from international macro 
models (for example, money and income differentials) as well as variables such as
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actual and unrequited interventions that may provide information about future 
fundamentals. We use intra-daily exchange rate data to allow a narrow enough 
window around the times of news announcements to be able to precisely estimate 
the exchange rate reactions in the spirit of Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and 
Vega (2003)19.
We examine the intra-daily influence of intervention news on exchange rate 
movements20. We also consider whether intervention news not only impacts ex­
change rates directly, but also influences exchange rates via order flow (signed 
trade volume). Like unrequited interventions, order flow plays no role in stan­
dard models of exchange rate determination, so a finding that order flow matters 
will provide evidence in favor of a different modelling strategy for exchange rate 
determination (at least for very short term movements)21.
The information that market participants in foreign exchange markets receive 
can be broadly categorized into two categories: “scheduled” and “non-scheduled” . 
Official macro data are typically announced by the relevant government agency 
on a pre-arranged schedule, so that market participants can plan in advance
their reactions to this information. Table 4.3 describes the scheduled macro news
19The enormous literature measuring the effects of macro news on intra-daily exchange rates 
includes Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Ederington and Lee (1995), de Gen- 
naro and Shrieves (1997), Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998), Andersen and Bollerslev 
(1998), Melvin and Yin (2000), Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright (2003), Love and Payne
(2003), Love (2004), Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, Iyer, Liu, and Wright (2004), Bauwens, 
Omrane, and Giot (2005), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005).
20Bauwens, Omrane, and Giot (2005) examine the influence of news, including rumours 
of intervention, on euro-usd volatility over a six month period in 2001. They find that the 
most significant pre-announcement increase in volatility is related to rumours of central bank 
interventions. They also find that once a rumour is refuted, volatility stabilizes or drops. 
Other intra-day studies of the effects of (actual) intervention operations include: Goodhart and 
Hesse (1993), Peiers (1997), Chang and Taylor (1998), Beattie and Fillion (1999), Fischer and 
Zurlinden (1999), Neely (2002), Payne and Vitale (2003), Breedon and Vitale (2004), Panthaki
(2005), Pasquariello (2004, forthcoming), Dominguez (2003b, forthcoming).
21 Evans and Lyons (2002) is one of the first studies that found a link between order flow and 
exchange rate movements. We will be examining these same links though with a very different 
data set and time period.
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announcements from the UK, the US, the Euro-area and Japan that are included 
in our “macro surprise” variables. Non-scheduled news is by its nature less likely 
to be anticipated by the market. It is also likely that market participants are less 
able to quickly interpret the implications of non-scheduled news, which would 
include all our categories of intervention news, for exchange rates, potentially 
leading to more heterogeneity in their responses to the news22. Further, regardless 
of whether news is scheduled or not, its influence on exchange rates may be related 
to the state of the market at the time of the news arrival23. News that arrives 
during periods of high uncertainty may have different effects on the exchange 
rate, than news that arrives in calmer periods24.
4.3 Exchange Market Data
25Our intra-day exchange rate and order flow data cover an eight-month period, 
from December 1999 through July 2000 for the USD-GBP, the USD-EUR and
220 f course, an increase in market heterogeneity may also occur in reaction to scheduled 
announcements. Kondor (2005) shows that if traders display confirmatory bias, the release of 
public information may increase divergence in opinion. The main insight is that sometimes 
(public) information implies something different when it is coupled with different (private) 
pieces of existing information. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) also model the influence of 
higher-order expectations in reaction to news.
23For example, Dominguez (2003b) shows that the influence of central bank interventions on 
exchange rate returns depends on the intra-day timing of intervention operations (whether they 
occur during heavy trading volume, or are closely timed to scheduled macro announcements) 
as well as whether the operations are coordinated with another central bank. Dominguez 
and Panthaki (2006) find that “news” has its greatest influence on intra-day exchange rate 
returns during periods of high market uncertainty (proxied by high volatility as measured by 
the absolute value of returns).
24Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) find evidence that “bad” news in good 
times (economic expansions) have greater impacts than good news in good times, suggesting 
that good news in good times confirms beliefs but bad news in good times comes as more of a 
surprise. Our short sample period will not allow us to test this hypothesis directly, though in 
future work we intend to test whether “confirming” versus “surprising” news about interventions 
has different effects.
25This section draws heavily from Dominguez and Panthaki (2006)
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the YEN-USD26. The data are from the brokered segment of the inter-dealer 
exchange rate market as captured by the Reuters D2000-2 electronic trading 
system27. Electronic brokers were first introduced in 1992 and since that time 
their market share has increased rapidly. In the early 1990s the inter-dealer 
market was split evenly between direct and voice-broker trading but by the late 
1990s (the sample period used in this study) the two top electronic brokerage 
systems, Reuters and EBS, made up over 50 percent of the market.
Inter-dealer brokering systems provide prices that are advertised to all member 
dealers (though the identity of the quoting dealer is only available once the quote 
is hit). Dealers can submit a buy or sell quote or “hit” a quote of another dealer. 
Only the highest bid and lowest ask (the touch) are shown on the Reuters screen28. 
The quantity available at each (best) bid and ask is also shown (which may involve 
more than one bank), and when a bid or ask is hit the quantities available at 
that price are adjusted if they dip below $10 million. When multiple banks have 
entered the same bid or ask price, and the price is hit, offers are met on a first 
come basis (meaning that the dealer who first input the price gets the deal first 
and if more quantity is needed, the dealer that next submitted the same price 
fills the order, and so on). All transactions are made at either the posted bid or 
ask29. Figure 4.2 shows bid and ask quotes for the USD-EUR, USD-GBP, and
26The exchange rate data axe available from Reuters. The other major electronic brokerage 
system, EBS has a much larger share of total trading in the USD-EUR and YEN-USD markets 
potentially leading the Reuters data to be less representative. Reuters order flow data, in 
particular, may not well capture average trading behaviour in these markets.
27See Rime (2003) for a detailed description of electronic trading systems and Lyons (2001) 
for a full description of the three basic types of trades in the foreign exchange market. Direct 
inter-dealer trading was traditionally the most liquid part of the foreign exchange market - it 
typically is used for large size trades (above $ 10 million) and spreads are typically only one 
to two basis points. Brokered inter-dealer trades are a growing segment of the market, and 
typically involve slightly higher spreads of 2-3 basis points (especially for trades below $ 10 
million). Customer-dealer trades involve 3-7 basis point spreads for “good” customers.
28Limit orders with prices below the best bid or above the best offer are not observable on 
Reuters D2000-2 but are shown on Minex.
290 ne advantage of the (shrinking) voice-brokered market is that they allow for some com­
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YEN-USD rates over our sample period along with the quote mid-point. The 
relative depth of the Reuters D2000 USD-GBP market is apparent in Figure 4.2 
based on the narrow spreads between bid and ask quotes. Spreads in the USD- 
EUR and YEN-USD quotes are sometimes quite wide due to the relative lack of 
liquidity in these markets on the Reuters system.
While dealers in individual banks will know their own customer order flow - 
they do not have access to information on customer orders of other banks. One 
of the reasons that inter-dealer brokerage systems have become so popular is 
that they provide an important source of real time information on both market 
quotes and overall market order flow. The Reuters D2000-2 system classifies 
transactions as buyer-initiated or seller-initiated, providing dealers with a real 
time proxy of signed trading volume30. We measure order flow in this study as 
the difference between the number of buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated 
trades in each 20-minute interval. Figure 4.3 shows the number of buy and sell 
orders separately as well as our measure of order flow for the three exchange 
rates. It is worth noting that the relative number of transactions in the YEN- 
USD Reuters D2000-2 system is significantly lower than for either the USD-EUR 
or USD-GBP (the vertical axis on each of the figures is the same to highlight 
comparisons across the currencies). The low volume of transactions reported 
for the YEN-USD market is reflective of the fact that the competitor brokerage 
system, EBS, is dominant in this market.
The intra-day price series used in this study incorporates information from 
both transactions prices (actual trades) and (tradeable) bid and ask quotes sub­
mitted by dealers (but not hit)31. We use tradeable quotes in addition to actual
munication between dealers and brokers which allows for negotiation over price.
30The dealer posting the quote is considered the non-initiating side. Reuters does not provide 
information on the size of each trade.
31 Tradeable quotes differ from indicative quotes, which have been used in a number of pre­
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transactions prices to create a 20-minute price series for the USD-EUR, USD- 
GBP and YEN-USD rates that spans the period over which we have intervention 
news data32. We measure exchange rate returns, As#, as the log difference in 
2 0 -minute (midpoint) prices and exchange rate volatility Vu as the absolute value 
of the 20-minute returns. Figure 4.4 shows USD-EUR, USD-GBP and YEN-USD 
returns and volatility over our sample period. The vertical axis on each of the 
figures is again the same to highlight comparisons across the currencies. It is 
worth noting that the range of USD-GBP returns (and volatility) is significantly 
lower than it is for USD-EUR and YEN-USD returns and volatility during the 
early part of the sample. It is only in late June and July 2000 that USD-GBP 
returns and volatility rise. Figure 4.5 shows average daily USD-EUR, USD-GBP 
and YEN-USD returns, order flow and news arrival (measured as the number of 
news articles in a given 20-min interval) over the 24-hour GMT time scale. It is 
worth noting that both news arrival and order flow are fairly evenly spread over 
the day, and there is little evidence of trend in average returns.
Figure 4.6 shows the average absolute return in each 20-minute interval over 
the 24-hour GMT time scale for each of the exchange rates33. The data confirm 
the seasonal pattern that is typically found in intra-day exchange rate volatility 
data which, in turn, largely reflects the opening and closing of the three main 
trading markets in Tokyo, Europe and New York. In order to take the opening
and closings of markets into account we de-seasonalize the volatility series using
vious studies, in that they provide “firm” prices. Indicative quotes provide market information 
for non-dealers.
32There are a periods of low liquidity on Reuters D2000-2 due to technical problems (the 
feed failing), holidays, and during Asian trading hours. Some studies simply drop these time 
periods from the sample. Our approach is to interpolate a 20 minute time series (using a linear 
interpolation method) from all available quotes in order to fully span our “news” data set. 
Reuters does not include weekend data so any news that arrives over a weekend is moved to 
the first 20-minute interval on the nearest Monday.
33Note that in Figure 4.6 the x-axis for the three currencies starts at midnight, which is 
approximately 12am GMT for USD-EUR and USD-GBP, and 3pm GMT for YEN-USD.
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the Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b,a, 1998) flexible fourier form (FFF) regres­
sion method which involves decomposing the demeaned i-minute exchange rate 
returns, into a daily volatility factor, a periodic component for the ith intraday 
interval and an i.i.d. mean zero unit variance innovation term all divided by the 
square root of the number of uncorrelated intraday return components34. This 
estimated FFF seasonal is shown (together with the average daily volatility) in 
Figure 4.6.
Table 4.4 provides descriptive statistics for our 20-minute exchange rates, re­
turns35 and volatility as well as order flow, order flow volatility and transaction 
frequency (measured as the number of transactions in a given 2 0 -min interval). 
The three exchange rate returns series display little autocorrelation, suggesting 
that future exchange rate changes cannot be predicted from past changes. Intra­
day return volatility, order flow volatility, and transaction frequency for all three 
currencies shows evidence of strong and persistent autocorrelation. While buy 
and sell orders are highly autocorrelated, net order-flow (buy orders minus sell 
orders) does not display significant autocorrelation. As we saw visually in Fig­
ure 4.4 USD-GBP returns are significantly less variable than are USD-EUR or 
YEN-USD returns over this time period. And, as we saw visually in Figure 4.3, 
YEN-USD transaction frequency is significantly lower (at 3 transactions every 20 
minutes) than is transaction frequency for USD-EUR or USD-GBP (which have 
closer to 30 transactions every 20 minutes).
Table 4.5 presents contemporaneous correlations among our key variables: 
exchange rate returns, exchange rate volatility, order flow, order flow volatility,
trading frequency and news arrival36. The correlations for all three currencies in­
34See Dominguez (forthcoming) for a detailed description of how this was implemented.
35We compute returns (approximately) as the percentage change in the exchange rate mul­
tiplied by 100, so the units can be thought of as basis points.
36Evans and Lyons (2003) document strong contemporaneous correlation between news ax-
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dicate that there exists a strong contemporaneous association between exchange 
rate returns and order flow, as well as between exchange rate volatility, order 
flow volatility and transaction frequency. The correlation between returns and 
order flow is highest for USD-EUR (at 0.51) and lowest for YEN-USD (at 0.224). 
Beyond these contemporaneous correlations, we might expect longer-lived corre­
lation between intervention news and the other variables if traders have different 
views of the implications (and information content) of the news.
4.4 Effects of Intervention News on Returns and 
Volatility
The standard approach in the empirical exchange rate literature is to run the 
following sort of “event study” style regression37 of the conditional mean of i- 
minute exchange rate returns, As ti , on actual interventions, on j leads38 and lags 
of each of the k “news” announcements, and on g lags of past returns (to account 
for any autocorrelation); that is:
A s ti =  ao +  o c iIti +  ^ 2  a 3,5A5 fi_s +  eti (4.1)
k j  9
where As ti denotes the change in the natural log of the i-minute (spot market) 
exchange rate on day t 2 , Iu  denotes actual interventions (which are included
rival, transaction frequency and order flow volatility. Melvin and Yin (2000) find a positive 
correlation between trading frequency (using indicative quotes) and the rate of flow of public 
information.
37An alternative approach based on state dependent heteroscedasticity is used by Rigobon 
and Sack (2004) and Evans and Lyons (2003).
38We include leads in order to take into account the possibility that the time-stamp on our 
news lags the actual timing of when market participants first learn about the news. We find 
some evidence of lead effects for our intervention news variables for up to 1 hour prior to the 
Reuters’ time stamp.
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as (0 ,1 ) dummy variables starting from the time the news of the intervention 
operation appears in Reuters through the end of day t39), and N denotes the 
(time-stamped to the nearest i-minute) intervention news and macro surprises40. 
We use the Schwarz (1978) criteria to fix the lag length on returns and the lead/lag 
length on News, and we correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in 
the error term using the Newey and West (1987) approach. Using this general 
regression specification it is possible to test for the impact and intra-day effects 
of different kinds of intervention news and macro surprises on exchange rate 
returns by examining whether the N ks  are individually and jointly statistically 
significant. The this context measure the typical effect of the k th news
announcement at time i (on day t) on exchange rate returns in the same (narrow) 
i-minute window. It is worth noting that in order to be able to interpret the 
oikj S  in this way we need to assume that the variables in the regression can be 
viewed as fixed over the i-minute period (which is less likely to be realistic for 
low-frequency data windows). It is also the case that the a^jS measure the 
linear combination of exchange rate return effects associated with the market’s 
assessment of both the news and how the news will influence the economy41.
Our “news” variable includes three distinct categories of news: (1) macro sur­
prises, (2 ) news about intervention policy from both policy-makers and the mar­
ket and (3) news about unrequited interventions (interventions that the market
expected but did not occur). Macro surprises are aggregated across each coun­
39We also tried a specification where the actual Japanese intervention dummy variable was 
included only through the end of Asia trading hours. These regression results are qualitatively 
similar to those presented in the tables and are available upon request.
40The intervention news variables are (0,1) dummy variables. Macro surprises are measured 
as the difference between the specific announcement and the ex-ante expectation of the an­
nouncement (based on the median response to a survey conducted by Money Market Services 
International) divided by the sample standard deviation of each announcement (this serves to 
normalize the surprises so that comparisons of the relative size of coefficients is feasible).
41 For a nice discussion of the underlying assumptions in this sort of event study analysis see 
Faust, Rogers, Wang, and Wright (2003) pages 6-9.
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try so that UK, US, Euro-area and Japanese surprises are included separately42. 
Within category (2) news was further broken down by type of intervention news 
(positive or negative) and for categories (2) and (3) by geographic region (Euro­
zone, Japan, UK or Joint) and expected direction of influence (whether the news 
is expected to appreciate or depreciate the exchange rate)43. Category (2 ) and 
(3) news is in binary dummy variable form which is likely to downward bias our 
results if these sorts of news are sometimes anticipated by the market.
Table 4.6 presents results of our regression of intra-day (20-minute) USD- 
EUR, USD-GBP, and YEN-USD returns on actual intervention and the three cat­
egories of “news”. Only coefficients that are statistically significant are included 
in the table. The first, third and fifth columns in Table 4.6 present the results of 
our benchmark regression, which include the actual Japanese interventions and 
the macro surprises as “news” , for each exchange rate. Actual (Japanese) inter­
ventions do not significantly influence returns in these benchmark specifications 
and only Japanese macro surprises significantly influence USD-EUR returns. Fur­
ther, the relatively low regression goodness-of-fit for these benchmark regressions 
suggests that actual interventions and macro surprises account for a small frac­
tion of the overall variability of returns for all three exchange rates. The second, 
fourth and sixth columns in Table 4.6 include our intervention news variables. 
The coefficient values and statistical (in)significance of the macro surprises remain 
qualitatively unchanged with the inclusion of intervention news. The coefficient
on actual Japanese interventions is now significant in the YEN-USD regression,
42As robustness checks we also included disaggregated macro surprises (by type and region). 
Results were qualitatively similar whether surprises are included in aggregated or disaggregated 
form.
43We attempted to group news into variables in such a way as to insure that we would not 
be combining news that would be expected to lead to opposite effects on exchange rates. The 
coefficients on these disaggregated news variables are then aggregated into broader groupings of 
variables in order to keep our tables readable. Regression results with the disaggregated news 
categories are available upon request.
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suggesting that these interventions led to a depreciation of the yen relative to 
the dollar (which was the objective of the Japanese government in this period). 
Many of our intervention news categories are statistically significant contempo­
raneously and in leads and lags across all three exchange rates. Interestingly, 
reports of intervention, denials of interventions, and unrequited interventions all 
seem to have qualitatively similar influence on returns. For example, news that 
the ECB would not intervene generally led to a 1 basis point depreciation of the 
euro, pound and yen relative to the dollar. ECB denials of euro intervention led 
initially to a 5 to 7 basis point appreciation of the euro (based on the lead and 
contemporaneous coefficients), but eventually to a 13 basis point depreciation of 
the euro (based on the lag coefficients) relative to the dollar. Likewise, unre­
quited ECB interventions generally led to 1 to 3 basis point depreciation of the 
euro relative to the dollar. Recall that, had the ECB intervened (which they did 
not) in this sample period, their objective would have been to appreciate, not 
depreciate, the euro.
The regression results presented in Table 4.6 indicate that actual interven­
tions, denials of interventions, and unrequited interventions all had an influ­
ence on intra-daily exchange rate returns. However, the relatively low regression 
goodness-of-fit (for all specifications across all three exchange rates) suggests that 
intervention news does not go very far in explaining overall exchange rate move­
ments. It is possible that our binary coding of intervention news is partly to 
blame for our inability to explain a larger fraction of exchange rate variation. 
It may be that our intervention variables will be more successful at explaining 
exchange rates during periods when the market is more uncertain, or that inter­
ventions influence volatility more than returns. It may also be that interventions 
(however measured) do not impact price directly, but that their influence is me­
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diated through order flow. We investigate these possibilities in the next three 
sets of regressions.
In order to examine how intervention information influences traders under 
different market conditions, we test for two types of interaction effects. First, we 
ask whether intervention news is more (or less) likely to influence returns dur­
ing periods of high market uncertainty (proxied by high volatility). We create 
an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 during 2 0 -minute intervals when 
volatility (measured as the absolute value of returns) exceeds the sample average 
by two standard deviations. The first three columns in Table 4.7 present regres­
sion results that show that during periods when the market is most uncertain 
intervention news (of all types) had a significantly larger influence on returns 
than was the case when news arrived during normal periods (the second page of 
Table 4.7 presents the coefficients on the intervention news variables interacted 
with the “high volatility” indicator variable). Second, we examine if intervention 
is more (or less) effective when lots of other news is hitting the market. We create 
an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 during 2 0 -minute intervals when 
the number of news reports exceeds the sample average by two standard devia­
tions44. The last three columns of Table 4.7 (again the second page of Table 4.7 
presents the intervention news variables interacted with the “high news arrival” 
indicator variable) suggest that intervention news often had a larger impact on 
returns when it arrived during heavy news periods. These results suggest that in­
tervention news is more likely to influence trader behaviour during specific market 
conditions, especially during times of high uncertainty. However, the regression 
goodness-of-fit measures remain relatively low indicating that intervention news
explains a small fraction of overall variability of returns.
44 The “news report” variable is based on a broad interpretation of foreign exchange market 
news. For more information about this variable see Dominguez and Panthaki (2006).
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In order to examine whether intervention news helps to explain the absolute 
value of exchange rate returns, we regress de-seasonalized45 intra-day volatility, 
Vts. , on the same set of explanatory variables:
V£ =  A0 + X J ti + J 2 H  tidK-, + E  + nu (4.2)
k  j  9
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) find that three factors influence intra-daily ex­
change rate volatility: calendar effects and volatility dependencies (both of which 
are captured in the FFF seasonal) and macro surprises, with macro surprises 
providing the least explanatory power. We examine the influence of intervention 
news on volatility and allow for a longer lag structure to test whether the ef­
fects of these (non-scheduled) news reports are longer-lived. We use the Schwarz 
(1978) criteria to fix the leads and lags in the regression specification and correct 
for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term using the 
Newey and West (1987) approach.
Table 4.8 presents our volatility regression results using the same column 
format as we did in Table 4.6. We again find that only Japanese macro surprises 
enter significantly in the USD-EUR regression, providing suggestive evidence that 
scheduled news, perhaps because it is less ambiguous, has extremely short-lived 
(less than 20 minutes) influence on volatility. Actual Japanese interventions now 
only significantly influence USD-GBP volatility. As we found in Table 4.6 all 
the different types of intervention news significantly influence volatility across 
all three currencies46. Statements from the Japanese government that it did
45 It could be that the intra-day seasonal is explained by news arrival. We test for this 
possibility by including our intervention news variables and macro surprises directly in the 
FFF regression and find no evidence of correlation between the daily seasonal and our news 
variables.
46It is also worth noting that the regression goodness-of-fit is dramatically higher, due in part 
to the strong AR component of volatility.
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not intend to intervene generally led to reductions in YEN-USD and USD-GBP 
volatility, but led to increases in USD-EUR volatility Unrequited interventions, 
on the other hand, seem to have generally led to reductions in volatility for all 
three currencies. One way to interpret this result is that market expectations 
of interventions (even if they do not occur) provide a calming influence on the 
market.
4.5 Does Intervention New s Influence Order Flow?
In standard models of exchange rate behaviour when “positive” news arrives for 
a currency, demand for that currency rises, causing the relative value (the price) 
of the currency to rise. In these models there is no reason for order flow to rise 
in reaction to news because price is assumed to instantaneously reflect the news. 
Trading volume may rise in reaction to news, but as long as the new price is 
efficient, there is no reason for these trades to be biased in favor of purchases or 
sales. So that in standard models the arrival of “news” should be orthogonal to 
changes in order flow47.
We use transaction frequency, T F , as a proxy for volume, and first test 
whether the arrival of intervention news in our sample is positively related to 
transaction frequency.
T F tl =  7o +  7 i 4  +  E E + E +  uti (4.3)
k j  9
470 ne view of the relationship between order flow and prices is that it is only a temporary 
phenomenon. Order flow in this context reflects trader “digestion effects” in reaction to news, 
so that once the news is fully “digested”, any order flow induced price effects will revert back. 
Work by Evans and Lyons (2002), Danielsson, Payne, and Luo (2002), however, shows that order 
flow continues to explain changes in foreign exchange returns well after 24 hours, suggesting 
either that digestion is very slow, or more likely, that the influence of order flow on prices is 
not temporary.
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Table 4.9 presents the results of this regression. We find strong evidence of a 
relationship between intervention news (but not actual Japanese interventions 
or macro surprises) and transaction frequency. This suggests that when traders 
learn of interventions news (regardless of whether the news indicates that an in­
tervention is likely or not) this influences their decision about whether to trade 
or not. In some cases the coefficient sign on intervention news is negative sug­
gesting transaction frequency fell in reaction to the news, though the signs on 
intervention news do not indicate any discernible patterns among the different 
sorts of news. While our measures of regression goodness-of-fit in Table 4.9 are 
quite high, this is largely due to the strong autoregressive nature of transaction 
frequency (as documented in Table 4.4).
Under what circumstance might intervention news cause a change not just in 
volume, but in order flow? One reason that price might not immediately (or fully) 
react is if the intervention news either is not common knowledge, or if different 
market participants interpret the news differently. Unrequited intervention oper­
ations are likely to be good examples of news that evoke heterogeneous reactions. 
In this case, order flow might convey this information to the market (rather than 
price). Further, if underlying demand for currencies is driven not by news per se, 
but by changes in risk aversion or hedging technologies, again it might be order 
flow that will convey this information to the market48.
A simple linear regression specification that relates foreign exchange returns
48Four recent papers that have studied the link between “news” and order flow include: Love
(2004), Love and Payne (2003), Melvin and Yin (2000), Evans and Lyons (2003), Dominguez and 
Panthaki (2006). Breedon and Vitale (2004) find that the strong contemporaneous correlation 
between order flow and exchange rates is mostly due to liquidity (and not information) effects.
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to order flow is:
& s ti — A) +  PijOFti-j + X! ^ 2)5Asti_fl +  /ia  (4.4)
J 9
Table 4.10 presents results for a regression of returns on contemporaneous and 
lagged order flow (OF)49. The first thing to note in the table is that our measure 
of regression goodness-of-fit differs significantly across the three currencies. Our 
estimates suggest that order flow explains over 14% of the variation in 20-minute 
USD-GBP returns, 6 % of YEN-USD returns, and only 2.8% of USD-EUR returns. 
These differences are likely due in large part to the fact that the Reuters D2000 
system dominates in the sterling market but only captures a small fraction of 
trades in either the euro or yen markets. The coefficient on contemporaneous 
order flow is positively associated with returns for all three currencies, suggesting 
that the influence of news is not fully captured in price changes and that order 
flow may play a role in the price discovery process.
Our results so far suggest that intervention news influences exchange rate re­
turns, volatility, and transaction frequency and that order flow influences returns. 
The next question to ask is what drives order flow? Previous studies have found 
a link between macro surprises and order flow, which runs counter to standard 
models that would suggest that common knowledge news, such as macro sur­
prises, should be instantly incorporated in price. We test whether this result also 
holds for our data sample, and whether intervention news is also linked to order
49In future work we will also test for interaction effects between order flow and market 
conditions to see whether order flow is more (or less) important in the price discovery process 
when volatility (or news arrival frequency) is higher (or lower) than usual.
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flow, OF.
O F u =  70 +  l i l n  +  J2 E  TvNLt +  E  + «*. (4'5)
k  j  9
Table 4.11 presents results for the regression of order flow on actual Japanese 
interventions, macro surprises, intervention news, and past order flow. The first, 
third and fifth columns provide results for our benchmark specification which 
only includes the actual Japanese interventions and macro surprises. While none 
of the macro surprises are statistically significant, actual Japanese interventions 
enter statistically significantly in both the USD-EUR and YEN-USD specifica­
tions. The results in the second, fourth and sixth columns indicate that actual 
interventions and all the different categories of intervention news significantly in­
fluence order flow. However, the regression goodness of fit never rises above 0.04 
suggesting that order flow is largely not being driven by these variables50. The co­
efficient signs on intervention news generally suggest that actual and threatened 
interventions by the Japanese government led buy orders for dollars to rise rela­
tive to sell orders. Likewise, unrequited interventions by the BOJ led to a relative 
increase in dollar buy orders. A comparison of coefficient magnitudes across the 
different rows in Table 4.11 suggest that actual interventions had almost twice as 
large an influence on order flow as did unrequited interventions.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter examined whether actual and unrequited intervention news influ­
ences exchange rates. Previous studies have found that surprises in scheduled
50This result is at odds with results in Evans and Lyons (2004) which find a strong connection 
between disaggregated order flow and news. It is possible that the difference in results is due 
to the fact that our order flow information is only reflecting inter-dealer trades.
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macro announcements help to explain intra-daily exchange rate behaviour. Like­
wise, official interventions by governments in the foreign exchange market have 
been found to influence intra-day (and daily) returns and volatility. Results in 
this chapter indicate that unrequited intervention news (and even news of “no 
intervention”) has a statistically significant influence on both exchange rate re­
turns and volatility, suggesting that the expectation of intervention, even when 
governments do not intervene, can affect currency values. These results provide 
strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that interventions influence exchange 
rates via the information or signaling channel.
We also examine the role of order flow in exchange rate determination. In 
standard models there is no reason for order flow to rise in reaction to news be­
cause price is assumed to instantaneously adjust. We find evidence that order 
flow has some explanatory power suggesting that prices are, at the very least, 
slow to adjust. At the same time, we find that actual interventions and our vari­
ous categories of intervention news explain a very small fraction of the variation 
in order flow. Overall, our results indicate that along with actual interventions, 
other kinds of intervention news (including denials of intervention and unrequited 
interventions) and order flow matter. We do not find evidence that macro sur­
prises have much influence on returns, volatility or order flow over our sample 
period. These results suggest that future models of exchange rate determination 
ought include a broader conception of price relevant “news”.
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Table 4.1: Broad Categories of Intervention News
(a) Interventions and News
News
Policymaker Reported Not Reported
Threat of Actual 
or Oral Intervention51
Intervention
detected52
Intervention | 
missed j
Threat of No Actual 
or Oral Intervention53
False
intervention54
i
i
(b) Interventions and Market Expectations
Market
Policymaker Expected Not Expected
Threat of Actual 
or Oral Intervention51
Surprise | 
intervention |
Threat of No Actual 
or Oral Intervention53
Unrequited
intervention55
i
i
Notes: The data cover the eight month period from 01 Dec 1999 to 24 July 2000. The 
majority of unrequited interventions are for the ECB, since during this period of time 
the market constantly expected them to step in and shore up the euro but they did not. 
Both the ECB and the BOJ made numerous oral interventions, the former repeatedly 
stating that they would not intervene while the latter consistently assuring markets 
that the BOJ stood ready to step in if necessary.
5138 for the Euro-zone, 134 for Japan out of which there were 4 actual Japanese interventions, 
6 for Joint which includes G7.
52 There were 4 actual interventions conducted by the Bank of Japan and all four were reported 
by Reuters.
5326 for the Euro-zone, 1 for Japan, 1 for UK and 20 for Joint (which includes G7).
54There was one false intervention, when the market thought the ECB and other European 
banks might be intervening but this was denied by the ECB.
552 15 are unrequited actual interventions (Euro-zone: 76, Japan: 91, Joint: 48) and 77 are 
unrequited oral interventions (Euro-zone: 8, Joint: 69).
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Table 4.2: Actual Japanese Interventions
Date
BOJ Intervention 
(in billions of yen) Operation Details
24 December 1999 370.4 Purchase usd
4 January 2000 575.3 Purchase usd
8 March 2000 222.1 Purchase usd and euro56
15 March 2000 846.8 Purchase usd
3 April 2000 1385.4 Purchase usd
Notes: Daily Japanese intervention data are available at:
http: / / www.mof. go.jp/english/feio/e034_133.htm
56The Bank of Japan purchased 150.1 billion usd and 72 billion euro.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Macro News Announcements, 01 Dec 1999 - 24 
July 2000
Announcement
UK Announcements (total =  80)
RPIX
Retail Sales 
Global trade 
Provisional M4 
PPI
Industrial Production 
Unemployment 
Current Account
US Announcements (total =  80)
PPI
CPI
Industrial Production 
Monthly M3
Goods & Services Trade Balance 
Civilian Unemployment Rate 
Nonfarm Payrolls 
Retail Sales
Euro Area Announcements (total =  58) 
PPI
Harmonised CPI 
Ind Production 
M3
Trade ex-EMU prel. EUR 
Unemployment rate
Japanese Announcements (total =  122) 
Current Account
Adjusted Merchandise Trade Balance 
CPI
CPI Tokyo
Crude Oil Imports
Domestic Wholesale Price Index
GDP
Reported as Local time
Y/Y % change 08:30 GMT
M/M % change 08:30 GMT
GBP (billion) 08:30 GMT
M/M % change 08:30 GMT
M/M % change NSA 08:30 GMT
M/M % change 08:30 GMT
thousands 08:30 GMT
GBP (billion) 08:30 GMT
M/M % change 08:30 ET
M/M %  change 08:30 ET
M/M %  change 09:15 ET
change USD (billion) 16:30 ET
USD (billion) 08:30 ET
percent 08:30 ET
thousands 08:30 ET
M/M % change 08:30 ET
M/M %  change 11:00 GMT
M/M %  change 11:00 GMT
3M/3M %  change 11:00 GMT
Y/Y % change 09:00 GMT
EUR (billion) 11:00 GMT
percent 11:00 GMT
YEN (billions) 18:50 GMT
YEN (billions) 18:50 GMT
M/M %  change 18:00 GMT
M/M %  change 15:00 GMT
Y/Y % change 23:30 GMT
18:50 GMT
Q/Q %  change 18:50 GMT
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Table 4.3: Contd.
Announcement Reported as Local time
Housing Starts Y/Y % change 23:00 GMT
Job-to-Applicant Ratio 18:00 GMT
Large Scale Retail Sales Y/Y %  change 18:50 GMT
Machine Orders M/M %  change 0:00 GMT
Merchandise Trade Balance Total YEN (billions) 18:50 GMT
Money Supply Y/Y % change 18:50 GMT
Preliminary Industrial Production M/M % change 18:50 GMT
Tankan Survey Manufacturing 18:50 GMT
Tertiary Industry Index M/M %  change 18:50 GMT
Unemployment Rate percent 18:00 GMT
Vehicle Sales Y/Y % change 0:00 GMT
Workers’ Household Spending Y/Y %  change 17:00 GMT
Notes: M/M% change refers to month-on-month percentage change. 3M/3M% change 
is three month-on-three month percentage change. Y/Y% change is year-on-year per­
centage change. NSA refers to non-seasonally adjusted. 22 GMT is 7am in Japan.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for USD-EUR, USD-GBP and YEN-USD Quotes, 
Returns, Volatility, Order Flow and Transactions, 01 Dec 1999 - 24 July 2000
Mid
Quote
Return Volatility Order
Flow
Order
Flow
Volatility
Transactioi
Frequency
a. USD-EUR
Mean 0.97 0.00 5.55 0.27 1.14 30.36
Variance 0.04 9.99 8.30 13.04 1.73 52.13
Skewness 0.10 -0.13 2.93 0.53 2.04 2.30
Kurtosis 2.87 12.07 14.56 17.62 11.62 11.27
Autocorrelation
lag 1 0.99 0.13 0.47 0.04 0.86 0.85
lag 5 0.98 0.05 0.30 0.02 0.61 0.56
lag 10 0.98 0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.38 0.32
lag 20 0.97 -0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.04
b. USD-GBP
Mean 1.57 -0.03 2.06 0.42 1.07 28.02
Variance 0.05 2.88 2.01 7.88 1.17 41.51
Skewness -0.32 0.00 1.40 0.38 1.39 2.24
Kurtosis 1.83 5.01 7.92 11.40 5.09 9.37
Autocorrelation
lag 1 1.00 0.01 0.36 0.04 0.80 0.79
lag 5 1.00 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.56 0.49
lag 10 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.35 0.27
lag 20 1.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.11
c. YEN-USD
Mean 106.29 0.01 7.01 0.06 0.26 2.83
Variance 2.28 14.06 12.19 2.98 0.36 4.96
Skewness -0.19 0.17 4.23 0.18 1.91 3.30
Kurtosis 3.15 21.82 26.83 20.46 8.45 20.50
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Table 4.4: Contd.
Mid Return Volatility Order Order Transaction 
Quote Flow Flow Frequency
Volatility
Autocorrelation
lag 1 0.98 0.07 0.49 0.15 0.66 0.66
lag 5 0.95 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.47 0.43
lag 10 0.93 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.32 0.27
lag 20 0.91 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.11
Notes: The data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Currencies are defined as the 
number of dollars per foreign currency for the euro and sterling, and number of foreign 
currency per dollar for the yen. The mid quote is calculated as the average of the 
bid and ask quotes. Returns are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid 
quote. Volatility is defined as the absolute return. Order flow is the net of the total 
buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a 
purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR, sterling for USD- 
GBP and dollar for YEN-USD). In each 20-minute period, order flow volatility is the 
standard deviation of order flow, transaction price refers to the last transaction price 
and transaction frequency is the number of actual trades in a that 20-minute period.
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Table 4.5: Contemporaneous Correlations Between Returns, Volatility, Order Flow, Transactions and Reuters News, 01 
Dec 1999 - 24 July 2000
Return Volatility Order
Flow
Order
Flow
Volatility
Transaction
Frequency
Reuters
News
Arrival
a. USD-EUR
Return 1
Volatility -0.011 1 ... ...
Order Flow 0.511 0.011 1 ...
Order Flow Volatility -0.023 0.318 0.022 1
Transaction Frequency -0.015 0.333 0.055 0.956 1
Reuters News 0.006 0.019 0.000 -0.008 -0.007 1
b. USD-GBP
Return 1 ♦ .
Volatility -0.032 1 ...
Order Flow 0.375 0.013 1
Order Flow Volatility -0.024 0.450 0.036 1
Transaction Frequency -0.020 0.403 0.036 0.925 1
Reuters News -0.002 -0.010 -0.004 -0.023 -0.022 1
Table 4.5: Contd.
Return Volatility Order
Flow
Order
Flow
Volatility
Transaction
Frequency
Reuters
News
Arrival
c. YEN-USD 
Return 1
Volatility 0.014 1 .. .
Order Flow 0.224 0.016 1
Order Flow Volatility 0.010 0.226 0.036 1
Transaction Frequency 0.007 0.203 0.028 0.922 1
Reuters News -0.003 -0.008 -0.020 0.003 -0.001 1
Notes: The data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Currencies are defined as the number of dollars per foreign currency for the 
euro and sterling, and number of foreign currency per dollar for the yen. Returns are defined as 100 times the log difference of the 
mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Volatility is defined as the absolute return. 
Order flow is the net of total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of 
the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR, sterling for USD-GBP and dollar for YEN-USD). In each 20-minute period, order 
flow volatility is the standard deviation of order flow, transaction price refers to the last transaction price and transaction frequency 
is the number of actual trades in a that 20-minute period. Reuters News Arrival refers to an indicator variable for measures the 
number of news articles in each 20 minute period.
Table 4.6: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR, USD-GBP and YEN-USD Returns
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark 4- 
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News
Non-News
Constant -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0009
Japanese Intervention 0.0040 0.0043 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0085 -0.0173**
Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.1204*** 0.1117*** 0.0083 0.0063 0.0628 0.0579
lag 2 0.1013*** 0.0946*** 0.0120 0.0103 0.1218*** 0.1174***
Macro Surprises
UK 0.0083 0.0071 0.0013 0.0005 0.0005 0.0000
US -0.0116 -0.0113 0.0025 0.0026 -0.0068 -0.0067
Euro-zone 0.0181 0.0161 0.0026 0.0022 -0.0162 -0.0178
Japan 0.0240** 0.0234** 0.0036 0.0031 -0.0055 -0.0050
Policymaker News
Euro-zone Policy Statement 
lead 2-6 0.0033 0.0014 0.0002
lead 1 -0.0129 0.0010 •«. 0.0220
lag 0 • ♦. 0.0249 «• • -0.0016 0.0521
lag 1 • *. 0.0078 0.0044 0.0192
lag 2-6 0.0058 . . . -0.0014 0.0036
Table 4.6: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent Benchmark + 
Variables Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Euro-zone Intervention
lead 2-6 0.0061 0.0001 0.0075
lead 1 0.0074 -0.0070* -0.0206
lag 0 -0.0058 0.0066 0.0048
lag 1 0.0527*** -0.0027 0.0143
lags 2-6 0.0022 0.0060** -0.0020
Euro-zone No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0155* -0.0043* 0.0135
lead 1 0.0076 -0.0023 0.0269*
lag 0 -0.0126 -0.0083* -0.0180
lag 1 -0.0452* -0.0057 -0.0237
lags 2-6 -0.0024 -0.0024 0.0089
Japan Policy Statement
leads 2o6 -0.0566 -0.0033 0.0097
lead 1 -0.0984* -0.0014 0.0316
lag 0 -0.1018* -0.0112 0.0302
lag 1 0.0447 -0.0057 -0.0259
lag 2to6 0.0001 0.0034 0.0187
Japan Intervention
leada 2-6 0.0075 -0.0003 0.0064
lead 1 0.0007 0.0039 0.0187
lag 0 -0.0027 0.0044* 0.0033
lag 1 0.0019 -0.0011 0.0080
lags 2-6 -0.0047 -0.0005 0.0037
Table 4.6: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Japan No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0344*** 0.0017 0.0163**
lead 1 -0.0818*** -0.0131*** 0.0227
lag 0 -0.1751*** 0.0043 -0.0117
lag 1 -0.1587*** -0.0546*** 0.0290*
lags 2-6 -0.1454*** 0.0080** 0.0221***
UK Policy Statement
leads 2-6 -0.0086*** 0.0047 -0.0366***
lead 1 -0,0350*** 0.0037*** -0.0350***
lag 0 -0.0323*** 0.0291*** -0.0183***
lag 1 -0.0300*** -0.0124*** 0.0005
lags 2-6 0.0031 0.0021 0.0080
UK Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0104 -0.0052 0.0174**
lead 1 -0.0412 -0.0313** -0.0575*
lag 0 -0.0089 0.0081** 0.0989***
lag 1 0.0511 -0.0260* -0.0560*
lags 2-6 0.0291 -0.0058 -0.0302**
UK No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0607 -0.1040***
lead 1 -0.1367*** 0.0048
lag 0 0.0151*** «*« ... -0.1682***
lag 1 -0.1055*** -0.1132***
lags 2-6 0.0162 ... -0.0059
Table 4.6: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Joint Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0015 0.0031 -0.0017
lead 1 -0.0151 -0.0133* -0.0064
lag 0 -0.0073 0.0077 0.0050
lag 1 -0.0069 -0.0124 0.0122
lags 2-6 0.0816* 0.0082* 0.0797
Joint No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0062 0.0024 -0.0135
lead 1 -0.0114 0.0035 -0.0061
lag 0 -0.0225 -0.0005 -0.0245
lag 1 0.0041 -0.0017 0.0199
lags 2-6 -0.0014 0.0032 -0.0134
Markets’ Expectations News
Euro-zone Intervention Rumour
leads 2-6 -0.0094 -0.0028 -0.0354
lead 1 0.0254 -0.0022 0.0697*
lag 0 -0.0440 -0.0156 0.0096
lag 1 0.0180 -0.0224 -0.0123
lags 2-6 0.0327 0.0083 0.0208
Euro-zone Intervention Not Expected
leads 2-6 -0.0122 0.0091** 0.0058
lead 1 0.0076 -0.0037 -0.0207
lag 0 -0.0337* 0.0099 -0.0684***
lag 1 -0.0142 -0.0131 -0.0007
lags 2-6 -0.0111 0.0043 -0.0107
Table 4.6: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent Benchmark + Benchmark -f Benchmark +
Variables Benchmark Reuters News Benchmark Reuters News Benchmark Reuters News
Japan Intervention Rumour
leads 2-6 0.0087 -0.0125** -0.0962
lead 1 0.0152 0.0379*** -0.1883**
lag 0 0.1357** 0.0247 -0.0980
lag 1 -0.0343 0.0114 -0.1078
lags 2-6 -0.0107 -0.0079 -0.0145
Joint Intervention Rumour
leads 2-6 0.0094 -0.0033 0.0121
lead 1 -0.0008 0.0067 -0.0013
lag 0 0.0781* 0.0169** 0.0213
lag 1 -0.0126 -0.0026 0.0518
lags 2-6 0.0047 -0.0018 0.0116
Joint Intervention Not Expected
leads 2-6 -0.0304 -0.0012 0.0291
lead 1 -0.0031 0.0115 -0.0540
lag 0 -0.0274 -0.0188*** -0.0031
lag 1 0.0514* 0.0173 0.0488
lags 2-6 -0.0735** -0.0038 0.0031
Policymaker and Market News
ECB Denies Euro Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0083 •.. •.. 0.0398
lead 1 0.0596* -0.0584*
lag 0 0.0712** • .. . • • -0.2236***
lag 1 -0.1363*** -0.3227***
lags 2-6 0.0151 ... -0.0319
Table 4.6: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Market Detects Japan Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0061 -0.0003 0.0060
lead 1 0.0027 0.0102 -0.0361
lag 0 -0.0174 -0.0186*** 0.0335
lag 1 0.0236 0.0014 0.0077
lags 2-6 -0.0027 -0.0006 -0.0010
Unrequited Interventions News 
Euro-zone Actual Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0059 0.0007 -0.0026
lead 1 -0.0037 0.0025 -0.0117
lag 0 0.0147 -0.0007 0.0077
lag 1 -0.0115 0.0106** 0.0067
lags 2-6 -0.0061 -0.0055*** -0.0039
Euro-zone Oral Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0207* -0.0026 0.0313**
lead 1 -0.0332 -0.0138** 0.0159
lag 0 -0.0033 -0.0013 0.0078
lag 1 -0.0278 -0.0088 0.0076
lags 2-6 -0.0143 -0.0062 -0.0018
Japan Actual Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0030
lead 1 0.0166 0.0015 -0.0132
lag 0 0.0111 -0.0031 0.0254*
lag 1 0.0062 -0.0007 -0.0153
lags 2-6 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0070
Table 4.6: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Joint Actual Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0118 0.0028 -0.0081
lead 1 0.0006 -0.0045 -0.0115
lag 0 -0.0265 -0.0069 0.0013
lag 1 0.0086 0.0046 -0.0157
lags 2-6 0.0020 0.0023 -0.0026
Joint Oral Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0037 -0.0004 -0.0182**
lead 1 0.0028 0.0012 -0.0043
lag 0 -0.0098 -0.0024 -0.0199*
lag 1 0.0014 0.0033 -0.0204**
lags 2-6 0.0089 -0.0001 -0.0135
Adj R 2 0.0279 0.0319 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0195 0.0181
F  — t e s t 59,99*** 4.35*** 0.7106 0.9404*** 41.45*** 2.85***
Notes: Returns and order flow are calculated at 20 minute frequency. Returns are defined as 100 times the log difference of the 
mid quote. The mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Order flow is the net of total buys and total sells, 
where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR, 
sterling for USD-GBP and US dollar for YEN-USD). *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively and 
“...” indicates that the coefficient is insignificant.
Table 4.7: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR, USD-GBP and YEN-USD Returns in “High Volatility” and “High News 
Arrival” Periods
Independent
Variables
“High Volatility” High News Arrival”
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Non-News
Constant -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0010
Japanese Intervention 0.0039 0.0001 -0.0141* 0.0038 0.0013 -0.0179**
Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.0734*** 0.0109 0.0490 0.1054*** 0.0096 0.0556
lag 2 0.0729*** 0.0091 0.1083*** 0.0879*** 0.0090 0.1168***
Macro Surprises
UK 0.0067 0.0017 0.0020 0.0067 0.0010 0.0003
US -0.0103 0.0024 0.0088 -0.0107 0.0026 -0.0065
Euro-zone -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0162 0.0148 0.0026 -0.0166
Japan 0.0227** 0.0031 -0.0052 0.0231** 0.0031 -0.0044
Policymakers News
Euro-zone Policy Statement
leads 2-6 -0.0058 0.0035* -0.0110 0.0057 0.0011 -0.0016
lead 1 -0.0006 -0.0041 0.0139 -0.0118 -0.0015 0.0211
lag 0 0.0260 0.0035 0.0309 0.0383* -0.0024 0.0591*
lag 1 0.0087 0.0055 0.0230 0.0129 0.0032 0.0196
lags 2-6 0.0111 -0.0003 -0.0082 0.0057 0.0004 0.0056
Table 4.7: Contd.
Independent “High Volatilityr” (cHigh News Arrival”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Euro-zone Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0030 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0063 0.0001 0.0103
lead 1 -0.0027 -0.0043 0.0048 0.0029 -0.0045 -0.0146
lag 0 -0.0223* 0.0085* -0.0094 -0.0050 0.0066 -0.0024
lag 1 0.0161 0.0022 -0.0120 0.0506*** 0.0015 0.0220
lags 2-6 0.0031 0.0062*** 0.0003 0.0039 0.0049* -0.0092
Euro-zone No Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0001 -0.0057*** -0.0033 -0.0204** -0.0058** 0.0154
lead 1 0.0030 -0.0035 0.0145 0.0108 0.0018 0.0133
lag 0 0.0066 -0.0098** -0.0058 -0.0387 -0.0104* -0.0247
lag 1 -0.0196 -0.0100** -0.0115 -0.0425* -0.0086 -0.0322*
lags 2-6 -0.0126** -0.0017 0.0046 -0.0066 -0.0032 0.0166**
Japan Policy Statement
leads 2-6 0.0139 0.0014 0.0069 -0.0515 -0.0026 0.0259*
lead 1 -0.0328 -0.0047 0.0278 -0.1013* -0.0014 0.0301
lag 0 -0.0410** -0.0038 0.0141 -0.0708*** -0.0117 0.0093
lag 1 -0.0034 -0.0065 -0.0392 0.0424 -0.0064 -0.0275
lags 2-6 -0.0026 0.0042 0.0180* 0.0002 0.0033 0.0114
Japan Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0005 0.0002 0.0026 0.0073 -0.0005 0.0067
lead 1 -0.0010 0.0042 0.0092 0.0019 0.0035 0.0192
lag 0 0.0071 0.0036 0.0051 0.0004 0.0059* 0.0156
lag 1 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0017 0.0054 -0.0003 0.0078
lags 2-6 -0.0040 -0.0009 -0.0034 -0.0040 0.0001 0.0065
Table 4.7: Contd.
Independent “High Volatility” “High News Arrival”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Japan No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0322*** 0.0030 0.0156*** -0.0290** 0.0143* 0.0192**
lead 1 -0.0680*** -0.0128*** 0.0266** -0.0889*** -0.0136*** 0.0230
lag 0 -0.1684*** 0.0037 0.0070 -0.1700*** 0.0105** 0.0115
lag 1 -0.1704*** -0.0548*** 0.0233* -0.1505*** -0.0555*** 0.0230
lags 2-6 -0.1572*** 0.0066* 0.0228*** -0.1496*** 0.0083** 0.0218***
UK Policy Statement
leads 2-6 -0.0085*** 0.0047 -0.0370*** -0.0086*** 0.0047 -0.0367***
lead 1 -0.0354*** 0.0039*** -0.0359*** -0.0350*** 0.0038*** -0.0353***
lag 0 -0.0336*** 0.0290*** -0.0201*** -0.0325*** 0.0290*** -0.0185***
lag 1 -0.0319*** -0.0125*** -0.0004 -0.0304*** -0.0125*** 0.0004
lags 2-6 0.0037 0.0021 0.0082 0.0032 0.0021 0.0080
UK Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0171 -0.0117*** 0.0168*** 0.0113 -0.0056 0.0196**
lead 1 -0.0373 -0.0288*** -0.0746*** -0.0459*** -0.0291* -0.1236***
lag 0 -0.0135 0.0076** 0.1383*** 0.0624*** 0.0238*** 0.0001
lag 1 0.0664** -0.0253* -0.0962*** 0.0912* -0.0216 0.0093
lags 2-6 -0.0220*** -0.0060 0.0170 0.0273 -0.0061 -0.0333**
UK No Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0075 0.1121*** -0.0619 -0.1043***
lead 1 -0.1331*** 0.0016 -0.1356*** 0.0049
lag 0 0.0106*** -0.1672*** 0.0144*** -0.1682***
lag 1 -0.1077*** -0.1152*** -0.1062*** -0.1136***
lags 2-6 0.0145 -0.0075 0.0159 -0.0061
Table 4.7: Contd.
Independent
Variables
i‘High Volatilityr » U High News Arrival”
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Joint Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0083 -0.0051 0.0148 -0.0130 0.0012 0.0020
lead 1 -0.0030 -0.0138* -0.0111 -0.0007 -0.0143* -0.0157
lag 0 0.0036 0.0089 -0.0066 -0.0221 0.0123 -0.0098
lag 1 -0.0061 -0.0092 0.0062 0.0092 -0.0115 0.0019
lags 2-6 0.0368 0.0005 0.0026 0.0694* 0.0121** 0.0838
Joint No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0144** 0.0020 0.0109 -0.0022 0.0019 -0.0137
lead 1 0.0096 0.0040 -0.0088 -0.0086 0.0061 -0.0077
lag 0 -0.0065 -0.0028 -0.0296* -0.0154 -0.0067 -0.0364
lag 1 -0.0024 -0.0047 -0.0124 0.0171 0.0024 0.0200
lags 2-6 0.0117 0.0034 -0.0106 -0.0069 0.0020 -0.0165
Markets’ Expectations News
Euro-zone Intervention Rumour
leads 2-6 0.0064 -0.0022 -0.0276 -0.0062 -0.0038 -0.0370
lead 1 -0.0497* -0.0053 0.0565 0.0208 -0.0099 0.0423
lag 0 -0.0279 -0.0026 0.0517* -0.0353 -0.0177 0.0342
lag 1 -0.0253 -0.0198 -0.0294 0.0200 -0.0331** -0.0287
lags 2-6 -0.0080 0.0043 0.0092 0.0440* 0.0057 -0.0079
Euro-zone Intervention Not Expected
leads 2-6 0.0051 0.0129*** 0.0156 -0.0167 0.0079 0.0003
lead 1 0.0056 -0.0015 -0.0233 0.0020 -0.0045 -0.0099
lag 0 -0.0341* 0.0088 -0.0503** -0.0501** 0.0096 -0.0567**
lag 1 0.0012 -0.0104 -0.0070 -0.0158 -0.0048 0.0008
lags 2-6 -0.0141** 0.0045 -0.0034 -0.0126 0.0036 -0.0067
Table 4.7: Contd.
Independent
Variables
“High Volatility” High News Arrival”
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Japan Intervention Rumour
leads 2-6 -0.0092 -0.0113 -0.0498* 0.0124 -0.0164** -0.1084*
lead 1 0.0235 0.0286** -0.1370 0.0102 0.0387*** -0.1893**
lag 0 0.0666*** 0.0213 0.0602 0.1201* 0.0252 -0.0859
lag 1 -0.0138 0.0108 -0.0393 -0.0131 0.0110 -0.1141
lags 2-o6 -0.0071 -0.0112 0.0001 -0.0114 -0.0050 -0.0098
Joint Intervention Rumour
leads 2-6 -0.0076 -0.0012 -0.0073 0.0069 -0.0030 0.0181
lead 1 -0.0358 0.0047 0.0035 -0.0222 0.0064 0.0031
lag 0 -0.0040 0.0181** 0.0251 0.0656 0.0221*** 0.0557**
lag 1 -0.0444* -0.0062 0.0432 -0.0254 -0.0054 0.0625*
lags 2-6 -0.0100 -0.0016 0.0145 -0.0045 -0.0041 0.0111
Joint Intervention Not Expected
leads 2-6 0.0076 0.0097* -0.0024 -0.0330 -0.0005 0.0303
lead 1 0.0240 0.0118 -0.0736 0.0053 0.0143 -0.0829
lag 0 0.0067 -0.0192*** -0.0206 -0.0063 -0.0217*** 0.0019
lag 1 0.0707*** 0.0056 0.0229 0.0688*** 0.0198 0.0354
lags 2-6 -0.0448*** -0.0067 0.0243 -0.0619** -0.0050 0.0005
Policymaker and Market News
ECB Denies Euro Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0080 -0.0060 -0.0093 0.0238
lead 1 0.0746** -0.0755*** 0.1224*** -0.0786
lag 0 0.1041*** -0.0130 0,1087** -0.2348***
lag 1 -0.1172*** -0.0834*** -0.1374*** -0.3098***
lags 2-6 0.0149 -0.0055 0.0043 0.0140
Table 4.7: Contd.
Independent “High Volatilityr” UHigh News Arrival”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Market Detects Japan Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0064 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0064 -0.0008 0.0088
lead 1 0.0124 0.0040 -0.0367 0.0066 0.0137* -0.0575**
lag 0 -0.0156* -0.0177*** 0.0260 -0.0209 -0.0178*** 0.0348
lag 1 -0.0014 0.0016 0.0054 0.0290 0.0022 0.0053
lags 2-6 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0061 -0.0021 0.0039
Unrequited Interventions News 
Euro-zone Actual Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0021 -0.0012 -0.0013 0.0050 0.0010 -0.0012
lead 1 0.0013 0.0035 -0.0061 0.0012 0.0041 -0.0108
lag 0 0.0083 -0.0013 -0.0092 0.0193 0.0003 -0.0059
lag 1 -0.0086 0.0091** 0.0121 -0.0129 0.0115** 0.0069
lags 2-6 0.0035 -0.0037** -0.0040 -0.0059 -0.0052*** -0.0045
Euro-zone Oral Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0149 -0.0020 0.0282* 0.0189 -0.0022 0.0358**
lead 1 0.0063 -0.0133** 0.0243 -0.0177 -0.0137** -0.0058
lag 0 -0.0012 -0.0056 -0.0008 -0.0088 -0.0083 0.0051
lagl -0.0129 -0.0093 -0.0069 -0.0171 -0.0068 -0.0060
lags 2-6 0.0019 -0.0087** 0.0113 -0.0204 -0.0049 0.0141
Japan Actual Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0014 -0.0004 0.0012 -0.0015 0.0006 -0.0059
lead 1 0.0020 0.0006 -0.0107 0.0192* 0.0013 -0.0134
lag 0 -0.0006 -0.0020 0.0139 0.0100 -0.0047 0.0208
lag 1 0.0087 -0.0001 -0.0024 -0.0044 -0.0005 -0.0121
lags 2-6 0.0007 0.0011 -0.0033 0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0083
Table 4.7: Contd.
Independent “High Volatility UHigh News Arrival”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Joint Actual Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0102 0.0020 -0.0076 -0.0099 0.0030 -0.0095
lead 1 0.0146 -0.0037 -0.0132 0.0081 -0.0050 -0.0105
lag 0 0.0065 -0.0071* -0.0015 -0.0103 -0.0114*** -0.0216
lag 1 0.0330*** 0.0060 -0.0265* 0.0115 0.0046 -0.0194
lags 2-6 0.0063 0.0009 -0.0088 0.0084 0.0028 -0.0049
Joint Oral Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0068 -0.0003 -0.0204**
lead 1 0.0030 0.0020 0.0033 -0.0022 0.0017 0.0009
lag 0 -0.0034 -0.0031 -0.0107 -0.0087 -0.0055* -0.0184**
lag 1 0.0049 0.0033 -0.0069 -0.0060 0.0026 -0.0162*
lags 2-6 0.0068 0.0008 -0.0060 0.0115* 0.0001 -0.0128
Interaction Terms
Policymakers News
Euro-zone Policy Statement
leads 2-6 0.0460 -0.0257 -0.0152 -0.0508 0.0120 0.0598*
lag 0 -0.0692*** 0.5920***
Euro-zone Intervention
lag 0 0.6590*** -0.0752*** 0.3748
lags 2-6 0.0341 0.0355*** -0.1882 0.0131 0.0084 0.0369
Euro-zone No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.4246*** -0.0126 0.4780 0.0183 0.0009 -0.0043
lag 0 -0.0913 -0.0094 -0.0745*** 0.2252*
lag 1 -0.5365*** 0.0633*** 0.0093 -0.0026 0.1644*
lags 2-6 0,1675 -0.0226 -0.2045 0.0474* -0.0009 -0.0434
Table 4.7: Contd.
Independent “High Volatility «■High News Arrival”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Japan Policy Statement
leads 2-6 -0.7931** -0.0771*** -0.1839 -0.0024 -0.0051 -0.1548*
lag 0 -1.2279*** 0.1557**
lags 2-6 -0.0205 -0.4013* 0.0384 0.0042 0.0506
Japan Intervention
lag 0 -0.1864 0.0660** -0.2116
Japan No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0323 -0.0370*** -0.0358
UK Intervention
lead 1 0.0099 -0.0240 -0.0171 0.2562***
lags 2-6 0.4954*** 0 0 4 9 6 *** -0.2391 -0.2354*** -0.0207
UK No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.3665*** -0.5452***
Joint No Intervention
leads 2-6 0.1629 0.0040 -0.5760*** -0.0507 0.0108 0.0286
lag 1 0.0711*** 0.5392* -0.2478*** -0.0614*** -0.0011
Markets’ Expectations News
Euro-zone Intervention Rumour
lead 1 -0.2329 -0.0285 0.0348* 0.3240***
lags 2-6 0.3090 0.2225*** -0.0665 -0.0694 0.0228 0.1981
Euro-zone Intervention Not Expected
leads 2-6 -0.1810 -0.0839 0.0622 0.0042 -0.0726*
lags 2-6 -0.2306*** 0.0475 0.0222 0.0015 -0.0163
Table 4.7: Contd.
Independent “High Volatility1►5 U High News Arrival”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Japan Intervention Rumour
leads 2-6 0.2751 -0.0324 0.0282** 0.0306
lag 0 -0.0165 -0.7890**
Joint Intervention Rumour
lag 0 0.8920* 2.1248***
lag 1 0.0701 -0.3106** 0.0908*** 0.0672
Joint Intervention Not Expected
leads 2-6 -0.7495*** -0.0934***
lag 1 0.0618***
lags 2-6 0.0485 0.0083 -0.3099** -0.1239 -0.0301
Policymaker and Market News
ECB Denies Euro Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.1407 0.2355*
lag 0 -0.8464***
lags 2-6 0.0416 -0.1821**
Market Detects Japan Intervention
lead 1 0.0414 0.2157 -0.0108 -0.0238 0.1713**
lag 0 0.9206**
lag 1 0.7832*** 0.2937 -0.0123 0.0004 0.0157
lags 2-6 -0.3726*** -0.0127 -0.1390 0.0167* 0.0078** -0.0209
Unrequited Interventions News
Euro-zone Actual Intervention
lags 2-6 -0.0942 -0.0734*** 0.0323 -0.0148 -0.0035 0.0145
Joint Actual Intervention
lag 1 -0.1910 0.0228 0.0399*** 0.0209
Table 4.7: Contd.
Independent “High Volatility.5) C(High News Arrival”
Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Joint Oral Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0237 0.0128 -0.0358 -0.0657 0.0058 0.0721***
lag 0 -0.2838 -0.2899*** -1.4061***
lag 1 0.1844 0.1784*** 0.4144*** 0.3584*** -0.0105 -0.1439*
lags 2-6 0.0865 -0.0360*** 0.2534 -0.0317 0.0032 -0.0147
Adj R 2 0.0364 0.0217 0.0623 -0.0007 -0.0011 0.0171
F  — t e s t 8.99*** 2 4 2 *** 5.48*** 3.5159*** 0.9387 2.16***
Notes: Returns are calculated at 20 minute frequency and are defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the 
mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively and “...” indicates that the coefficient is insignificant.
Table 4.8: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR, USD-GBP and YEN-USD Volatility
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News
Non-News
Constant -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002
Japanese Intervention -0.0012 0.0014 0.0017 0.0029* -0.0001 0.0028
Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.3195*** 0.3129*** 0 2 2 0 8 *** 0.2181*** 0.4385*** 0.4338***
lag 2 0.1237*** 0.1193*** 0.1336*** 0.1315*** 0.0323 0.0300
lag 3 0.1037*** 0.1015*** 0.0945*** 0.0934*** 0.0594*** 0.0574***
lag 4 0.0794*** 0.0792*** 0.0869*** 0.0883*** 0.0275* 0.0298*
lag 5 0.0466*** 0.0479*** 0.0811*** 0.0832*** 0.0206 0.0214*
lag 6 0.0468*** 0.0500*** 0.0654*** 0.0665*** 0.0456*** 0.0468***
Macro Surprises
UK -0.0078 -0.0070 0.0011 0.0009 -0.0036 -0.0041
US 0.0079 0.0080 -0.0027 -0.0024 0.0168 0.0176
Euro-zone 0.0042 0.0029 -0.0040 -0.0034 -0.0047 -0.0058
Japan 0.0167* 0.0168** 0.0018 0.0017 0.0030 0.0029
Policymakers News
Euro-zone Policy Statement 
leads 2-6 -0.0102 -0.0013 0.0275
lead 1 0.0043 0.0066 -0.0264
lag 0 -0.0035 -0.0025 ... 0.0073
lag 1 • *. -0.0178 -0.0037* -0.0280
lags 2-6 ... 0.0049 ... 0.0038** ... -0.0076
Table 4.8: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent Benchmark + 
Variables Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Euro-zone Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0051 0.0001 0.0105
lead 1 -0.0150 -0.0055** -0.0309
lag 0 -0.0043 0.0029 0.0045
lag 1 0.0238* -0.0002 0.0001
lags 2-6 -0.0095** -0.0005 -0.0056
Euro-zone No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0090
lead 1 -0.0115 -0.0026 -0.0033
lag 0 -0.0069 -0.0045 0.0021
lag 1 -0.0048 -0.0015 -0.0023
lags 2-6 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0071
Japan Policy Statement
leads 2-6 0.0140 0.0033 -0.0122
lead 1 0.0243 -0.0080** 0.0235
lag 0 -0.0007 0.0098* -0.0469**
lag 1 -0.0418 -0.0110*** -0.0066
lags 2-6 -0.0245 0.0000 -0.0013
Japan Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0062**
lead 1 -0.0188*** -0.0001 0.0016
lag 0 0.0061 -0.0020 -0.0084
lag 1 -0.0023 0.0011 0.0108
lags 2-6 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0003
Table 4.8: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Japan No Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0200** -0.0090*** -0.0241***
lead 1 0.0137 -0.0084*** -0.0181
lag 0 0.1217*** -0.0149*** -0.0281***
lag 1 0.0793*** 0.0468*** -0.0217**
lags 2-6 0.0599*** -0.0087*** -0.0130***
UK Policy Statement
leads 2-6 -0.0059*** -0.0004 0.0190**
lead 1 0.0211*** -0.0180*** -0.0519***
lag 0 0.0121*** 0.0124*** -0.0202***
lag 1 0.0068*** -0.0046*** -0.0498***
lags 2-6 0.0074 0.0009 0.0431**
UK Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0130* 0.0096*** 0.0054
lead 1 -0.0291*** 0.0003 0.0203*
lag 0 0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0088
lag 1 0.0123 -0.0096 -0.0495***
lags 2-6 0.0346 0.0089** 0.0405***
UK No Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0559* 0.1079***
lead 1 0.0466*** -0.0972***
lag 0 -0.1052*** 0.0532***
lag 1 0.0634*** -0.0170**
lags 2-6 -0.0107 -0.0174
Table 4.8: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Joint Intervention
leads 2-6 0.0102 -0.0044 -0.0056
lead 1 0.0133 -0.0010 -0.0158
lag 0 0.0033 -0.0064 -0.0148
lag 1 0.0201 -0.0004 -0.0328*
lags 2-6 0.0086 0.0104 0.0638
Joint No Intervention
leads 2-6 -0.0058 0.0026 0.0145
lead 1 0.0218 0.0024 -0.0089
lag 0 -0.0071 0.0043 -0.0074
lag 1 0.0099 0.0015 -0.0018
lags 2-6 0.0040 -0.0007 -0.0150*
Markets’ Expectations News
Euro-zone Intervention Rumour
leads 2-6 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0046
lead 1 0.0645** -0.0044 0.0066
lag 0 -0.0329 0.0083 -0.0226
lag 1 0.0176 -0.0051 0.0234
lags 2-6 0.0327 0.0027 0.0718**
Euro-zone Intervention Not Expected
leads 2-6 0.0095 0 .0 0 0 0 -0.0048
lead 1 -0.0170 0.0050 0.0031
lag 0 -0.0166 -0.0076* -0.0083
lag 1 0.0137 -0.0016 0.0295
lags 2-6 -0.0062 0.0010 -0.0166*
Table 4.8: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent Benchmark +  
Variables Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Japan Intervention Rumour
leads 2 -6 -0.0025 0.0023 0.0548
lead 1 -0 .0 1 1 0 0.0204* 0.1116**
lag 0 0.0441 0.0023 0.0344
lag 1 -0.0475 0.0135* 0.0126
lags 2 -6 -0.0026 -0 .0 0 2 1 0.0149
Joint Intervention Rumour
leads 2 -6 -0.0283* -0.0005 0.0125
lead 1 -0.0068 -0.0032 0.0099
lag 0 -0.0075 -0.0038 -0.0249
lag 1 -0 .0 0 0 2 0.0068 0.0344
lags 2 -6 0.0281* 0.0009 -0.0151
Joint Intervention Not Expected
leads 2 -6 -0.0214 0.0008 -0.0443***
lead 1 -0.0217 0.0080* 0.0676
lag 0 -0.0168 -0.0029 -0.0308
lag 1 0.0081 0 .0 0 0 2 -0.0070
lags 2 -6 -0.0017 -0 .0 0 1 1 0.0182
Policymaker and Market News 
ECB Denies Euro Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.0240 -0.1171***
lead 1 -0.0118 -0.0176
lag 0 0.0270 0.2109***
lag 1 0.0037 0 .2 0 1 1 ***
lags 2 -6 0 .0 2 2 2 0.0248*
Table 4.8: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Market Detects Japan Intervention
leads 2 -6 0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0006
lead 1 0.0038 0.0070* 0.0146
lag 0 -0.0241*** -0.0018 0 .0 0 0 2
lag 1 0.0154 -0.0064*** -0 .0 1 1 0
lags 2 -6 -0.0014 -0 .0 0 1 2 -0.0023
Unrequited Interventions News 
Euro-zone Actual Intervention
leads 2 -6 0.0018 0.0007 -0.0026
lead 1 -0.0088 0.0004 0.0114
lag 0 0.0104 -0.0005 0 .0 0 1 0
lag 1 -0.0066 0.0043* -0.0231***
lags 2 -6 0.0038 -0.0003 0 .0 0 2 2
Euro-zone Oral Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.0074 -0.0018 -0 .0 1 1 2
lead 1 -0.0289* -0.0006 0.0140
lag 0 0 .0 2 0 0 -0.0069* -0.0204*
lag 1 -0.0258 0.0027 -0.0319**
lags 2 -6 -0.0176 -0 .0 0 2 0 -0.0043
Japan Actual Intervention
leads 2 -6 0.0008 -0.0013 0.0066
lead 1 0.0131* 0 .0 0 2 1 -0.0095
lag 0 0.0023 -0 .0 0 0 2 0.0115
lag 1 0.0099 -0 .0 0 0 2 0.0044
lags 2 -6 -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0056
Table 4.8: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News
Joint Actual Intervention
leads 2 -6 0.0089 -0.0027* -0.0069
lead 1 -0.0033 -0 .0 0 1 1 -0.0042
lag 0 0.0060 0.0008 0.0047
lag 1 0.0030 -0.0035 -0.0169*
lags 2 -6 -0.0152** 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0
Joint Oral Intervention
leads 2 -6 0.0176*** 0.0005 0.0065
lead 1 0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0094
lag 0 0.0076 0.0016 0.0079
lag 1 -0.0057 -0.0015 -0.0075
lags 2 -6 -0.0030 -0 .0 0 1 0 0.0109
Adj R 2 0.2900 0.2911 0.2134 0.2133 0.2542 0.2548
F - t e s t  503.15*** 41.37*** 291.44*** 26.25*** 414.39*** 34.17***
Notes: Volatility is calculated at 20 minute frequency and is defined as the absolute return where returns are calculated as 100 
times the log difference of the mid quote. The mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively and “...” indicates that the coefficient is insignificant.
Table 4.9: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR, USD-GBP and YEN-USD Transaction Frequency
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News
Non-News
Constant -0.1191 -0.1669 -0.1348 -0.0463 0.0254 0.0237
Japanese Intervention 0 .1 1 1 1 1.4011 0.2837 2.2116 -0.1479 -0.0967
Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.7757*** 0.7700*** 0.6105*** 0.6056*** 0.4561*** 0.4529***
lag 2 0.0427 0.0435 0.1427*** 0.1406*** 0.1610*** 0.1638***
lag 3 0.0516** 0.0535** 0.1141*** 0.1150*** 0.0807*** 0.0778***
lag 4 0.0286 0.0302 0.0026 0.0041 0.0472*** 0.0464***
lag 5 0.0006 0 .0 0 2 2 -0.0092 -0.0079 0.0411** 0.0433**
lag 6 -0 .0 2 0 0 -0.0228 -0.0104 -0.0104 0.0190 0.0184
Macro Surprises
UK -0.7110 -0.4008 -1.8893 -1.8783 0.6009 0.6338
US -3.2545 -3.1218 -8.3139 -7.6455 -0.1151 -0.0838
Euro-zone 5.0453 4.4099 2.9518 4.0523 0.1497 0.1080
Japan 1.2370 1.2266 3.3537 3.3480 0.0493 0.0598
Policymakers News 
Euro-zone Policy Statement 
leads 2 -6 -1.0823 -3.5747** 0.9078**
lead 1 -3.8739 1.4189 -1.0977
lag 0 1.0178 -2.4579 -1.2081
lag 1 -2.8044 5.5219 -0.2763
lags 2 -6 5.9955 1.1216 0.5240
Table 4.9: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent Benchmark + 
Variables Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Euro-zone Intervention
leads 2 -6 0.5831 2.4328 0.1188
lead 1 -5.5056 -0.1535 -0.7075
lag 0 -2.0409 0.6084 -0.4569
lag 1 2.0008 -1.4992 1.2223
lags 2 -6 -2.7741 -2.8091 -0.1643
Euro-zone No Intervention
leads 2 -6 -2.6902 -2.4982 -0.1493
lead 1 1.7784 -1.1041 -0.2471
lag 0 -2.4048 -1.2829 0.0895
lag 1 0.3803 -2.4438 -0.0165
lags 2 -6 0.3336 0.6201 0.1139
Japan Policy Statement
leads 2 -6 -9.8919 2.5937 0.1264
lead 1 -1.9381 -11.8245*** -0.8506
lag 0 7.7966 -2.2490 -1.2707***
lag 1 -5.9042 -4.0775** -1.3386***
lags 2 -6 -0.2155 -0.0261 -0.0308
Japan Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.1411 -1.0660 -0.0261
lead 1 -2.7364 1.4473 0.3461
lag 0 -2.3994 -2.4012* -0.1276
lag 1 -1.9540 -0.9994 0.1948
lags 2 -6 0.4534 -1.1900 -0.0935
Table 4.9: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Benchmark 4 - 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Japan No Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.0824 -3.8608*** -0.6175***
lead 1 -0.8786 -2.9270 -0.2838
lag 0 -4.9613* -5.4316** -0.0030
lag 1 -1.2251 5.5040* -0.5991
lags 2 -6 -1.2942 -5.1247*** 0.9473**
UK Policy Statement
leads 2 -6 0.0753 5.7916* 1.1470***
lead 1 -1.9180*** -24.0771*** -5.4239***
lag 0 -1.3735*** -10.4315*** 1.2127***
lag 1 -1.4509*** -6.4750*** -0.6482***
lags 2 -6 0.2833 2.1236*** 0.0696
UK Intervention
leads 2 -6 2.1577 5.9899 -0.3962*
lead 1 -12.4467** -18.1542* 1.6275**
lag 0 -0.4054 0.2144 -3.0208***
lag 1 12.2095 9.1821*** 0.3601
lags 2 -6 19.7575 22.9598** 0.7077*
UK No Intervention
leads 2 -6 16.1599 7.7523***
lead 1 59.1926*** -15.5949***
lag 0 -34.1638*** 0.3743
lag 1 16.5015*** 3.7740***
lags 2 -6 4.6558 1.0486
Table 4.9: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Joint Intervention
leads 2 -6 -8.1347*** -2.1731 0.1036
lead 1 -2.4003 -6.6085 0.7630
lag 0 -4.7618 -1.1574 -0.1263
lag 1 2.8660 1.0669 -0.3590
lags 2 -6 -7.5746** -2.9022 0.2961
Joint No Intervention
leads 2 -6 1.5683 0.3500 0.5197
lead 1 0.7957 8.5668* -1.3226**
lag 0 -2.9739 5.7461 0.5940
lag 1 -2.4368 3.1022 -1.3561
lags 2 -6 0.0877 -1.3477 -0.6475***
Markets’ Expectations News
Euro-zone Intervention Rumour
leads 2 -6 3.0919 -7.0001 1.0068
lead 1 2.2644 -11.9918 0.6641
lag 0 -14.9089** 7.3302 -0.7211
lag 1 -11.0659 20.9957* -1.6429
lags 2 -6 20.6951** 13.6894 0.8342
Euro-zone Intervention Not Expected
leads 2 -6 6.3587 1.5525 0.0359
lead 1 -10.8800 -5.6801 -1.7589*
lag 0 -10.3835* -7.1485 1.6553
lag 1 0.1824 -2.4088 -0.5777
lags 2 -6 -2.8829 0.2545 -0.7046*
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Table 4.9: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark 4 - 
Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark 4- 
Benchmark Reuters News
Japan Intervention Rumour
leads 2 -6 -33.5305 11.1123 1.1799
lead 1 -5.4654 -13.5491* -2.0552
lag 0 -12.4225 -13.7972** -0.7157
lag 1 -5.9700 -1.7792 -2.0647**
lags 2 -6 -4.1077 -5.1590 0.4320
Joint Intervention Rumour
leads 2 -6 -2.7537 0.8994 0.2306
lead 1 1.9300 -2.9782 1.9195
lag 0 -3.1121 -4.3300 -0.7594
lag 1 8.5803 8.0125 -1.1988
lags 2 -6 -0.8401 -1.8870 -0.4259
Joint Intervention Not Expected
leads 2 -6 0.8656 -2.2587 -1.6031***
lead 1 -4.3529 18.4291* 5.4832*
lag 0 14.4336 -5.4565 1.6213
lag 1 -6.0109 12.6291* 1.6776
lags 2 -6 5.4311 10.4574 0.7324
Policymaker and Market News 
ECB Denies Euro Intervention
leads 2 -6 -5.1443 -2.6839**
lead 1 6.0032 -1.4297
lag 0 -25.5413*** 9.6255***
lag 1 -4.8274 -1.6589*
lags 2 -6 10.0206* 1.6004
Table 4.9: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News
Benchmark -f 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Market Detects Japan Intervention
leads 2 -6 -1.2566 -1.5004 -0.0438
lead 1 0.6017 -4.2591** -0.4087
lag 0 0.7568 -2.0461* -0.3876
lag 1 1.1870 -2.3036 -0.1975
lags 2 -6 -1.4051 -0.6249 0.1616
Unrequited Interventions News 
Euro-zone Actual Intervention
leads 2 -6 1.7551 1.0524 0.0287
lead 1 1.0349 4.9853 0.3895
lag 0 7.9300** -2.8856 0.7296
lag 1 4.4938 -0.0094 -0.3628
lags 2 -6 -0.1858 0 .0 0 0 0 0.0075
Euro-zone Oral Intervention
leads 2 -6 -1.8132 -3.0198* -0.3193
lead 1 -6.0245 -0.0842 0.4627
lag 0 -0.7910 0.0349 0.1940
lag 1 4.7574 -8.8983* -1.0147
lags 2 -6 -5.1974 -1.6680 -0.4344
Japan Actual Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.4777 -0.2984 0 .0 0 1 0
lead 1 4.7189 0.6937 -0.3291
lag 0 2.8580 2.6335 -0.2412
lag 1 0.7294 1.9979 0.4409
lags 2 -6 0.2977 -0.1580 -0.0063
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Table 4.9: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Joint Actual Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.6855 -0.0271 -0.4368**
lead 1 0.0774 -0.5229 -0.2539
lag 0 1.6138 1.9670 0.1465
lag 1 -3.7833* -4.8069 0.5747
lags 2 -6 -0.1704 1.0529 -0.0252
Joint Oral Intervention
leads 2 -6 1.4115 0.0753 0.2731
lead 1 -2.1958 -1.7508 -1.0830***
lag 0 0.2604 -0.3129 0.4856
lag 1 -4.5715** -3.8372** -0.3765
lags 2 -6 1.1432 0.2452 0.0927
Adj R 2 0.7444 0 .0 0 0 0 0.6534 0.6527 0.4815 0 .0 0 0 0
F  — t e s t 3580.2*** 287.68*** 2019.2*** 175.88*** 1127.3*** 91.77***
Notes: Transaction frequency is calculated as the number of transactions in any given 20 minute period. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively and “...” indicates that the coefficient is insignificant.
Table 4.10: The Influence of Order Flow on USD-EUR, USD-GBP and YEN-USD
Returns
Return on Order Flow
Independent Variables USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Non-News
Constant -0.0007 -0.0008*** -0.0004
Lagged Dependent Variable
lag 1 0.1675*** 0.0219 0.0569
lag 2 0.1092*** 0.0279** 0.1166***
Order Flow
lag 0 0.0039*** 0.0014*** 0.0104***
lagl -0 .0 0 1 0 *** -0 .0 0 0 2 *** -0.0008
lags 2 -6 0 .0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 -0.0003**
Adj t i 1 0.0279 0.1429 0.0677
F  — t e s t 1309.9*** 447.60*** 221.48***
Notes: Returns and order flow are calculated at 20 minute frequency. Returns are 
defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote. The mid quote is calculated 
as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Order flow is the net of total buys and total 
sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of 
the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR, sterling for USD-GBP and US dollar 
for YEN-USD). *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
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Table 4.11: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR, USD-GBP and YEN-USD Order Flow
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News Benchmark
Benchmark +  
Reuters News
Non-News
Constant
Japanese Intervention 
Dependent Variable 
lag 1 
lag 2
0.2080*
1.6459**
0.0394**
-0.0207
0.2235*
2.0492**
0.0372**
-0.0243
0.3731***
0.7717
0.0409**
0.0080
0.4199***
1,1083*
0.0375**
0.0039
0.0630**
-0.3475***
0.1443***
0.0444**
0.0952***
-0.3851***
0.1398***
0.0435**
Macro Surprises 
UK 
US
Euro-zone
Japan
3.0878
-0.3649
2.1182
-0.6084
2.9353
-0.2769
1.8108
-0.7647
2.8361
1.7786
-0.8635
1.1375
2.6467
1.7572
-1.2158
0.9545
-0.6851
-0.3065
-0.5097
0.0033
-0.7558
-0.3002
-0.5574
-0.0266
Policymakers News 
Euro-zone Policy Statement
leads 2 -6 0.2426 0.8825 0.2407
lead 1 0.0935 -0.0843 0.5711
lag 0 5.6901** -0.7996 -0.9097
lag 1 0.4000 1.3558 0.6017
lags 2 -6 -0.6265 -0.0357 -0.7437*
Euro-zone Intervention
leads 2 -6 0.9496 -0.4779 -0.0160
lead 1 2.0617 -2.1921 -0.3057
lag 0 -3.2170 -0.0664 -0.0374
lag 1 4.8435** -3.3023** 0.3898
lags 2 -6 1.0745 1.2720 0.5332**
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Table 4.11: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent Benchmark + 
Variables Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Euro-zone No Intervention
leads 2 -6 -1.5923 -0.3487 0.2904
lead 1 -0.8517 -1.1820 -0.7690
lag 0 0.8086 0.6501 0.2747
lag 1 -1.8882 0.7387 -0.4789
lags 2 -6 -1.5967 -1.2097* 0.0707
Japan Policy Statement
leads 2 -6 2.2553 0.7651 -0.2557
lead 1 -2.3174 2.2733 -0.3551
lag 0 -6.2474 -0.3496 -0.2199
lag 1 1.7836 -0.7399 -0.4314
lags 2 -6 -1.3052 -0.2940 0.2550
Japan Intervention
leads 2 -6 0.0478 -0.0872 -0.0344
lead 1 -0.7477 -0.1227 0.2077
lag 0 1.3768 0.7259 0.2058
lag 1 0.2616 -0.9076 0.4525*
lags 2 -6 -0.4249 -0.6331** -0.1367
Japan No Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.1969 1.8581** 0.0401
lead 1 -5.4053*** -0.4401 -0.3494
lag 0 -0.4208 -0.9131 0.0613
lag 1 0.5683 -13.3560*** 0.2706
lags 2 -6 0.0951 0.5585 0.4769*
Table 4.11: Contd.
Independent
Variables
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
UK Policy Statement
leads 2 -6 0.3714** -2.6370** -2.2069***
lead 1 -0.2607** 4.1237*** 0.6722***
lag 0 -0.1992 0.4884* -3.9647***
lag 1 -0.2235* 2.5270*** -2.5359***
lags 2 -6 -1 .0 2 1 2 * 1.8993** -0.3932
UK Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.5071 -3.3257*** 0.8210***
lead 1 4.6147 -5.5302 1.6616**
lag 0 -12.4332 5.7917 -0.7453
lag 1 10.3757 -11.7637 2.2342**
lags 2 -6 5.2592 -0.9037 -1.1879**
UK No Intervention
leads 2 -6 -22.3954** -2.7476**
lead 1 -38.6217*** -1.2196***
lag 0 11.4225*** -4.1294***
lag 1 -27.5438*** -2.4924***
lags 2 -6 4.1392 -3.4954**
Joint Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.5599 0.4197 0.3466
lead 1 0.9095 1.5596 -0.7916
lag 0 0.0134 0.7063 1.1777
lag 1 -2.4532 3.2671 -0.0959
lags 2 -6 -0.5542 -0.8474 0.5245
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Table 4.11: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark + 
Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark 4 - 
Benchmark Reuters News
Joint No Intervention
leads 2 -6 -1.0040 1.4740 0.0048
lead 1 2.1191 -2,2228 -0.1883
lag 0 -2.2471 1.9865 -1.1493
lag 1 1.4976 -1.5539 -0.5847*
lags 2 -6 0.3612 2.2740*** -0.0838
Markets’ Expectations News 
Euro-zone Intervention Rumour
leads 2 -6 1.2052 -1.2717 0.1124
lead 1 3.3579 1.1801 1.1792
lag 0 -12.9361* 3.9654 3.6847**
lag 1 -3.5211 -1.5121 -0.1748
lags 2 -6 7.9182** 1.0447 0.3852
Euro-zone Intervention Not Expected 
leads 2-6 ... -3.3163* 0.6598 0.1163
lead 1 1.6053 -3.1539 -0.7862
lag 0 -4.5707 1.8284 -1.8090**
lag 1 1.9184 -7.7603** -0.1629
lags 2 -6 0.5770 2.0654* 0.0393
Japan Intervention Rumour
leads 2 -6 -0.0990 1.9614 0.4158
lead 1 -1.4992 13.1025* -0.3570
lag 0 2.7281 10.4908** 0.0872
lag 1 -1.9650 -2.0319 0.3600
lags 2 -6 0.6277 1.8386 -0.9601**
Table 4.11: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent Benchmark + 
Variables Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Joint Intervention Rumour
leads 2 -6 0.4839 -2.0999 0.3357
lead 1 0.7862 1.2380 0.8790
lag 0 3.5766 3.6004 -1.5897
lag 1 -6.5737 2.5833 -0.8238
lags 2 -6 -1.2034 1.0242 -0.9270***
Joint Intervention Not Expected
leads 2 -6 -6.8488 0.4649 -0.6168
lead 1 -3.7064 -1.8376 -2.7690
lag 0 -9.5704 -2.6581 2.5971
lag 1 8.8355** 1.3359 2.5695
lags 2 -6 -3.6728 3.1124* -0.7601
Policymaker and Market News 
ECB Denies Euro Intervention
leads 2 -6 -3.3153 -0.9361
lead 1 16.9509*** , , ,  M, -0.1789
lag 0 -1.5291 , , ,  , , , -7.0859*
lag 1 -9.5598* -3.0197**
lags 2 -6 0.6507 -1.7189**
Market Detects Japan Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.6607 -0.0018 -0.0976
lead 1 0.4429 0.7762 -0.5286*
lag 0 -1.4686* -1.4194* 0.3591
lag 1 -1.6056 0.4822 0.0141
lags 2 -6 -0.7906 -0.1216 0.0114
Table 4.11: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Unrequited Interventions News 
Euro-zone Actual Intervention
leads 2 -6 0.6585 0.4050 -0.3107*
lead 1 -0.2408 0.1546 0.3588
lag 0 3.3120 -1.6748 -0.4065
lag 1 -1.0034 1.5304 0 .2 1 2 0
lags 2 -6 -1.2116 -1.1465 -0.3368
Euro-zone Oral Intervention
leads 2 -6 2.3432 0.7649 0.3613
lead 1 -4.8194 0.4384 1.5196
lag 0 -2.8450 0.8576 0.7968
lag 1 -0.8370 3.3824 0.3776
lags 2 -6 -3.4705* -0.2042 0.2204
Japan Actual Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.3527 -0.4489 -0.2061*
lead 1 2.9203* -0.0385 -0.1983
lag 0 0.6967 -1.8323* -0.0199
lag 1 -0.4155 0.6857 -0.2292
lags 2 -6 -0.0636 0.4792 0.1099
Joint Actual Intervention
leads 2 -6 -0.0959 1.0503* -0.0721
lead 1 -2.4456 -1.3736 -0.2883
lag 0 -1.5986 -1.3222 0.6100
lag 1 3.7832** 0.0354 0.6241*
lags 2 -6 -0.0117 0.0536 0.2473*
Table 4.11: Contd.
USD-EUR USD-GBP YEN-USD
Independent
Variables
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark +  
Benchmark Reuters News
Benchmark + 
Benchmark Reuters News
Joint Actual Intervention 
leads 2 -6 0.4744 -0.2017 0.0434
lead 1 -0.1610 -0.4029 -0.0313
lag 0 -0.3285 -0.5013 -0.4511
lag 1 0.7773 -0.1139 -0.2455
lags 2 -6 0.9341 -0.4104 0.1266
Adj R 2 0.0023 0 .0 0 2 2 0.0023 0.0027 0.0252 0.0271
F  — t e s t 5.91** 1.23* 5.36** 1.27** 53.34*** 2  g***
Notes: Order flow is calculated at 20 minute frequency. It is the net of total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to a 
trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR, sterling for USD-GBP and US 
dollar for YEN-USD). *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively and “...” indicates that the coefficient 
is insignificant. For each regressor the sum of leads 2-6, lead 1, lag 0, lag 1 and the sum of lags 2-6 were included in the regression.
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Figure 4.1: Japanese Interventions and the YEN-USD Exchange Rate, 1990-2002
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Figure 4.2: Reuters D2000-2 Bid, Ask and Mid Quotes, 01 Dec 1999 - 24 July 
2000
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Notes: Currencies are defined as the number of dollars per foreign currency for the euro 
and sterling, and number of foreign currency per dollar for the yen. The mid quote is 
calculated as the average of the bid and ask quotes.
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Figure 4.3: Total Buys, Total Sells and Order Flow, 01 Dec 1999 - 24 July 2000
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Notes: Order flow is the net of total buys and total sells, where a buy (sell) refers to  
a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the denominator currency (euro 
for USD-EUR, sterling for USD-G BP and dollar for YEN-USD).
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Figure 4.4: Exchange Rate Returns and Volatility, 01 Dec 1999 - 24 July 2000
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Notes: The data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Currencies are defined as the 
number of dollars per foreign currency for the euro and sterling, and number of foreign 
currency per dollar for the yen. Returns are defined as 100 times the log difference 
of the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the average of the bid and ask 
quotes. Volatility is defined as the absolute return.
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Figure 4.5: Average Daily USD-GBP Returns, Order Flow and News Arrival, 01
Dec 1999 - 24 July 2000
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Notes: The data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Currencies are defined as the 
number of dollars per foreign currency for the euro and sterling, and number of foreign 
currency per dollar for the yen. The figures plot the average intra-daily pattern of 
returns, order flow and news arrival over a 24-hour period. Returns are calculated as 
100 times the log difference of the mid quote where the mid quote is calculated as the  
average of the bid and ask quotes. Order flow is the net of total buys and total sells, 
where a buy (sell) refers to a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of the 
denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR and sterling for U SD-G BP). News Arrival is 
an indicator variable for the number of Reuters news articles in each 20 minute period.
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Figure 4.6: Average Daily Volatility and the FFF Seasonal (in basis points), 01
Dec 1999 - 24 July 2000
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Notes: The data are sampled at 20-minute frequency. Currencies are defined as the 
number of dollars per foreign currency for the euro and sterling, and number of foreign 
currency per dollar for the yen. The figures plot the average intra-daily pattern of 
volatility (jagged line) and the Flexible Fourier Form seasonal (sm ooth line) over a 24- 
hour period. Volatility is defined as the absolute return, where returns are calculated 
as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote. The mid quote is calculated as the 
average of the bid and ask quotes.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis contributes to and extends the literature by analysing the effect of 
different types of information on order flow, high frequency exchange rate returns 
and volatility.
The first chapter conducted an event study using the CHF-USD exchange rate 
and SNB interventions to study the relationship between various characteristics of 
interventions and the volatility of the exchange rate. Additionally, using Reuters 
reports, it studies the impact of the news of these interventions on volatility. The 
data set contains information on the size, direction, frequency and timing of the 
intervention, making it unique in many ways. The analysis was conducted using 
four different measures of volatility - absolute returns, squared returns, one hour 
realised volatility based on absolute returns and one hour realised volatility based 
on squared returns. The results vary depending on which measure is used but 
there are some general conclusions that can be drawn. With this rich data set it 
has been possible to identify that interventions decrease volatility contempora­
neously but this effect is reversed in the two hours afterward, a result that is in 
line with previous empirical work in the area. Further, the direction of the inter­
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vention does not seem to affect volatility. Buy and sell interventions have similar 
effects on volatility and the same is true for against-the-wind and with-the-wind 
interventions.
Additionally, a lagged size effect of intervention is identified, but whether 
this effect is positive or negative depends on the volatility measure used. It 
is positive for both the absolute return based volatility measures, which would 
support the idea that large interventions calm markets. On the other hand, 
for realised volatility based on squared returns there is no effect at all while 
for the squared return measure the effect is positive. Further analysis of the 
volatility and intervention size relationship finds that as we move from small to 
large interventions, the larger interventions tend to increase volatility relative to 
small interventions which is counter intuitive. A possible explanation for this 
could be that the market interprets larger intervention quantities as indication 
that the central bank is trying to push the exchange rate unsuccessfully, and this 
negative signal leads to higher volatility.
The frequency of interventions has a small but positive impact on volatility, 
underscored further when the analysis is done by splitting the sample into low, 
average and high frequency interventions. The interaction between intervention 
size and intervention frequency results in a small positive effect on volatility for 
the squared return measure and the absolute return measure. This implies that 
for a given intervention size, the higher the frequency of intervention, the higher 
the volatility. For both the realised volatility measures this effect is negative 
indicating that for a given intervention size or intervention frequency, the higher 
the other characteristic the lower the volatility. Therefore the SNB’s intervention 
strategy of small but frequent interventions would be supported by the results 
that are based on the realised volatility measures.
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The effect of the timing of the intervention varies with the volatility measure, 
but clearly is a significant component of the central bank’s intervention strategy. 
After controlling for joint interventions with the Fed and the Buba, I find that for 
the two realised volatility measures 9am interventions reduce volatility while for 
the other two measures the significant coefficients have an overall positive effect 
increasing volatility. 2pm interventions decrease volatility for both the squared 
return measures but increase volatility for both the absolute return measures.
Overall, Reuters reports of interventions do not appear to affect exchange 
rate volatility. This result appears to be driven by reports of buy interventions 
since reports of sell interventions have a lagged negative impact on volatility. 
However, explicit testing of the difference of these impacts indicates that they 
are insignificant. Further, testing the impact of Reuters reports in the presence of 
actual interventions I find that Reuters reports have a small but significant and 
lagged negative effect on volatility for the squared return measure and both the 
absolute return measures. This overall effect is driven entirely by reports of sell 
interventions since reports of buy interventions are insignificant in the presence 
of buy intervention itself.
In the second chapter we examined the role of news in exchange rate deter­
mination using Reuters’ newswire reports and high frequency data on the USD- 
EUR and USD-GBP exchange rates from the Reuters’ D2000-2 electronic trading 
system. Previous studies have found that surprises in scheduled macro announce­
ments help to explain intra-daily exchange rate behavior. We measure news much 
more broadly, including both fundamentals-related and non-fundamentals-related 
time-stamped Reuters news reports to examine whether it is macro announce­
ments, or simply intra-daily data (and a more “narrow window”), that accounts 
for these positive results. Overall, our results do not suggest that our broader
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definition of news provides a vast improvement over the macro surprises in ex­
plaining exchange rate behavior, giving yet more credence to the importance of 
macro variables in standard models. We do, however, find that non-scheduled 
news, and intriguingly, non-scheduled non-fundamentals-related news has a sta­
tistically significant influence on both intra-day exchange rate returns and volatil­
ity. Further, we find that news has its largest impact during periods of higher 
than normal news arrival and higher market uncertainty.
We also examine the role of order flow in exchange rate determination. In 
standard models there is no reason for order flow to rise in reaction to news 
because price is assumed to instantaneously adjust. Trading volume may rise in 
reaction to news, but as long as the new price is efficient, there is no reason for 
trades to be biased in favor of purchases or sales. We find that order flow explains 
a large fraction of the variation in both USD-EUR and USD-GBP exchange rate 
returns, suggesting that prices are, at the very least, slow to adjust. At the same 
time, we find that our measure of “news” explains a relatively small fraction of 
the total variation in order flow. Overall, our results indicate that along with 
the standard fundamentals, both non-fundamentals-related news and order flow 
matter, suggesting that future models of exchange rate determination ought to 
include all three types of explanatory variables.
The last chapter analysed whether actual and unrequited intervention news 
influences exchange rates. Previous studies have found that official interventions 
by governments in the foreign exchange market influence intra-day (and daily) 
returns and volatility. Results in this paper indicate that unrequited intervention 
news (and even news of “no intervention”) has a statistically significant influence 
on both exchange rate returns and volatility, suggesting that the expectation of 
intervention, even when governments do not intervene, can affect currency values.
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These results provide strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that interventions 
influence exchange rates via the information or signaling channel.
Further, we find evidence that order flow has some explanatory power for ex­
change rate returns. However, at the same time, we find that actual interventions 
and our various categories of intervention news explain a very small fraction of 
the variation in order flow. Overall, our results indicate that along with actual 
interventions, other kinds of intervention news (including denials of intervention 
and unrequited interventions) and order flow matter. We do not find evidence 
that macro surprises have much influence on returns, volatility or order flow over 
our sample period.
The results from these studies suggest that future models of exchange rate 
determination ought to include a broader conception of price relevant “news” , 
while giving yet more credence to the importance of macro variables in these 
models.
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Table A.l: The Influence of “News” on USD-EUR Returns and Order Flow: A 
VAR Model
Independent
Variables
Benchmark Benchmark -(-Reuters News
Return Order Flow Return Order Flow
Non-News
Constant 0.0017 -0.0962 0.0010 -0.0743
Return
lag 1 0.3582*** 1.3101 0.3459*** 1.1430
lag 2 0.1788*** 0.1643**
Order Flow
lag 0 0.0041*** 0.0042***
lag 1 -0.0019*** 0.0221 -0.0018*** 0.0020
lag 2 -0.0006** 0.0068 -0.0005* -0.0136
Macro Surprises
UK -0.0101 5.0274 -0.0147 5.7477
US -0.0277 -5.2604 -0.0294 -4.7663
Euro-zone 0.0338* -14.3703*** 0.0395 -8.1814***
Fundamentals
Monetary
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.0084 -1.0791
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0129 -4.6559**
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0305*** -0.2344
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0059 -0.4899
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0024 -2.0145*
US leads 2-6 -0.0102* 0.1796
US lead 1 -0.0044 0.4414
US lag 0 0.0160** -0.8204
US lag 1 -0.0036 -0.8439
US lags 2-6 0.0008 1.1213**
Other Asset Markets
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.0023 0.7519
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0160 8.4874***
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0104 2.5912
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0086 -2.2406
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0072 -2.6507*
US leads 2-6 0.0037 -0.9658
US lead 1 -0.0049 0.7425
US lag 0 -0.0125 -0.3583
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Table A.l: Contd.
Independent Benchmark Benchmark -[-Reuters News
Variables Return Order Flow Return Order Flow
US lag 1 -0.0045 0.9636
US lags 2-6 -0.0015 -0.8800
Japan leads 2-6 0.0095 -0.0814
Japan lead 1 0.0689** -8.5058***
Japan lag 0 0.0004 -1.7482
Japan lag 1 0.0249 3.3829
Japan lags 2-6 0.0144 3.0938
Fiscal
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0025 0.4461
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0113 -6.1151*
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0177 -1.6637
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0040 -2.2044
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0073 1.1606
US leads 2-6 0.0039 -3.6388*
US lead 1 -0.0326 5.0813
US lag 0 -0.0126 -5.6661
US lag 1 0.0034 3.6566
US lags 2-6 -0.0058 -4.2576
Exchange Rate Policy
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0016 0.7563
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0045 2.2718*
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0085 -0.2313
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0105 0.3313
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0015 0.3730
US leads 2-6 0.0290 1.2358
US lead 1 -0.0130 -14.9526
US lag 0 -0.0214 10.4919
US lag 1 -0.0157 -5.9246
US lags 2-6 0.0200 -6.7035*
Japan leads 2-6 -0.0049 0.6127
Japan lead 1 0.0219 -1.5432
Japan lag 0 0.0293* 1.4404
Japan lag 1 -0.0190 -1.8030
Japan lags 2-6 0.0166 -0.6215
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Table A.l: Contd.
Independent Benchmark Benchmark -l-Reuters News
Variables Return Order Flow Return Order Flow
Actual Intervention
Japan leads 2-6 0.0030 -2.0271
Japan lead 1 0.0119 7.4136
Japan lag 0 -0.0475** 1.2369
Japan lag 1 0.0212 1.2510
Japan lags 2-6 -0.0065 1.3283
Other Macro
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0070* 0.3599
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0057 1.1424
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0123 0.4687
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0013 3.3193
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0029 0.9345
US leads 2-6 0.0006 -1.4605
US lead 1 -0.0054 -1.7089
US lag 0 0.0006 -1.2609
US lag 1 -0.0202** -1.4458
US lags 2-6 -0.0008 -0.4373
Japan leads 2-6 0.0050 0.0990
Japan lead 1 -0.0301 -5.5000
Japan lag 0 0.0227 -0.8689
Japan lag 1 -0.0313 -10.8247
Japan lags 2-6 0.0065 -3.2790
N on-Fundamentals 
Options Market
leads 2-6 0.0055 -2.0109*
lead 1 -0.0118** 3.6691**
lag 0 -0.0057 2.1169
lag 1 -0.0130* -1.1340
lags 2-6 0.0016 1.9008*
Technical Analysis
leads 2-6 0.0112 -0.5570
lead 1 0.0008 0.4721
lag 0 -0.0058 -1.2684
lag 1 -0.0118 1.5752
lags 2-6
“■ rvrv*r
-0.0022 -1.1207*
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Table A.l: Contd.
Independent Benchmark Benchmark -[-Reuters News
Variables Return Order Flow Return Order Flow
Sentiment
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0012 1.9952
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0192 3.7682
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0012 5.2044
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0245 -2.1541
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0039 4.4245**
US leads 2-6 0.0087 8.2858***
US lead 1 -0.0380** 18.0051***
US lag 0 0.0108 -1.8307
US lag 1 -0.0743*** 13.0514***
US lags 2-6 0.0072 0.1633
Private Sector
leads 2-6 0.0004 -0.4880
lead 1 -0.0006 -2.7580
lag 0 -0.0036 -1.1938
lag 1 0.0044 1.0452
lags 2-6 -0.0025 0.2699
Politics
leads 2-6 0.0077 3.3985*
lead 1 -0.0060 -1.1605
lag 0 -0.0499** 0.9199
lag 1 0.0433 -5.8070**
lags 2-6 0.0060 -1.6747
Adj R 2 0.3926 0.0018 0.3785 0.0200
F  — t e s t 278.03*** 9.27*** 18.04*** 1.59***
Notes: Returns and order flow arei calculated at 20 minute frequency. Returns are
defined as 100 times the log difference of the mid quote .The mid quote is calculated  
as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Order flow is the net o f total buys and total 
sells, where a buy (sell) refers to  a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) 
of the denominator currency (euro for USD-EUR ). *, ** and *** represent significance 
at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
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Table A.2: The Influence of “News” on USD-GBP Returns and Order Flow: A
VAR Model
Independent
Variables
Benchmark Benchmark -(-Reuters News
Return Order Flow Return Order Flow
Non-News
Constant -0.0020*** 0.6698*** -0.0017** 0.6051***
Return
lag 1 -0.0506 -20.0019*** -0.0706** -20.8298***
lag 2 0.0380 0.0222
Order Flow
lag 0 0.0028*** 0.0028***
lag 1 -0.0003* 0.0946** -0.0003 0.0838*
lag 2 -0.0002 0.0515* -0.0002 0.0313
Macro Surprises
UK 0.0168* 4.6876 0.0195* 5.1041
US -0.0184 -3.1246 -0.0201 -2.9920
Euro-zone -0.0515*** 2.0898 -0.0395*** 5.7900
Monetary
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0034 0.6135
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0003 -3.1164***
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0098 0.4872
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0179* -4.0717***
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0062 -1.2827
US leads 2-6 -0.0030 -0.2047
US lead 1 -0.0005 0.8677
US lag 0 0.0125** 0.0279
US lag 1 -0.0045 1.4418*
US lags 2-6 -0.0029 0.1465
Other Asset Markets
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0020 -1.4182**
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0194** 0.2162
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0050 -1.9617
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0072 0.4866
Euro-zone lags 2-6 -0.0028 0.5554
US leads 2-6 -0.0037 -0.0836
US lead 1 -0.0089 1.8597*
US lag 0 -0.0108* -0.1105
US lag 1 0.0031 0.1144
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Table A. 2: Contd.
Independent Benchmark Benchmark -(-Reuters News
Variables Return Order Flow Return Order Flow
US lags 2-6 0.0015 -0.5809
Japan leads 2-6 0.0066 0.6622
Japan lead 1 -0.0007 -1.3717
Japan lag 0 -0.0038 1.2016
Japan lag 1 0.0081 -1.7746
Japan lags 2-6 0.0053 -0.6891
Fiscal
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.0020 -0.4322
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0076 -1.0020
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0122 2.6589
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0016 -2.8042
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0008 -1.1038
US leads 2-6 0.0018 -0.9108
US lead 1 0.0208* 0.8346
US lag 0 -0.0086 -1.1735
US lag 1 -0.0064 6.3639**
US lags 2-6 -0.0184** -1.8804
Exchange Rate Policy
Euro-zone leads 2-6 0.0008 -0.2765
Euro-zone lead 1 -0.0069* 1.2496*
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0023 -2.2964**
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0047 0.9328
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0005 0.9969**
US leads 2-6 0.0091 5.1061***
US lead 1 0.0106 -2.5427
US lag 0 -0.0053 2.9542
US lag 1 -0.0170 -4.2673
US lags 2-6 0.0040 -3.9449**
Japan leads 2-6 0.0022 0.4737
Japan lead 1 -0.0029 0.2613
Japan lag 0 0.0041 0.1106
Japan lag 1 -0.0116* -0.4721
Japan lags 2-6 0.0049** -0.7589*
Actual Intervention
Japan leads 2-6 -0.0092** -1.0261*
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Table A.2: Contd.
Independent Benchmark Benchmark +Reuters News
Variables Return Order Flow Return Order Flow
Japan lead 1 0.0322** 2.5535
Japan lag 0 0.0062 0.5593
Japan lag 1 0.0037 -0.5178
Japan lags 2-6 -0.0029 -0.4907
Other Macro
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0010 0.1616
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0038 0.2698
Euro-zone lag 0 0.0100* 0.4621
Euro-zone lag 1 0.0063 2.4618**
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0013 0.6684
US leads 2-6 -0.0018 0.0531
US lead 1 0.0068* -0.7845
US lag 0 -0.0017 0.4053
US lag 1 -0.0034 -0.2447
US lags 2-6 -0.0024 -0.3051
Japan leads 2-6 0.005 1.6024
Japan lead 1 -0.0348** -0.8739
Japan lag 0 -0.0124 -1.2328
Japan lag 1 -0.0085 -6.7247
Japan lags 2-6 -0.0020 1.9949
Non-Fundamentals 
Options Market
leads 2-6 -0.0002 -2.0209***
lead 1 -0.0013 1.2625*
lag 0 -0.0034 0.0442
lag 1 0.0022 -2.0562
lags 2-6 0.0095** 0.4567
Technical Analysis
leads 2-6 0.0037 0.1490
lead 1 -0.0086 0.1370
lag 0 -0.0114 -1.4763
lag 1 -0.0001 -0.4729
lags 2-6 -0.0020 0.3156
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Table A. 2: Contd.
Independent Benchmark Benchmark -bReuters News
Variables Return Order Flow Return Order Flow
Sentiment
Euro-zone leads 2-6 -0.0030 -0.0295
Euro-zone lead 1 0.0009 2.0491
Euro-zone lag 0 -0.0089 3.3249
Euro-zone lag 1 -0.0013 1.8110
Euro-zone lags 2-6 0.0145* 3.0085
US leads 2-6 0.0367*** 2.8369*
US lead 1 0.0397** 5.1246*
US lag 0 -0.0115 -1.7072
US lag 1 0.0005 0.5496
US lags 2-6 -0.0161* 2.7729
Private Sector
leads 2-6 0.0010 0.3894
lead 1 -0.0032 -0.9397
lag 0 -0.0031 0.1356
lag 1 0.0024 0.2909
lags 2-6 -0.0037** -0.7539*
Politics
leads 2-6 0.0085 0.0708
lead 1 0.0279** -0.4620
lag 0 -0.0057 -1.5963
lag 1 0.0052 -4.3907*
lags 2-6 0.0044 -0.3170
Adj R 2 0.2628 0.0139 0.268 0.022
F  — t e s t 155.12*** 9.72*** 11.36*** 1.66***
Notes: Returns and order flow are calculated at 20 minute frequency. Returns are
defined as 100 tim es the log difference of the mid quote .The mid quote is calculated  
as the average of the bid and ask quotes. Order flow is the net of total buys and total 
sells, where a buy (sell) refers to  a trade in which the initiator is a purchaser (seller) of 
the denominator currency (sterling for U SD -G B P). *, ** and *** represent significance 
at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
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